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THE CONTEXT, PROPERTIES, AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
NONCONSENSUAL ARBITRATION:
A STUDY OF FOUR SYSTEMS
John R. Allison*
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict knows little of the boundaries of culture, class, geography, or subject
matter. Disputation is, and always has been, a worldwide phenomenon. In the
United States, especially in modern times, we have shown a notable inclination to
employ formal adjudication systems to resolve our disputes rather than techniques
such as conciliation, community opprobrium, or informal adjudication that have
been more prevalent in some other cultures and in our own culture at earlier
times.1 Our dependence on formal litigation models for conflict resolution can be
attributed plausibly to a variety of complex factors. 2 Although it is true that
many observers today characterize modern litigation and administrative adjudica-
tion as encumbered by inordinate cost, delay, and user frustration, one can find
widely divergent opinions as to whether societal dependence on formal adjudica-
tion has been the chief culprit.3 These perceived problems may be traceable to
* The Spence Centennial Professor of Business Administration, and Director, Center for Legal
and Regulatory Studies, University of Texas at Austin; J.D., Baylor University, 1972.
1. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983) (tracing the use of informal conflict
resolution models in this country from colonial beginnings); McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation,
94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985) (discussing various dispute resolution models, many of which are founded
on religious values, having the primary objective of reconciling relationships); Nader, Disputing
Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1000 (1979) (observing that traditional nonadjudicative
methods for redressing grievances, such as holding up the wrongdoer to community opprobrium, have
come to be little used as means of social control as society has become more complex and diffuse);
Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 122 (1976) (discussing Japan's longstanding
and successful system of family conciliation tribunals).
2. Some cite the competitiveness derived from capitalism and from the recentness of our frontier
heritage as driving forces behind the extensive use of formal adjudication. See, e.g., F. KELLOR,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITs HISTORY, FUNCTIONS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS 6-7 (1948). Others refer to
the fact that much of the cost of formal adjudication is external, i.e., not borne by the parties but rather
by the public support of the judicial system as possibly leading to a degree of use that is excessive
when viewed from a social policy perspective. See Calvani, Langenfeld & Shuford, Attorney
Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41 VAND. L. REV. 761, 778 & n.97 (1988).
3. Compare Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 & n.2 (1975)
(documenting spiraling litigation activity and projecting, at then-current rates, a million cases per year
in courts of appeals by the early 21st century); Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals
of Civil Justice: Jurisdiction Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893, 895-97 (tracing
development of the view that there is an institutional crisis in the American civil justice system); Levin
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the very foundation of our traditional dispute resolution models, the adversary
system itself.4 On the other hand, the adversary system may provide more social
benefits than costs, and the problems of delay, expense, and frustration that are
often ascribed to the process today may simply highlight the need for refinements
in a fundamentally sound institution.
There also is sharp disagreement about whether our heavy use of formal
adjudication and the commitment of very substantial resources to it represent a
serious social problem.6 Although it is true that the volume of formal adjudica-
tion in both courts and administrative agencies has grown markedly in the past two
or three decades, one can argue plausibly that the American system of adjustin
conflicting interests has more of a qualitative problem than a quantitative one.
Given the size, heterogeneity, and complexity of our society, as well as the value
we place on protecting rights, it is not unreasonable to view high-volume use of
& Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 222-23 (1985) (demonstrating
that legal expenses are consuming an increasing portion of the nation's GNP); Manning, Hyperlexis:
Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 767 (1977) (observing with alarm the dramatic increases in
court filings, backlogs, and processing times) with Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage
of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV.
1808, 1817-20 (1986) (arguing that the chorus of complaints about a litigation explosion is not really
about the volume of litigation but about the expanding reach and complexity of the substantive law);
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 16-17 (1985) (arguing that most
of the filing increase in federal courts had come from only a few categories of cases, including huge
increases in government- instituted litigation); Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 61 (1983) (general perception of a litigation explosion has been skewed by input
from elitist groups).
4. See, e.g., Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984)
(examining adversarial excesses, including those relating to discovery); Riskin, Mediation andLawyers,
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34-35, 43-48 (1982) (contrasting the inevitably divisive characteristics of the
adversarial approach to dispute resolution with other approaches aimed at healing relationships and
finding creative solutions to problems); Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 (1986) (same).
5. See, e.g., Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Examining
the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 319, 335 (1985) (urging that court reform efforts and
ADR experiments be more narrowly tailored to fit particular problems in a fundamentally sound
system). There are also those who argue that some form of adversarial system is an inevitable product
of the effort to ameliorate the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly. See Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Comment, Adversary Presentation and Bias in
Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 390 (1972). Still others view the adversary model of
adjudication as fundamentally sound, but nevertheless point to the practice of using juries in civil cases,
especially commercial or otherwise complex ones, as a major contributor to unconscionable cost and
delay. See, e.g., de Seife, A Plea for the Creation of Commercial Courts, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437,
438 (1982); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980).
6. See, e.g., authorities cited at supra note 3.
7. For example, the number of filings per capita in federal district courts tripled in a little more
than two decades, from 1960 to the early 1980's. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 63-64 (1985).
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formal litigation systems as a natural and unalarming development. 8 Regardless
of whether one views the empirical evidence of usage volume with such
quiescence, it is at least as pertinent to ask questions that are essentially
qualitative. Are we receiving appropriate value from our formal dispute resolution
systems? The costs to users of formal adjudication are many, including not only
attorney fees and other direct litigation expenses but also the opportunity costs of
protracted resolution processes and the virtually incalculable economic conse-
quences of diverting creative energy from productive endeavors and of severing
profitable commercial relationships. 9 Some cost items, such as attorney fees, are
essentially just wealth transfers and thus amount only to private costs, albeit very
substantial and important ones. On the other hand, such cost components as
creative energy diversion and relationship damage represent not only private but
also social costs because they include substantial external components. 10 Other
costs, such as those associated with operating the court system, are predominantly
external and even more clearly exemplify social costs. From the perspective of
the disputant, do formal adjudication models generally provide an appropriate level
of private goal satisfaction in exchange for the private costs of dispute resolu-
tion?1 1  From the societal perspective, do these models appropriately further
relevant social policy goals in exchange for the social costs?'
2
8. See, e.g., Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, supra note 3, at 18-28 (sources
of increased court filings vary over time with changes in society); Marvell, Civil Caseloads: The
Impact of the Economy and Trial Judgeship Increases, 69 JUDICATURE 153, 153-56 (1985) (judicial
activity increases with expansions in economic activity).
9. Such indirect costs could be characterized as part economic and part psychological, or perhaps
as psychological costs that ultimately translate into economic costs. In any event, these costs obviously
cannot be quantified with any claim of precision. On the importance of psychological costs, see
Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 63, 80
(1974) (identifying psychological costs of litigation); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman,
The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 73, 121-22 (1983) (after having studied the
monetary costs of litigation, explicitly recognizing that psychological costs of litigation may be great).
10. Internal, or private, costs are those bome by the parties to a transaction, in this case the
parties to a dispute. External, or social, costs are those bome by others outside the transaction. For
general discussions of these concepts, see B. FLEISHER, E. RAY, & T. KNIESNER, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS 341-43 (1987); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 & n.9 (2d ed. 1977); Gould,
The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 279 (1973); Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a
Public Good, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 235 (1979); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 399 (1973).
11. The goals of private parties in dispute resolution may include obtaining just compensation
for a wrong, protecting tangible and intangible property interests to insure future return on the
investment in those property interests, opportunism, vindication, and retribution.
12. Social policy goals in the design and operation of dispute resolution systems may include
the provision of nonviolent outlets for individual vindication and retribution needs, bringing repose to
disputes so that disputants can turn their efforts back to creative endeavors, maintenance of an orderly
system for protecting and transferring property rights so that investment is encouraged, establishment
of social norms, maintenance of social norms by deterring nonconforming behavior, and wealth
distribution. See Bush, supra note 3, at 905-20, for a discussion of some of the public goals of dispute
resolution.
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We still seem to be rather far from definitive answers to questions of this
nature. The one thing that can be said with certainty is that for the past several
years such questions have been posed with increasing frequency and intensity.
Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers recently have been paying much more
attention both to ways in which traditional dispute resolution methods might be
refined 13 and to the use of entirely different means for settling our differenc-
es.
14
By far the greater portion of this inventive vigor has been focused on the
design and implementation of systems for settling conventional private controver-
sies, the customary stuff of civil litigation. The modern alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) movement, which began in earnest in the mid-1970s, has
15 16produced the mini-trial, 15 summary jury trial, medical malpractice claims
prescreening, 17 early neutral evaluation 18 and "rent-a-judge" programs,19 among
13. For example, the federal courts have been making increasing use of the summary judgment
in recent years. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780
F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1986). In addition, greater attention is being paid today to case management
techniques. In the federal realm, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in
1983 to encourage more efficient management of federal civil dockets. As is always true of change,
not everyone accepts every innovation with enthusiasm, nor should they. Compare Peckham, A
Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 255-60 (examining the utility of case
management and noting its inevitability because of pretrial discovery) with Resnik, ManagerialJudges,
96 HARv. L. REv. 374,378 (1982) (observing the dangers of granting such indeterminate extrajudicial
powers to courts).
14. One very recent experiment in New Jersey creates an arbitration system that is at a
procedurally intermediate stage between traditional arbitration and litigation. See Note, The New Jersey
Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a "Better Way"?, 136 U. PA. L. REv.
1723 (1988).
15. The minitrial, which is designed primarily for intercorporate disputes, involves capsulized
presentations of evidence and legal arguments by opposing counsel to a panel consisting of a neutral
advisor (who usually will be a subject-matter expert or attorney) and executives from each company.
The company representatives, who should have settlement authority, retire for direct settlement
negotiations immediately after the presentations. They may seek the opinion of the neutral advisor
before commencing settlement talks or only after negotiations have stalled. See, e.g., Enslen, ADR:
Another Acronym, or a Viable Alternative to the High Cost ofLitigation and Crowded Court Dockets?
The Debate Commences, 18 N.M.L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1988) (presenting a more detailed description and
analysis of the minitrial).
16. The summary jury trial involves capsulized presentations of evidence and legal arguments
by opposing counsel to an advisory jury selected in the same manner as are regular juries. The verdict
of the jury, which is nonbinding unless the jury agrees otherwise, is then used as a foundation for
settlement negotiations. Like the minitrial, its functions are to force the parties and their attorneys to
think about settlement in a rational, structured way much earlier in the dispute resolution process than
they might otherwise and to introduce a greater degree of realism into the parties' expectations. See,
e.g., Enslen, id. at 13-15 (presenting a more detailed description and analysis of the summary jury
trial).
17. Medical malpractice claims prescreening programs typically have required the claimant, as
a prerequisite to litigation, to submit the claim to a panel consisting of an attorney, a health care
professional, and a third person (who is required by some programs to be from neither the health care
4
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1990, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss1/4
1990] NONCONSENSUAL ARBITRATION 5
other procedures. In addition to engendering novel mechanisms, dissatisfaction
with perceived deficiencies in the adversarial litigation model also have accelerated
the use of much older procedures such as mediation
20 and arbitration. 2 1
The ADR movement also has emerged in the administrative realm as a
component of various regulatory programs. Regulatory negotiation ("reg-neg") as
an experimental alternative to traditional administrative agency rulemaking has
enjoyed some success.2 2 Alternatives to conventional agency adjudication are
nor legal professions, although in New York the third panel member is a trial court judge). After
evaluation of the claim by the panel, the claimant retains the right to litigate the claim fully, but a
unanimous "liability" or "no liability" panel determination is admissible evidence in the case. Although
all forms of ADR have some detractors, there seems to be a consensus that medical malpractice
prescreening has not been very successful. See Corodemus & Ver Strate, Dark Victory: The Doom of
Medical Malpractice Panels, 5 SETON HALL L.J. 31 (1980) (presenting a generally negative analysis
of medical malpractice claims prescreening, including discussion of some state court decisions holding
such panels to violate state constitutional provisions); Karzon, Medical Malpractice Statutes: A
Retrospective Analysis, 1984 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693 (same); Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice
Reform Act: The New York Legislature Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription
for Comprehensive Reform, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 135 (1986) (hailing the New York reform effort,
but decrying the fact that prescreening panels were retained from earlier legislation).
18. One prominent example of this procedure was initiated by the United States District court
for the Northern District of California in 1985, referred to as "early neutral evaluation," provides for
an evaluation of litigation by a couri-appointed neutral within 160 days after an action is filed. The
neutral suggests ways that the dispute could be litigated most efficiently and may propose options for
settlement. One readily can see that early neutral evaluation is a court-annexed variation of mediation.
See Patterson, Dispute Resolution in a World ofAlternatives, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 591, 598-99 (1988).
The District of Columbia Superior Court's Multi-Door Courthouse program utilizes a similar form of
early neutral evaluation. Id. See also Levine, Early Neutral Evaluation: A Follow-Up Report, 70
JUDICATURE 236 (1987) (evaluation of initial phase of program in the Northern District of California).
19. The rent-a-judge concept involves referral of a case to a retired judge who is paid by the
parties to conduct a private trial. The most well known rent-a-judge program is that found in
California. See Note, The California Rent-a-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy
Considerations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1592 (1981). Several other states,
including New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Washington, have adopted similar
measures. See Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in
Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REv. 845, 1015 & n.1125 (1984).
20. Mediation involves the use of a neutral party without decision- making authority who
attempts to facilitate settlement between the parties to a dispute. The precise role of a mediator, which
may range from performance of relatively passive tasks such as scheduling and overseeing direct
negotiations to performance of relatively proactive functions such as claims evaluation and suggestion
of settlement alternatives, depending on the wishes and agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Riskin, The
Place of Mediation in Alternative Dispute Processing, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 19, 26 (1985) (discussing
range of mediator activities).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 33-58 for a discussion of the nature and legal framework
of traditional consensual arbitration.
22. Regulatory negotiation, or negotiated rulemaking, is yet another variation on the mediation
theme applied to the process of promulgating regulations. Regulations are often subject to challenge
through litigation. Both federal and state governments have sought to avoid such litigation through
a process in which the proposing agency and interested groups meet together to negotiate the content
of regulations prior to their adoption. If a proposed regulation can be agreed upon through such
negotiation, subsequent litigation normally can be avoided. Regulatory negotiations have been
5
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being developed, the most notable instances of which involve some form of
arbitration. 2 3 Interestingly, today's search for more expeditious and less costly
forms of adjudication in the administrative context represents the second part of
a biphasal phenomenon, because administrative adjudication was viewed originally
as a less formal alternative to judicial adjudication.24
Most ADR mechanisms have been and continue to be completely voluntary.
Alongside the evolution of volitional alternatives, however, we recently have
witnessed the accelerating use of nonconsensual ADR mechanisms in both the
private-claims and administrative contexts. Although several forms of non-
consensual ADR have been attempted for the resolution of private disputes,2 5 the
most ambitious and well-known is the "court-annexed arbitration" now found in
a substantial number of states and federal districts.
26
Several important instances of nonconsensual ADR have been adopted within
the administrative-regulatory realm, as well. When a nontraditional form of
conflict resolution is imposed without the full consent of the parties in the
administrative arena, arbitration appears so far to be the procedure of choice.
Examples include mandatory arbitration of disputes over a withdrawing employer's
liability to a multiemployer pension plan,2 7 commodity futures customer-broker
disputes,2 8 and data compensation disputes under the federal pesticide law.
29
Uses of nonconsensual ADR will probably become much more common in this
setting than in the resolution of purely private claims, because in the former case
(a) a substantial degree of government coercion is already established and expected
and (b) the constitutional barriers to nonconsensual ADR will be easier to
surmount. 30  Perhaps the most unusual form of nonconsensual administrative
ADR to date is the data compensation arbitration program of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).31 Pesticides must be
successful at the federal level in environmental and airline matters and at the state level in regulated
industry pricing matters. The negotiations frequently involve intervention of a third party neutral acting
as a mediator. See Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985
DUKE L.J. 261; Harter, The PoliticalLegitimacy and Judicial Review of ConsensualRules, 32 AM. U.L.
REv. 471 (1983); Perritt, Negotiated Rule-Making Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of
Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEo. L.J. 1625 (1986).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 27-32.
24. See, e.g., Perrill, Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Development of
Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 863,865 (1987) ("Administrative
procedure was the original alternative dispute resolution technique.").
25. Medical malpractice prescreening and early neutral evaluation are two examples. See supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 68-110.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 115-219.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 220-58.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 259-558.
30. See infra text at Part VIII.
31. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1XD)(ii) (1982).
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registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) prior to marketing,
and registration requires submission of voluminous safety and health data
developed from extensive laboratory and field testing. Under present law, a later
registrant of the same or a similar pesticide may obtain registration without
submitting its own data if it cites the previously submitted data in the EPA's files
and offers to compensate the original registrant for use of the data. If the parties
are unable to agree on an amount of compensation, the only means available for
resolving the question is legally binding arbitration. There are no decisional
standards for the arbitrators and, for all practical purposes, there is no judicial
review.
The multifaceted constitutional incertitude that plagued the FIFRA data
arbitration program from its inception has now been resolved in favor of its
validity.32 The decisions approving data compensation arbitration, as well as
several other decisions involving other nonconsensual arbitration programs, have
much to tell us about the constitutionally permissible boundaries of such dispute
resolution experiments. These boundaries, which formerly may have been thought
substantially circumscriptive, now have been revealed as something considerably
less. As a result, we almost certainly will be seeing other variations on the same
theme.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the context, properties, and
constitutionality of these instances of nonconsensual arbitration. Although FIFRA
data arbitration and the constitutional challenges to which it has been subjected
will receive the most extensive study, the other examples also will be explored in
some detail. It is first necessary, however, to lay some groundwork. Each of the
nonconsensual arbitration systems to be studied, including FIFRA data arbitration,
draws the inspiration for its design and operation from contract-based commercial
arbitration. To aid in the understanding of the former, Part II discusses the
fundamental nature and legal framework of the latter. Part III examines the
emergence of a clearly growing trend toward nonconsensual arbitration, and Part
IV analyzes the use of court-annexed arbitration for private-claims resolution.
Parts V and VI explore multiemployer pension plan withdrawal liability arbitration
and commodity futures broker-customer arbitration, respectively, as two important
expressions of the trend in the regulatory context. In Parts IV, V, and VI, the
context, properties, and constitutionality of the three systems are examined in some
depth. Part VII analyzes FIFRA data compensation arbitration in detail. In order
to present the context and properties of this arbitration system properly, Part VII
thoroughly explores the complex regulatory scheme of which it is an integral part.
This part then studies the constitutional concerns generated by the program and its
operation. Part VIII concludes the article by briefly reflecting upon the four
systems and inquiring whether there remain any meaningful constitutional
limitations on experiments with nonconsensual dispute resolution, particularly in
the regulatory domain. After considering some of these experiments that at first
32. See infra text accompanying notes 391-558.
1990]
7
Allison: Allison: Context, Properties, and Constitutionality of Nonconsensual Arbitration:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
8 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1990, No. 1
blush seemed to test the constitutional margin, we must ask whether this margin
was ever where we may have supposed it to be and, if so, whether it has moved.
II. CONSENSUAL ARBITRATION
A. The Nature of Arbitration
Like most dispute resolution alternatives, commercial arbitration traditionally
has been and usually still is used only when all disputants agree to do so. 33 At
the onset of the modern ADR movement, consensual arbitration was not merely
a well- established procedure but was one the origins of which were traceable to
antiquity. 34  Along with the recent surge of interest in various resolution
alternatives, this ancient device has experienced rapidly growing usage during the
past few years. In the United States, the increasing popularity of commercial
arbitration probably is attributable not only to its perceived advantages over
litigation but also to the success of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
as a facilitator of the process. The AAA, a private nonprofit entity formed in New
York in 1926 and now the preeminent arbitration organization in the country, is
primarily an administrator of arbitration cases. It also performs other important
functions, including promulgation and updating of procedural arbitration rules,
arbitrator training, research and publication, and general arbitration-related
education.3
5
33. Although the present discussion is limited to commercial arbitration, it bears mentioning that
private-sector labor arbitration also is almost exclusively the product of agreement. Most labor-
management collective bargaining agreements include a provision calling for binding arbitration as the
capstone of an internal procedure for handling employee grievances and other labor disputes. Although
commercial arbitration and labor arbitration possess many common characteristics, the two have
traditionally been viewed as distinct. The federal law governing commercial arbitration, the Federal
Arbitration Act, expressly excludes labor disputes from its coverage. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The
enforceability of arbitration agreements in the labor-management relations context is governed by § 301
of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
34. Arbitration is found in Old Testament scripture, 1 Kings 3:16-28, and in Greek mythology.
Kellor, supra note 2, at 3. Arbitration enjoyed some popularity in the settlement of political disputes
in the first millennium B.C. Controversies between Athens and Megara over possession of the island
of Salamis in about 600 B.C., between Corinth and Corcyra over possession of Leucas in 480 B.C.,
and between Genoa and the Viturians over a common boundary in 117 B.C. were all settled by
arbitration. Id. at 4. Evidence also exists that various employment disputes in ancient times were
frequently arbitrated. Id. The arbitration of commercial disputes was demonstrably commonplace
throughout the centuries in many different civilizations. It was in use, for example, among traders from
the Phoenicians and Greeks to the desert caravans of Marco Polo's time. Id. at 3.
35. The number of commercial arbitration cases filed with the AAA increased 250% from 1972-
85. AMERICAN ARB. Ass'N, CASELOAD FIGURES (1985), cited in Hirshman, The Second Arbitration
Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1305 & n.7 (1985). A
comparison of the more recent 1983-87 period shows a 49% increase. AMERICAN ARB. ASS'N, 1987
STATISTIcAL REP. (June 1, 1988). Taking into account all categories of arbitrations handled by the
AAA, including commercial, construction, labor, and accident cases, filings with the organization
during 1987 totalled almost 53,000. AMERICAN ARB. ASS'N, 1987-88 ANN. REP. 3. There are no
8
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Arbitration involves the use of a disinterested third party decision maker or
panel of decision makers that behaves in a quasi-judicial manner. Unlike most
other alternative procedures, arbitration usually produces a legally binding decision
based upon examination of evidence and consideration of both factual and legal
arguments. Although arbitration possesses several of the adversarial attributes of
litigation, available evidence indicates that it is usually faster and less expensive
than litigation.36 Arbitration is also less formal, completely private, susceptible
to the selection of expert decision makers, and arguably more conducive than
litigation to the continuance of a commercial relationship between the parties.
37
Commercial arbitration arising from international transactions is not necessarily
faster or less expensive than litigation, but it is generally perceived as sharing the
other positive attributes with domestic commercial arbitration.
38
Arbitration possesses attributes that some users might view as negative, as
well. There usually is no opportunity in arbitration to conduct pretrial discovery,
a characteristic which contributes much to speed and economy but which is
criticized by some (especially attorneys) as permitting inadequate factual
development for sound decision making. 39 Arbitrators draw their authority from
the parties' contract, and are not obligated to follow relevant rules of law or
evidence unless the contract so provides.40 As a practical matter, arbitrators do
statistics on commercial arbitration not sponsored by the AAA. See Furnish, CommercialArbitration
Agreements and the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 317 & n.2 (1979) (reporting
exhaustive but fruitless efforts to find statistics for arbitration outside the AAA).
36. See Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced
Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REV. 219, 221-22 & n.15 (1986);
Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 438-40, 472-77 (1988).
37. See Allison, supra note 36, at 221-22 & n.15; Stipanowich, supra note 36, at 433-38.
38. See Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in International Trade: A Study in the
Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
361, 378-79 (1986).
39. Neither the Federal Arbitration Act, Uniform Arbitration Act, nor the AAA's Commercial
Arbitration Rules provides for prehearing discovery, and it is generally recognized that discovery
normally is permitted only if state law or the parties' agreement so provides, or if exceptional
circumstances are present. See Allison, supra note 36, at 250 & nn.240-44. Discovery is not favored
because parties that agree to arbitrate are deemed to have substituted the relatively low cost and speed
of the arbitration process for the more complete fact-finding and procedural safeguards that increase
costs and processing times in litigation. See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M.
105, 597 P.2d 290, 302, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979).
40. See Bernstein, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Arbitration: Revolutionary
Overthrow or Peaceful Coexistence?, 22 ARB. J., Aug. 1967, at 65, 84 (arbitrators do not feel
constrained by rules of law but can be expected to seek guidance from such rules); Brunet, Questioning
the Quality ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TtL. L. REV. 1, 54 (1987) (arguing that emphasis on
process values in arbitration and other forms of ADR may occur at the expense of substantive law);
Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration: A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
698, 701-03 (1952) (arbitrators are free to use a variety of criteria as the basis for their decisions, and
if considering pertinent rules of law may retest them for "inherent soundness"); Stipanowich, Punitive
Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REV. 953, 978-82 (1986)
(arbitrators not bound by legal rules). See also AMERICAN ARB. ASs'N, COMMERcIAL ARB. RULES §
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tend to pay attention to legal rules even if they do not adhere to them strictly.
4 1
Intuitively, one would expect attorney arbitrators, in contrast with those from
business or some technical area such as engineering, to have more regard for
pertinent rules of evidence and substantive law. In any event, the fact that
arbitrators are not required to follow legal rules quite possibly lessens the
predictability of outcome.4 2 Moreover, arbitrators are not required to prepare a
written opinion setting forth their factual findings or reasons for decision.
43
Indeed, in American domestic commercial arbitration they are discouraged from
doing so.4 4 Perhaps the most important arbitral characteristic that some observers
may view negatively is the virtual absence of review. In general, the merits of an
arbitration decision (or "award") are not reviewable by a court.45  It should be
evident even to the casual observer that the characteristics some would view as
negative contribute largely to the speed, economy, and privacy most often
mentioned as positive attributes. Depending on their attitudes and particular
situations, various disputants may have different views of arbitration's mix of
positive and negative traits. There are trade-offs. The really important principle
is that prospective users should understand the trade-offs and make informed
choices when selecting a dispute resolution mechanism like arbitration. This is the
nature of bargained-for exchange relationships.
31 (Sept. 1, 1988) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL RuLES] ("The Arbitrator shall be the judge of the
relevance and materiality of the evidence offered and conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not
be necessary.").
41. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLuM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961).
42. See Bayer & Abrahams, The Trouble With Arbitration, 11 LITIGAnON 30, 30 (1985)
(consistency and predictability are not characteristics of arbitration); Bonn, The Predictability of
Nonlegalistic Adjudication, 6 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 563, 571-77 (1972) (arbitration fails to meet the
requirements of a formally rational legal system that would support any significant predictability of
case outcomes; although the author found a limited degree of case-outcome predictability in textile
industry arbitration, he attributed it to self-selection biases in case filings).
43. See Bush, supra note 3, at 964-65 & n.136 (arbitration is not necessarily rule-applying or
rule-articulating); Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 248-49 (arbitration rarely involves publication
or communication of decisions or rules); Stipanowich, supra note 36, at 439-40 & n.86 (arbitrators'
decisions seldom contain any supporting rationale).
44. The AAA offers the following advice to its commercial arbitrators:
Commercial arbitrators are not required to explain the reasons for their decisions. As a general
rule, the award consists of a brief direction to the parties on a single sheet of paper. One reason
for brevity is that written opinions might open avenues for attack on the award by the losing
party.
Courts will not review arbitrators' decisions on the merits of the case, even where the
conclusions are different from those a court might reach. But a carelessly expressed thought in
a written opinion may afford an opportunity to delay enforcement of the award. The obligations
to the parties are better fulfilled when the award leaves no room for attack. In situations where
the arbitrator feels it necessary to write such an opinion, it should be contained in a separate
document.
American Arb. Ass'n, A Guide for Commercial Arbitrators 16 (undated).
45. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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B. The Legal Framework
An agreement to arbitrate can be made after a dispute has arisen and
settlement efforts have reached an impasse. Most commonly, however, arbitration
agreements take the form of provisions in commercial contracts by which the
parties obligate themselves to submit to arbitration all future disputes arising from
the underlying transaction. Courts in nations employing the continental code
system generally showed little or no antipathy toward the court-foreclosing effect
of arbitration and normally enforced arbitration agreements by ordering the
recalcitrant to submit to the process and adhere to the result.46 On the other
hand, courts in nations employing the English common law system, including the
United States, demonstrated an early and sustained hostility toward arbitration.
47
Although these courts usually would enforce post-dispute arbitration agreements,
they usually would not compel compliance with a predispute arbitration clause.
48
Attitudes eventually did change in America and in other nations operating
under English-based systems.49 Beginning in the early 1920s, states began to
legislate the legal enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements. 5° In 1925,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which required enforcement
of all written arbitration agreements (pre- or post-dispute) arising either from
maritime transactions or from transactions affecting interstate or foreign
46. Roman law recognized the validity of arbitration agreements and provided rules for their
enforcement. 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 355-60 (1959). This receptive attitude carried over to the
civil law and to continental procedural codes. Id. The official attitude toward arbitration in France,
however, could be characterized as relatively hostile until 1806. Carbonneau, ArbitralAdjudication:
A Comparative Assessment ofIts Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 33, 53 (1984).
47. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 596-605 (1927);
Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 138-46
(1934).
48. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1433, at 392 (1962).
49. L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRAcT LAW 432-33 (3d ed. 1972); Carbonneau,
supra note 46, at 39-44.
50. Although most of the American states passed arbitration legislation during the nineteenth
century, these statutes did little more than codify the common-law attitude and outline procedures for
review. Fuller & Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 433. In 1920 New York became the first state to enact
a modem arbitration statute, providing for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes
and for very limited judicial review of arbitrators' awards. Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y.
Laws 803 (current version codified at N.Y. Cv. PRAC. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1983)). In
1923, New Jersey passed a law similar to the New York statute, Act of Mar. 21, 1923, ch. 134, 1923
N.J. Laws 291 § 1 (current version codified at N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:24-1 to -11 (1988)), and
Massachusetts and Oregon followed with relatively progressive arbitration legislation in 1925. Act of
Apr. 29, 1925, ch. 294, 1925 Mass. Acts 337 (current version codified at MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
251, §§ 1-22 (West 1959 & Supp. 1988)); Act of Feb. 24, 1925, ch. 186, 1925 Or. Laws 279 (current
version codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 33.210-.340 (1988)).
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commerce.5 1  The expansive notion of interstate commerce that began to
develop in the 1930s caused the FAA to apply to arbitration agreements in most
commercial transactions of substantial magnitude. 52 Under the FAA, federal or
state courts not only must stay litigation in favor of arbitration, but also must order
specific enforcement of the arbitration clause upon petition of one of the
parties.53 Confirmation of the resulting arbitration award and conversion into
a judgment is largely pro forma. 54 As alluded to earlier, the law permits only the
most minimal judicial review, restricting it to nonsubstantive grounds such as
serious arbitrator misconduct. 55 Even in the rare case in which an arbitral award
51. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)). Section 2 of the FAA specifies the Act's jurisdictional reach. 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1982).
52. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967)
(consulting agreement to obtain assistance in moving business from New Jersey to Maryland and
continuing operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling business obviously has a
sufficient connection with interstate commerce).
53. Section 3 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982), requires federal district courts to stay litigation
in a case in which the dispute is within the scope of a written arbitration agreement. Section 4 of the
FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982), requires federal courts to compel arbitration in such a case upon petition
by one party and a showing that the other party has failed or refused to comply with the arbitration
agreement. State courts are also required to enforce the provisions of the FAA. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
54. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982). Again, although the language of the FAA refers to enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards by federal courts, the Supreme Court has ruled that the FAA must
also be enforced by state courts when the Act's interstate commerce or maritime jurisdictional
prerequisites are satisfied. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
55. Section 10 of The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982), provides that an arbitration
award may be set aside by a court only on specific grounds unrelated to the substantive merits:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Although there are a few minor language variations, the UAA's stated grounds for judicial
nonenforcement of an arbitral award are identical in all important respects to those of the FAA. UNIF.
ARB. AcT § 12, 7 U.L.A. § 140 (1985).
The Supreme Court has indicated, as well, that an arbitration award under the FAA may be set
aside for "manifest disregard of the law." Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). The concept
has remained undefined and all but unused. Stipanowich, supra note 40, at 982-86. A party seeking
review on such grounds bears a very heavy burden. See Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978); Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568
(2d Cir. 1968); Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967); Sidarma Societa
Italiana Di Armamento Spa, Venice v. Holt Marine Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dundas
Shipping & Trading Co. v. Stravelakis Bros., 508 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Puerto Rico
Maritime Shipping Auth., 496 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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can be set aside, the FAA does not authorize judicial involvement in the merits of
the dispute; in fact, it strongly implies an intent to foreclose such involvement by
expressly authorizing courts to remand for a new arbitration hearing.
56
Almost all American states have enacted modern arbitration statutes that
closely resemble the FAA. Many of these states either adopted or borrowed very
heavily from the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), which in all important respects
is practically identical to the FAA.
57
Arbitration agreements relating to international commercial transactions have
been accorded similar treatment by many bilateral treaties and several multilateral
conventions, the most notable of which is the 1958 United Nations Convention on
the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
58
III. THE EMERGENCE OF NONCONSENSUAL ARBITRATION
Although arbitration historically has been almost exclusively consensual, we
have begun to see this characteristic change. The change remains minor when
compared with all uses of arbitration, but it shows signs of further development
into an important phenomenon. As part of the more general movement toward
greater use of arbitration and other ADR mechanisms, instances of legally
compelled arbitration have appeared in a number of contexts in recent years. The
examples of nonconsensual arbitration chosen for discussion--court-annexed,
multiemployer pension plan withdrawal, commodity futures, and FIFRA data
arbitration--invoke the procedure in more or less traditional form, with several
variations that will be explained further into the discussion.
59
Before outlining several of the experiments with nonconsensual arbitration, it
is necessary to identify some problems of semantics that may impede understand-
ing of the basic concept. When discussing consent or its absence, one must
contend with the fact that there are many degrees of choice and compulsion.
Except for those possessing a radically deterministic view of the world, practically
all actions can be viewed as involving choice; the difference normally lies only in
56. 9 U.S.C. § 10(e) (1982).
57. See Special Project, supra note 19, at 935 ("every state except Vermont has adopted some
arbitration legislation"). Vermont recently became the last state to adopt a modem arbitration statute.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-5681 (1973 & Supp. 1988). More than three-fifths of the states
have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act. See UNIF. ARB. AcT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1985 & Supp. 1989)
(listing 32 states and the District of Columbia as having adopted the UAA).
58. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. Some writers refer to the U.N.
Convention as the New York Convention. See Allison, supra note 38, at 381-92 (discussing the legal
and institutional framework of international commercial arbitration).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 68-558.
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the consequences of making one selection over another. 60 Terms like "mandato-
ry" or "compulsory" arbitration sometimes are used to describe situations quite
dissimilar to those discussed in this paper.6 1 For example, one occasionally
encounters such terms being used to identify the product of a contractual
predispute arbitration clause. This usage results from the fact that, under modern
arbitration statutes, the parties to such an agreement are legally prohibited from
opting out of arbitration after a dispute arises. They must honor both the
procedure and the award that flows from it or face judicial compulsion. In truth,
of course, arbitration in this kind of situation is mandatory only in the sense that
the parties to any legally enforceable contract are bound either to honor it or
ultimately incur the loss of government protection for certain rights in property
(through enforcement of a money damage judgment) or liberty (through a decree
of specific performance and the consequent penalties for noncompliance). This
species of arbitration, which accounts for most of its modern applications and
which has been the primary subject of twentieth-century arbitration legislation in
this country, is just as consensual as the underlying contract. 62
60. According to Hobbes, even fear or necessity does not prevent actions from being exercises
of free will. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. 1, ch. 13, pt. 2, ch. 21. Acquinas viewed human actions as
necessarily being voluntary exercises of free will unless produced by overweening external physical
force or complete ignorance of facts relating to available choices and consequences. Fear of
consequences does not make acts involuntary. T. AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. 1 of 2d pt.,
ques. 6. Speaking more practically, however, it is obvious that in assigning legal responsibility for
actions and in determining the effects of actions on legal status and relations, a workable legal system
must differentiate among the circumstances in which persons exercise their free will. See generally
4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE ch. 26 (discussing the general theory of acts, and examining the law's
categorization of acts for the purpose of assigning legal responsibility and determining effects on legal
status and relations). Aristotle viewed the task of assigning legal responsibility as consisting essentially
of dividing actions into the voluntary and the involuntary, and saw actions resulting from compulsion
and ignorance as being the two primary instances in which exercises of the will should be treated as
involuntary. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 3, ch. 1.
61. This is the main reason I have chosen the term "nonconsensual" rather then "mandatory" or
.consensual."
62. Arbitration clauses found in contracts of adhesion, or in those procured by fraud, duress, or
the like, surely contain elements of involuntariness, and the law recognizes the need to protect against
such events. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (written arbitration agreement valid and
irrevocable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract").
This section of the FAA incorporates the agreement-formation rules and the defenses of state contract
law. Both state and federal courts refer to state common law to determine when an agreement to
arbitrate is "revocable" (unenforceable). State law, whether judicial or legislative in origin, may not
create special contract rules for determining the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements,
however, because of conflict with the congressional policy underlying the FAA. See Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987).
Despite the fact that the FAA incorporates state contract rules of contract formation and defense,
the assertion of general contract defenses cannot prevent a dispute from being arbitrated. The Supreme
Court has held that defensive issues such as fraud, duress, mistake, and the like are to be resolved by
the arbitrator if they relate to the contract as a whole. A court will entertain such questions
preparatory to deciding whether to compel arbitration only when they relate specifically to the
arbitration clause. For example, a claim of fraud will defeat a motion to compel arbitration only if the
14
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In this article, arbitration is spoken of as nonconsensual when its selection as
a dispute resolution mechanism is driven primarily by governmental power rather
than by the volition of contracting parties. Saying this, we still do not purge the
discussion of all definitional problems. Within the domain of cases in which the
use of arbitration is attributable primarily to governmental coercion, there are
variations in the mix of compulsion and choice. Court-annexed arbitration, for
instance, is completely nonconsensual but, subject to certain monetary dis-
incentives, either party may seek trial de novo.6 Multiemployer pension plan
arbitration also is completely involuntary, but the scope of review is much
narrower than in court-annexed arbitration. 64 Commodity futures arbitration is
voluntary for the customer, but is not voluntary in any meaningful sense for the
futures broker. The only real choice for the broker is to go into a different line
of work, because the practical economic necessity of membership in a commodity
futures exchange carries with it the statutory obligation to submit disputes to
binding arbitration if the customer so desires. There is also no significant review
of commodity futures arbitration. 65 FIFRA data arbitration is compulsory for
the original pesticide developer unless the choice is made not to register a given
pesticide with the EPA, and a pesticide cannot be marketed without registration.
It is compulsory for a later registrant of the same or a similar pesticide unless that
party spends several years and millions of dollars doing its own testing and
developing its own data, or simply forgoes market entry. Here, too, there is no
review of any consequence.
66
To reiterate, the conceptual thread that runs through this discussion is the
predominance of sovereign compulsion in the selection of arbitration as a dispute
resolution method.6 7
claimant demonstrates that the arbitration clause itself was fraudulently induced. See Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 136-45.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 236-50.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 380-82.
67. Arbitration of disputes between securities brokers and their customers is not used in this
discussion as an example of nonconsensual arbitration because it is the product of a clause in the
commission agreement. It must be admitted, however, that in this use of arbitration the degree of free
choice for one party, the customer, has not been especially meaningful in the past. The inclusion of
arbitration clauses in these contracts is an industry-wide practice and generally has not been a matter
for individual negotiation. The fact that the underlying transaction is a contract of adhesion does not
affect the arbitrability of the dispute, and the effect, if any, of the adhesion characteristic on the rights
of the parties is a question for the arbitrator. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1967).
Securities industry arbitration has come under increasing criticism in recent years, in large part
because of the absence of any real choice on the part of customers in the selection of the arbitral
forum. See, e.g., Wurczinger, SEC Faces Mandatory Arbitration Issue, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at
21, col. 1. In response to this criticism, the Securities Exchange Commission recently approved
changes in the arbitration rules of the securities industry's three primary self-regulatory organizations
(SRO's)--the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and National Association of
15
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IV. COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
A. Context and Properties
The most generalized variety of nonconsensual arbitration actually originated
quite some time ago in the Pennsylvania state court system. Legislation in that
state in 1952 created a procedure later to be known as "court-annexed arbitration,"
which required trial judges to refer certain cases to arbitration after pleadings were
filed.68 The next court-annexed system was not adopted, however, until 1970
when New York and Ohio implemented procedures patterned generally after the
Pennsylvania model. 69  Today, twenty-two states employ court-annexed
arbitration under either statutory authorization or court rule. 7 0 Some of these
systems apply statewide, but many apply only to designated urban counties.
7 1
Securities Dealers--that increase at least the appearance, and perhaps the reality, of customer awareness
and free choice in the use of arbitration as a substitute for litigation against the broker-dealer.
Exchange Act Release No. 26,805 [1989 Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,414, May 10.
The new rules require, inter alia, that broker-dealers place immediately before predispute arbitration
clauses language that informs customers that they are waiving their right to seek remedies in court, that
arbitration is final, that discovery is generally more limited than in court proceedings, that the award
is not required to contain factual findings and legal reasoning, and that the arbitration panel typically
will include a minority of arbitrators associated with the securities industry. Id., [1989 Current Binder]
Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,414, at 80,111-3, May 10.
A perception of industry bias in the securities arbitration system also has been a source of
criticism. See, e.g., Can Disgruntled Investors Turn the Tables on Their Brokers?, BUS. WK., Aug.
8, 1988, at 60-61. Recent empirical evidence strongly suggests, however, that this perception is
illusory. In a study commissioned by the New York Stock Exchange, data gathered from six major
brokerage firms on recent customer-broker disputes showed that customer-claimants fared substantially
better in industry-sponsored arbitration than in litigation, as measured by average recovery, average
legal costs, average recovery as a percentage of amount of claim, and average legal costs as a
percentage of amount of recovery. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, RESPONSE TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS (Oct. 14,
1988). Regardless of the reality, the recently approved changes in the arbitration rules of the SRO's
attempt to deal with the perception of pro-industry bias by articulating more precisely the requirement
for an arbitrator to be classified as "public" (i.e., nonindustry), as well as requiring greater disclosure
by arbitrators of personal and professional background information. Exchange Act Release No. 26,805
[1989 Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 84,414, at 80,101-80,104, May 10.
68. Act of Jan. 14, 1952, Pub. L. 2087, No. 566 (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7361-7362 (Purdon 1982). See Doty, Philadelphia's Compulsory Arbitration Program, 29 VILL.
L. REV. 1449, 1449-53 (1984) (describes history of court-annexed arbitration in Pennsylvania); Levin,
Court-AnnexedArbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 539-40 (1983) (same); Walker, Court-Ordered
Arbitration Comes to North Carolina and the Nation, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 901, 914-17 (1986)
(same).
69. See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, COuRT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL
PICTURE 5-6 (1985).
70. See Keilitz, Gallas & Hanson, State Adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 STATE
CT. J. 4, 6-8 (1988). In addition, legislation in Alaska authorizes the stale supreme court to adopt rules
providing for court-annexed arbitration of claims below $3,000, but no such rules have been adopted
yet. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.190, .200, .210, .220 (1983).
71. See Keilitz, Gallas & Hanson, supra note 70, at 6-8.
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In 1978, three federal district courts adopted local court rules authorizing court-
annexed arbitration systems resembling preexisting state procedures.72 Those
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of California
continue in operation, but the program in the Connecticut federal district was
abandoned not long after implementation. 7 3  Beginning in 1984, nine other
federal district courts have commenced programs of a similar nature. 74  In
general, state and federal systems of court-annexed arbitration operate in money
damage suits in which the amount in controversy is below a prescribed maxi-
mum.
75
All of the federal court-annexed arbitration programs and most of the state
programs permit a party dissatisfied with the arbitral outcome to obtain a trial de
novo.76 To further the goals of expediting dispute resolution and minimizing its
costs, however, all of the federal and most of the state programs incorporate
disincentives for seeking de novo review.77 These disincentives range from
72. The United States Department of Justice had drafted a bill that would have authorized from
five to eight federal courts to experiment with court-annexed arbitration in certain types of civil cases,
and submitted it to Congress in 1977. See The Court-Annexed Arbitration Act of 1978: Hearings on
S. 2253 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
Congress did not enact this legislation; indeed, it was not necessary because the power to adopt local
court rules granted by existing legislation, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982), and by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, FED. R. CIv. P. 83, is sufficiently broad to permit federal district courts to implement court-
annexed arbitration on their own initiative. See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556
F. Supp. 712, 714 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (power to adopt local rules sufficient to include creation of court-
annexed arbitration program); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 572-73 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(same). Although Congress did not pass the bill proposed by the Justice Department, it did provide
funding for the three federal district courts that had instituted court-annexed arbitration programs in
early 1978 by local court rule. D. CONN. R. 28; N.D. CAL. R. 500; E.D. PA. R. 49 (current version
E.D. PA. R. 8).
73. See Levin, supra note 68, at 540 & n.19; Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in
the Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REv. 787, 799 & n.77 (1983).
74. Eight of the nine programs have been adopted with congressional funding. M.D. FLA. R.
8.01-.06; W.D. MICH. R. 43; W.D. Mo. R. 30; D.N.J.R. 47; E.D.N.Y. AiR. R. §§ 1-7; M.D.N.C.R.
601-11; W.D. OKLA. R. 43; W.D. TEx. R. Civ. P. 300-9. In addition, court-annexed arbitration has
been adopted by individual court initiative, without congressional funding, in the Southern District of
Ohio. S.D. Ot1o R. 4.4.1; S.D. 01110 ARB. R. 1.0-11.3. See Walker, supra note 68, at 902 n.3. In
1988, Congress finally provided direct authorization for court-annexed arbitration in ten out of eleven
districts currently using it (all except the Southern District of Ohio). The legislation explicitly
recognizes the power of other district courts (including the Southern District of Ohio) to adopt court-
annexed arbitration on their own initiative by local court rule. JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS AND AccEss
TO JusTIcE AcT OF 1988, Pub L. No. 100-72, 102 Stat. 4659-62 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-
658).
75. Jurisdictional maxima in state court programs range from $6,000 in New York to $150,000
in Hawaii, with no limit in Florida, Michigan, and New Hampshire. See Keilitz, Gallas & Hanson,
supra note 70, at 6-7. Maxima in federal court programs range from $50,000 in the Eastern District
of New York to $150,000 in the Middle District of North Carolina, with no limit in the Southern
District of Ohio. See Walker, supra note 68 at 919.
76. See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 69, at 9-11.
77. See Walker, supra note 68, at 922-34.
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payment of a flat fee or all arbitration fees to payment of all arbitration fees, court
costs, and attorney fees. 78 In many of these systems responsibility for various
fee and cost components is contingent on the de novo petitioner's failure to obtain
a more favorable result in trial than in arbitration.
79
B. The Right to Trial by Jury
1. Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs
There have been surprisingly few constitutional challenges to court-annexed
arbitration. The most salient have been based on the right to trial by jury. Soon
after the first federal programs were in place, such a challenge was rejected in
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn.80 There the defendants in a diversity action in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania demanded a jury trial under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 38(b) and moved to prohibit arbitration and vacate the order of referral.
They claimed that the arbitration program violated the right to jury trial guaranteed
by the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution.
In upholding the program's validity, the court drew upon the Supreme Court's
longstanding acceptance of the proposition that the seventh amendment did not
concretize jury trials as they existed in 1791 when the amendment was adopt-
78. Id. at 933-34. In the ten currently authorized federal programs, the only permissible
disincentive is payment of all arbitration fees. See Pub. L. No. 100-72, 102 Stat. 4661 (to be codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 655).
79. See Walker, supra note 68, at 933-34.
80. 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The defendants also raised a challenge on equal
protection grounds. Id. at 574-77. Because the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
technically applies only to the states, such a challenge to federal government action is based on the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 574 n.19. The equal protection claim was based on three
characteristics of the district court's court-annexed arbitration program: first, litigants in this district
were treated differently than in the many other districts that did not have court-annexed arbitration;
second, the disincentives for seeking trial de novo after arbitration were different for plaintiffs and
defendants (in this district, one not improving his position through trial de novo was required to pay
all arbitration fees and, if a defendant, interest on the arbitration award from the date of its filing); and
third, distinctions were drawn between parties based on the amount of the plaintiff's claim, in that the
program in this district did not apply. to claims larger than $50,000 ($75,000 under the current local
rule, E.D. PA. R. 8.3). The court concluded that the program did not affect fundamental rights other
than the right to jury trial under the seventh amendment. That issue, of course, was resolved within
the framework of seventh amendment jurisprudence. Therefore, the classifications complained of were
not appropriate for review under a strict scrutiny standard but instead were to be examined under the
rational basis test. Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 575 n.20. The court found little difficulty in
concluding that the court-annexed arbitration program survived a review for minimal rationality.
Legitimate governmental interests obviously were present in the need to conserve scarce judicial
resources in the face of ever-increasing case loads, and the government is permitted to experiment in
good faith with novel means for protecting such interests. The means chosen, according to the court,
were not unduly burdensome and were rationally related to the government interests in question. Id.
at 575-77.
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ed. 81 Although the common-law understanding of the right to jury trial at that
time is to serve as a historical benchmark for assessing seventh amendment claims,
innovations in form and procedure are permissible so long as the substance of the
right is preserved. 82  This substance is preserved so long as an innovative
dispute resolution measure neither finally determines the rights of persons or
property nor imposes onerous conditions on access to jury trial. For example, the
court in Kimbrough relied on decisions by the Supreme Court finding no seventh
amendment violations in the practice of giving a jury's answers to special
interrogatories controlling effect when those answers conflict with the general
verdict,83 the employment of a pretrial "auditor" to examine documents and hear
testimony for the purpose of narrowing and clarifying issues for trial,8 4 the use
of six-member juries instead of the twelve-member tribunals that were traditional
at common law, 85 and the granting of summary judgments 86 and directed ver-
dicts.
87
In the view of the Kimbrough court, court-annexed arbitration alters the
substance of the jury trial right to no greater extent than these earlier innovations.
Because of the availability of post-arbitration trial de novo, the rights of persons
or property are not finally determined by the arbitration tribunal. 8 8 Moreover,
the court concluded, the combination of a short delay occasioned by the holding
of an arbitration hearing, 89 the short time period after the arbitration award
81. Id. at 567-69.
82. See, e.g., Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
83. Id. at 595-98.
84. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 307 (1920).
85. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229-30 (1978); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156-60
(1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-104 (1970).
86. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1902).
87. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943).
88. Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. at 569-70.
89. Referral to arbitration is immediate. The court in Kimbrough said that the arbitration hearing
is usually held about thirty days after referral. Id. at 567. The current local rules in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania provide that the hearing will be held in "about five months," but permit the
parties to agree to an earlier date. E.D. PA. R. 8.4(a). The parties have 120 days for discovery prior
to arbitration. Id. In the event of a demand for trial de novo, additional but presumably not
duplicative discovery may be necessary. The time prior to arbitration consumed by discovery and other
preparatory efforts should not be expected to lengthen total preparation time and expense for trial de
novo if the process is properly managed. Total time, and perhaps expense, certainly could be
increased, however, if the reference to arbitration is not made very soon after the complaint is filed
with the court, continuances are not tightly controlled, or the procedure otherwise is not well managed.
See Note, Oregon Court-Annexed Arbitration: Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 21 WILLAME=rE L.
REV. 593, 604-05 (1985). Therefore, in a well-designed and efficiently managed system, the time and
cost of the hearing and award should be the primary addition to total time and cost when trial de novo
is demanded. Such hearings customarily last less than one day. See Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 73,
at 803. Under the current local rule in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the arbitration panel-must
render its award "promptly" after the hearing. E.D. PA. R. 8.6. Other federal districts impose specific
time limits for rendition of the award, ten days being common. See, e.g., W.D. OKLA. R. 43(O)(1).
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during which trial de novo can be demanded, 90 and the minor disincentives for
seeking trial de novo under that federal district's local court rules 91 did not
impose onerous conditions on the availability of jury trial, 92 especially when
balanced against the overall benefits likely to be derived from court-annexed
arbitration.
93
Kimbrough's seventh amendment analysis was later cited with approval in a
decision striking the demand for trial de novo of a party who had refused to
participate in court-annexed arbitration.9 4 More recently, in Rhea v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied
primarily on Kimbrough to reject a seventh amendment challenge to a mandatory
mediation program adopted by local federal district court rule.
9 5
2. State Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs
Although the seventh amendment does not apply to limitations on the right to
trial by jury at the state level,9 6 state constitutional provisions throughout the
country normally parallel the seventh amendment rather closely in substance and
90. Under then-applicable local rule 49, the time period was twenty days. Under the current rule
in that district, the time period is thirty days. E.D. PA. R. 8.7(a). Thirty days is now the uniform
standard for the ten currently authorized federal programs. Pub. L. No. 100-72, 102 Stat. 4661 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 655).
91. Under then-applicable local rule 49, a party demanding trial de novo who did not receive
a judgment more favorable then the arbitration award had to pay all arbitration fees and, in the case
of the defendant, interest from the date of the award. Under the current rule, the penalty is limited to
an arbitration fee of $75 per arbitrator on the panel. E.D. PA. R. 8.7(d). There are three arbitrators
on the panel unless the parties agree to use a single arbitrator. Id.
92. Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. at 571.
93. The identifiable burdens imposed on one's exercise of the right to jury trial must be balanced
against benefits both to the public and to the individual disputant. With respect to the pubic benefit,
the court emphasized the burden to society of backlogs and delay in the court system and the growing
perception that alternative mechanisms like arbitration can contribute to the amelioration of problems
in the civil justice system. Id. Regarding the benefits to individual disputants, the court stated:
Furthermore, arbitration provides a valuable service by promoting speedy and inexpensive
dispute resolution. Litigants have the opportunity to test the validity of their claims very
shortly after they are filed. Certainly, this limits the time and expense of discovery prior
to arbitration. In the normal course of trial without arbitration, voluminous resources can
be expended in discovery which is of marginal advantage at trial. The pendency of
arbitration forces counsel to focus their attention on the basic elements of the case. Aside
from the ultimate award, if arbitration reveals that no claim exists, settlement will become
a viable possibility. At the very least, arbitration helps counsel streamline their case and
direct their additional discovery in profitable areas.
Id.
94. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
95. 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
96. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
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scope.9 7 Indeed, because of the absence of any previous federal court rulings
on the seventh amendment's applicability to court-annexed arbitration, the court
in Kimbrough relied on two Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in addition to
the more general seventh amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court. Shortly after implementation of Pennsylvania's state court-annexed
arbitration experiment, the program survived a right to jury trial challenge under
the Pennsylvania state constitution in In re Smith.98 In that case, the court had
relied in large measure on the United Supreme Court's seventh amendment
precedents, and found that the availability of trial de novo effectively answered
any claims that the right to jury trial had been infringed.99
Using essentially the same reasoning, the Pennsylvania high court's later
decision in Parker v. Children's Hospital upheld the state's nonconsensual
arbitration program for medical malpractice cases.1° ° Like the general court-
annexed arbitration system, the state's malpractice arbitration statute provided for
trial de novo subject to minor limitations and disincentives.10 1  The court
concluded that, on their face, these statutory prerequisites to malpractice litigation
did not impose a burden on the right of trial by jury sufficient to violate the
Pennsylvania Constitution. The court also rejected a claim that the required
presence of two health care professionals on the arbitration panel, along with two
attorneys and three lay persons, violated the procedural due process guarantee of
an impartial tribunal. The balance on the panel, coupled with the availability of
de novo review, minimized the potential effect of any conflict of interest
claim.10
2
It is interesting to note, however, that various nonconsensual ADR mecha-
nisms created at the state level for medical malpractice claims have not always
fared as well in the face of constitutional challenges as have the more generally
focused state and federal court-annexed arbitration programs. These programs103
vary greatly, both in fundamental design and in detail. Some programs, like
97. See, e.g., M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 175 (2d ed. 1979).
98. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), app. dism'd sub nom. Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858
(1958).
99. In reSmith, 381 Pa. at 231, 112 A.2d at 629.
100. 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
101. The losing party at trial had to pay all costs of both arbitration and trial if the court found
that de novo appeal had been taken arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 122, 394 A.2d at 939.
102. Id. at 131, 394 A.2d at 944.
103. See generally Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some
Questions It Raises, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 51 (1976) (examining wisdom and potential constitutional
infirmities of Virginia statute requiring prescreening and evaluation of malpractice claims by a panel
of attomeys and health care professionals); Moore, Constitutional Standards of Review for Medical
Malpractice Mediation Panels, 1 O110 ST. U.J. DISP. RES. 183 (1985) (surveying state court decisions
regarding constitutionality of mandatory prelitigation mediation in malpractice cases); Terry, The
Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 571 (1986)
(discussing many practical and constitutional problems encountered by states in using arbitration to deal
with perceived malpractice crisis); Comment, The Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Mediation
1990]
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that of Pennsylvania, have employed nonconsensual arbitration of malpractice
claims,1° 4 while others have required forms of mediation and claim evalua-
tion10 5 prior to litigation. Still other states have adopted special forms of
voluntary, legally binding arbitration. 10 6 State court decisions reviewing these
programs have varied as much as the programs themselves.
The experiences of Pennsylvania and Florida illustrate rather well the
ambivalence with which some courts have viewed nonconsensual medical
malpractice ADR. As mentioned above, in Parker v. Children's Hospital, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court drew heavily from its earlier decision upholding the
validity of Pennsylvania's court-annexed arbitration program to conclude that the
state's nonconsensual malpractice arbitration program did not contravene the right
to jury trial. Only two years after rejecting this facial challenge, however, the
same court ruled that substantial experience with the law's operation compelled
the conclusion that the right to jury trial had been unreasonably burdened. In
Mattos v. Thompson, the court held that the program had in fact caused unconscio-
nable delays that "burden[ed] the right to jury trial with 'onerous conditions,
restrictions or regulations which ... made the right practically unavailable."
10 7
Panels: A Maryland Perspective, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 75 (1979) (same, but with focus on Maryland
legislation); Note, The Michigan Medical Malpractice Act: Post-Morris v. Metriyakool, 4 CooLEY L.
REv. 173 (1986) (discussing Michigan legislation providing for voluntary, legally binding arbitration
of medical malpractice claims by specially structured panels, and decisions upholding statute's
validity); Comment, Mandatory State Malpractice Arbitration Boards and the Erie Problem: Edelson
v. Soricelli, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1562 (1980) (discussing the application of state malpractice arbitration
laws in federal court diversity of citizenship cases under the Erie doctrine); Recent Cases, Note,
Constitutional Law: Statutorily Required Mediation as a Precondition to Lawsuit Denies Access to the
Courts, 45 Mo. L. REV. 316 (1980) (discussing decision by Missouri Supreme Court invalidating
mandatory malpractice mediation statute under open courts provision of state constitution); Note, Civil
Procedure--Constitutional Law--Access to the Courts and the Medical Malpractice Act: Jiron v.
Mahlab, 14 N.M.L. REv. 503 (1984) (discussing decision by New Mexico Supreme Court invalidating
statute requiring prescreening and evaluation of malpractice claims by state Medical Review
Commission on ground that hindering access to courts violates due process); Note, Medical
Malpractice Arbitration: Time for a Model Act, 33 RLrGERs L. REV. 454 (1981) (surveying state
malpractice arbitration programs and suggesting uniform statute); Note, The Massachusetts Medical
Malpractice Statute: A Constitutional Perspective, 11 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 1289 (1977) (discussing
potential due process and equal protection problems with Massachusetts statute requiring prescreening
and evaluation of malpractice claims); Note, The Michigan Malpractice Act's Requirement of a
Physician on the Panel Violates the Due Process Right to a Fair and Impartial Tribunal, 28 WAYNE
L. REV. 1843 (1982) (arguing that Michigan law requiring malpractice arbitration panel to include a
physician violates due process guarantee of impartial tribunal, an argument that was later rejected by
the Michigan Supreme Court).
104. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§ 4101-4106 (Supp. 1987).
105. See MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
106. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065 (West Supp. 1989).
107. 491 Pa. 385, 395, 421 A.2d 190, 195 (1980) (quoting In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223 at 231, 112
A.2d 625 at 629 (Pa. 1955)). Apparently the Michigan experience was different. An empirical study
of the actual operation of Michigan's malpractice arbitration program revealed that the program
provided a cheaper and quicker forum for resolution than litigation. See Terry, supra note 103, at 573-
74 n.11. The Michigan program does differ in some important respects from that of Pennsylvania,
22
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In Florida, the state supreme court first upheld a mandatory prelitigation mediation
program against facial due process and right-to-jury-trial challenges. 10 8 Four
years later the same court struck down the program on these grounds because
actual experience had shown it to be "unworkable and inequitable in practical
operation." 10 9 In other states, various constitutional challenges to malpractice
ADR programs have been accepted and rejected with roughly equal frequen-
cy.11
0
Although the programs and the state court decisions scrutinizing them are
sufficiently disparate to resist generalization, one feature common to most
malpractice ADR programs may account for many of the constitutional difficulties
they have encountered. Unlike state and federal court-annexed arbitration
schemes, which tend to be simple and lean, most malpractice ADR statutes have
involved considerable complexity. Complexity invites delay and inefficiency,
which greatly increases the chances that restrictions on the right to jury trial and
on general access to the courts will be viewed as too great to withstand constitu-
tional challenge.
In contrast with pure common-law tort and contract disputes that are usually
the subject of court-annexed arbitration, other examples of nonconsensual
arbitration typically arise in an administrative setting. The disputes resolved by
these processes usually are integral parts of a broadly conceived regulatory
however. The most important difference is that in Michigan malpractice arbitration is voluntary,
although the composition of the panel and other particulars are regulated. Note, The Michigan Medical
Malpractice Act, supra note 103, at 175. It seems likely that consent might diminish the use of
delaying tactics by attorneys.
108. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
109. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 237 (Fla. 1980).
110. Compare Eastern v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (holding that
requirement of mediation before malpractice litigation did not violate state constitution's due process
clause, but that required payment of $2,000 bond prior to litigation did violate due process); Wright
v. Central Dupage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I11. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (holding that required mediation
prior to filing malpractice lawsuit violated separation of powers and jury trial provisions of state
constitution); Missouri ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979)
(finding mandatory malpractice mediation/claim evaluation statute violative of state constitution's open
courts provision); Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983) (same, using due process
rationale) with Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that
provision of Louisiana statute requiring review and evaluation by screening panel prior to litigation did
not violate due process or equal protection); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985
(1977) (finding that required mediation and posting of $2,000 bond prior to filing medical malpractice
suit did not violate either right to jury trial or open courts provisions of state constitution); Morris v.
Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984) (holding that statute requiring a health care
professional to be a member of the panel in a voluntary malpractice arbitration program did not violate
due process, in the absence of proof of actual bias); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483,
424 N.E.2d 586 (1981) (holding that required prelitigation arbitration in malpractice cases did not
violate equal protection clause or right to jury trial).
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scheme. The claims themselves may be either pure creations of statute,
111
statutorily modified replacements for common-law claims, 1 12 or occasionally
even traditional common-law tort and contract claims embedded in the fabric of
a regulatory program. 113 The multiemployer pension plan, commodity futures,
and FIFRA data arbitration systems selected for study are not the only instances
of nonconsensual regulatory arbitration to be found, but they are among the most
notable. 114 Moreover, they illustrate a spectrum of the many possible varia-
tions on the same general theme.
V. MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN ARBITRATION
A. Context and Properties
In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) to comprehensively regulate private pension plans. 115 The primary
goals of Congress were to encourage adequate funding of vested pension benefits,
prudent management of pension fund assets, and fulfillment of reasonable
111. Although at first blush one might view the claim for a share of pesticide data costs as a
statutorily modified replacement for a common-law trade secret claim, closer examination reveals the
claim to be purely a creation of federal statute. See infra text accompanying notes 364-67.
112. The claim by a multiemployer pension plan against a withdrawing employer can be viewed
primarily as a creation of federal statute, but also can be characterized as a modified substitute for a
contractual claim. See infra note 363 and accompanying text. In addition, some of the claims asserted
by a customer against a commodity futures broker, such as those asserting violations of the Commodity
Exchange Act's anti-fraud provisions, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982), represent statutorily modified replacements
for common-law claims. See infra text accompanying notes 360-62.
113. Several mechanisms are available for the resolution of disputes between customers and
commodity futures professionals, including arbitration, litigation, and an administrative reparations
proceeding. The reparations proceeding is limited to alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange
Act or the regulations of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In litigation or arbitration,
however, a customer may assert common-law tort and contract claims in addition to or instead of
statutory claims. Indeed, as is the case with arbitration generally, a customer does not have to frame
distinct legal theories at all when arbitrating a dispute with a broker or other commodity futures
professional because the arbitrator is not strictly bound to follow substantive legal rules. See Moylan
& Ukman, Dispute Resolution Systems in the Commodity Futures Industry, 6 J. FUTURES MKTS. 659
(1986); Raisler & Geldermann, The CFTC's New Reparation Rules: In Search of a Fair, Responsive,
and Practical Forum for Resolving Commodity-Related Disputes, 40 Bus. LAW. 537, 577-79 (1985);
White & Stein, Broker-Customer Arbitration: An Attractive Alternative to Litigation, 7 J. FutuRES
MKrs. 459 (1987).
114. Arbitration and arbitration-like decision models are found in a number of other regulatory
settings. For example, even though not denominated as arbitration, the use of carrier~appointed private
hearing officers to resolve Medicare claims disputes is essentially a form of legally binding arbitration
that closely resembles the traditional variety. See infra note 194.
115. Employee Income Retirement Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832
(codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)).
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employee pension expectations. 116 One of several problems identified by
Congress was that terminations of pension plans had deprived employees of
anticipated retirement benefits. 117  Consequently, Congress created in title IV
of ERISA an insurance program to guarantee payment of benefits to employees
and retirees whose pension plans terminate without sufficient assets to pay vested
benefits. 118 To provide insurance coverage, Congress established an indepen-
dent government corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC),
to collect premiums from insured plans and "to provide for the timely and uninter-
rupted Vayment of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries" of terminated
plans.1
19
There are several types of private pension plans, including single-employer
and multiemployer plans. As the term implies, a single-employer plan is
established and maintained by one employer for its employees. ERISA defines a
multiemployer plan as one to which more than one employer contributes and
which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements
between one or more employee organizations and more than one employer.
120
116. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982) (congressional statement of findings and purpose);
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) (discussing history of
ERISA).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
118. Id. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1381 (1982).
119. Id. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (1982).
120. Id. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(3) (1982). Even more fundamentally, pension plans may be
classified as either "defined contribution" plans or "defined benefit" plans. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34)-
(35) (1982). In a defined contribution plan, an employer determines, on an annual basis, the amount
of contribution to be made to the plan from profits. The amount can depend on the employer's
exercise of discretion or on one of a variety of formulas. Generally, employer contributions are
allocated to an individual employee's account and such contributions are based on the proportion of
his compensation to that of all the participating employees in the plan. An employee's benefits depend
on both the amount of employer contributions and the return on the pension trust's investments. A
defined benefit plan, on the other hand, aims to provide a fixed benefit to an employee over a period
of years, usually for life, after retirement. The benefit to be received is determined by a formula
specified in the plan and normally is calculated based on compensation and years of service.
Employees know the exact amount of the monthly pension they will receive at retirement. The
employer must make contributions to a defined benefit plan that are sufficient to fund this benefit, the
amount of such contributions being calculated actuarially. An employee covered by a defined benefit
plan is not directly affected by the return on the pension trust's investments, and contributions are not
made to individual accounts but are instead placed in a common fund from which individual benefits
are paid out. Obviously, the problem of liability for unfunded vested benefits arises in the case of a
defined benefit rather than a defined contribution plan. Defined benefit plans are the predominant
form. See Fischel & Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55
U. CIM. L. REV. 1105, 1112-13 (1988); The Second Circuit Review -- 1983-84 Term: Labor Law: The
Second Circuit Looks over the Rainbow of Discretion at ERISA Trustees' Accelerated Distribution
Decisions, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 997, 1003 n.39 (1985) (citing M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT
PLANS §§ 3.11-.12, .51 (1977)).
Multiemployer plans can be viewed as possessing hybrid defined-benefit and defined-contribution
attributes. Such a plan is a defined benefit one in that it sets benefit levels that are not tied to
individual accounts. A multiemployer plan does possess some defined contribution characteristics from
25
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Multiemployer plans have proved attractive because of their potential for lessening
industrial strife by fostering cooperation among employers, employees, and
unions. 12
1
Under ERISA's insurance scheme PBGC originally insured single- employer
plans unconditionally, but had substantial discretion over the insurance of
multiemployer plans. 12 2  If PBGC chose to underwrite the benefits of a
terminated multiemployer plan, it could recover its expenditures only from
employers who had contributed to the plan within the five years preceding
termination. 123  Consequently, when an employer withdrew from a multi-
employer plan its liability to the plan was merely a contingency. If the plan
terminated within five years from the date of the employer's withdrawal, and
PBGC covered the unfunded benefits upon termination, the withdrawing employer
was liable to PBGC for a proportionate share of PBGC's expenditures. An
employer who withdrew more than five years before the plan's termination
avoided liability, and the other employers who either remained in the plan until
termination or withdrew within five years before termination were left with a
disproportionate share of liability to PBGC. Although this total liability to PBGC
was limited to thirty percent of the employer's net worth, it nevertheless could
reach staggering proportions for those still in the plan at termination. 124
The law created a perverse incentive for each employer to withdraw from a
multiemployer plan before the other contributing employers did so. This incentive
was all the more powerful in a declining industry where the likelihood of
withdrawal by other employers was high as they closed plants or otherwise
contracted operations. As the number of participating employers diminished,
the employer's perspective, however, because the underlying collective bargaining agreement fixes the
amount the employer must contribute, typically an amount per month per covered employee. It is the
function and responsibility of the plan's trustees to align the benefit levels that the plan promises with
the expected contribution levels. See Fischel & Langbein, id. at 1113. By imposing a set of subsidiary
liabilities on employers for shortfalls in certain circumstances, the 1980 amendments to ERISA, infra
text accompanying notes 126-35, cause multiemployer plans to look even more like pure defined
benefit plans. Id. at 1113 n.41.
121. See Note, MPPAA Withdrawal Liability Assessment: Letting the Fox Guard the Henhouse,
14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 219 (1986).
122. PBGC's coverage of multiemployer plans was originally discretionary because Congress
had "substantial uncertainty as to the need for ... insurance in the case of multiemployer plans and
the effects of insuring such plans." See H.R. REP. No. 869, Part II, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2993, 3001.
123. See H.R. REP. No. 869, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2918, 2922 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 869(I)]. Employers participating in a
multiemployer plan had to pay insurance premiums to PBGC regardless of PBGC's subsequent decision
whether to underwrite an underfunded plan. Id. at 55, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2923.
124. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(2) (1982) (limiting liability to PBGC to 30 percent of net worth).
See also H.R. REP. No. 869(f), supra note 123, at 54, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2922.
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remaining employers would feel growing pressure to withdraw as their share of
potential liability increased.
125
Corrective action was taken by Congress in 1980 in the form of the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), 126 which amended
title IV of ERISA to impose mandatory withdrawal liability on employers and an
accompanying set of assessment and collection procedures. 127  An employer
leaving a multiemployer pension plan must pay to the plan a proportionate share
of its "unfunded vested benefit liability" irrespective of when withdrawal occurs
or whether the entire plan terminates. 128  The plan itself, acting through its
board of trustees, determines the fact and date of withdrawal, as well as the
amount of a withdrawing employer's liability. 129 The board, the membership
of which is designated in the document establishing the plan trust, must have equal
representation from employees and contributing employers. 130 Trustees owe
a strict fiduciary duty to act exclusively in the interests of the plan's participants
(covered employees) and their beneficiaries.13 1 The plan not only has substan-
tial discretionary authority to determine the fact and date of withdrawal, but it also
has exceptionally wide latitude in calculating the amount of withdrawal liabili-
ty. 132 The plan may select from among four methods for calculating the
amount of a withdrawing employer's liability, or may adopt its own method with
PBGC approval. 13 3 Regardless of the method chosen, the amount of any given
assessment depends heavily on the use of actuarial assumptions about employees'
life expectancies, retirement ages, and future rates of return on the plan's
125. See H.R. REP. No. 869(I), supra note 123, at 61, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2929.
126. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 26 and 29
U.S.C.).
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1401 (1982).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (1982) (establishing mandatory liability); 29 U.S.C. § 1393(c) (1982)
(defining "unfunded vested benefits" as "an amount equal to--the value of nonforfeitable benefits under
the plan, less the value of the assets in the plan").
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982).
130. See Labor Management Relations Act, § 302(cX5XB), 29 U.S.C. § 186(cX5XB) (1982)
(authorizing employer-financed trust funds for the benefit of employees with the proviso that employers
and employees be represented equally in trust administration).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1982) (providing that the plan's trustees owe a fiduciary duty); 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982) (defining the scope of that fiduciary duty).
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1383, 1385 (1982) (describing events of complete and partial withdrawal).
See Note, Trading Fairness for Efficiency: Constitutionality of the Dispute Resolution Procedures of
the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 71 GEO. L.J. 161, 166-69 (1982) (discussing
discretion of pension plan trustees); Note,Administrative Law--Decisionmaker Bias and the Procedural
Due Process Rights of Withdrawing Employers Under the MPPAA, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 227, 230-
31 & n.26 (same).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982). Once a calculation method is adopted by a plan, however, it
must be applied uniformly with respect to each employer who subsequently withdraws, and new rules
or amendments adopted by the plan may not be applied retroactively. 29 U.S.C. § 1394 (1982).
1990]
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investments. 134 Acting within the expanse of this discretion, a plan may even
impose liability in an amount exceeding a withdrawing employer's net
worth.13
5
Disagreements between the plan and an employer concerning withdrawal
liability must be resolved in binding arbitration. 136 Although either the plan,
the employer, or both jointly may request arbitration, the incentive to seek review
clearly lies with the withdrawing employer. 137  If arbitration is not sought
within the statutorily prescribed time, the liability amount set by the plan
automatically becomes final and may be collected by the plan through an
enforcement proceeding in either state or federal court.138  Arbitration of a
dispute concerning the existence or amount of withdrawal liability does not take
place on a clean slate. Instead, the arbitration panel must presume that the plan's
determination is correct, and can overturn that determination only if the employer
"shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the determination was unreason-
able or clearly erroneous." 
139
Either party may seek review of the arbitral decision in federal district court.
Three different standards of review are employed for alleged errors in the
arbitrator's fact findings, statutory interpretations, and conduct of the proceedings.
On the whole, the review is quite circumscribed. When the arbitrator's factual
findings are challenged, the court must operate from a strong presumption that the
findings are correct and may overturn them only on the basis of "a clear
preponderance" of contrary evidence. 140 This review standard is quite similar
to that required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for appellate review of
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1) (1982) (requiring only that the plan use actuarial assumptions and
methods that "in the aggregate, are reasonable," and that "in combination, offer the actuary's best
estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"). See generally Note, Trading Fairness for
Efficiency, supra note 132, at 167-68 (discussing substantial element of discretion in making actuarial
assumptions).
In Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, Inc.,
762 F.2d 1137, 1150 (1st Cir. 1985) (Aldrich, dissenting), the dissenting judge challenged the
majority's statement that the duties of plan trustees were largely ministerial by asking "But, how
'ministerial' is it for the trustees to select, as here, a discount rate of 7 1/2% for determining future
values, an interest rate unheard of in my memory in a decade, while the Fund's actuary admitted the
rate could reasonably have been set at 14 1/2%?"
135. See Shelter Framing Corp. v. Carpenters Pension Trust, 543 F. Supp. 1234 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(plan assessed employer's withdrawal liability at twice its net assets), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 705 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1982) (prescribing time limits for initiation of arbitration by either
party or jointly).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1) (1982).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(A) (1982).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1982).
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a trial court's fact findings in a nonjury trial. 14 1 Despite its very limited scope,
judicial review of the arbitrator's fact findings under MPPAA is still greater than
in the case of consensual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, where it
is nonexistent. 142  The second type of review occurs when an arbitrator's
interpretation of the statute itself is challenged. Although the MPPAA is silent on
the standards for judicial review of such questions, the courts have held that the
review is de novo.1 4 3 This stands in sharp contrast to the complete absence of
merit review in consensual arbitration, but most of the arbitrator's important
liability-related determinations under MPPAA are factual in nature and thus
subject only to a clearly erroneous review standard.144  The third form of
review, which applies to nonsubstantive issues such as alleged procedural
unfairness or arbitrator misconduct, follows the standards provided in the Federal
Arbitration Act for review of consensual arbitration. This review is extremely
limited. 1
45
141. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (trial judge's findings of fact to be set aside only if clearly
erroneous). A finding is clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a) only if the appellate court "is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL CouRTS 647-51
(4th ed. 1983).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 45, 55.
143. Although MPPAA itself says nothing about statutory interpretation by the arbitrator or
judicial review of such interpretation, the federal courts have held that this review is de novo. See
Union Asphalts & Roadoils, Inc. v. MO-KAN Teamsters Pension Fund, Inc., 857 F.2d 1230, 1233 (8th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1748 (1989); Trustees of the Amalgam. Ins. Fund v. Geltman
Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 926, 928-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986); Board of Trustees of
the W. Conf. of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396,
1405-06 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); LAM Nat'l Pension Fund Benefit Plan
C v. Stockton Tri Indus., 727 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Republic Indus., Inc. Teamsters
Joint Council No. 83 Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 641 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259
(1984).
144. The fundamental questions of whether there has been a withdrawal, when the withdrawal
occurred, which calculation method to use, and what actuarial assumptions to make are factual in
nature. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently made it even clearer than
before that the minimal scrutiny provided for by the clearly erroneous standard will almost always
apply. The court held that the clearly erroneous standard of review also applies to "mixed questions
of law and fact"--questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is
undisputed, and the issue is whether the rule of law as applied to the facts is or is not violated.
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Pension Fund v. Louis Zahn Drug Co., 890
F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1989).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(3) (1982) (incorporating provisions of Federal Arbitration Act, except
as modified). See Federal Arbitration Act, § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982) (grounds for setting aside
arbitration award in consensual arbitration). See also supra note 55.
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B. A Constitutional Potpourri: Taking, Due Process, Jury
Trial, and Encroachment on Article III Judicial Power
The withdrawal liability provisions of MPPAA engendered a substantial
amount of constitutional litigation, only some of which related to the dispute
resolution mechanism. In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray &
Co.,14 6 decided in 1984, the Supreme Court ruled that the action of Congress
in making the withdrawal liability provisions retroactively effective to a date five
months prior to the Act's passage was sufficiently rational to withstand a
substantive due process challenge. Two years later the Court rejected a general
and relatively insubstantial takings clause challenge in Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp.
147
From 1983 to 1985 six courts of appeals upheld MPPAA in the face of
multifaceted constitutional attacks. 148 Several of these courts rejected substan-
tive due process challenges of the type rejected by the Supreme Court in R.A.
Gray.14 9 Employers also claimed that being required to begin payment of the
withdrawal liability assessed by the plan before arbitral or judicial review of that
assessment violated the hearing requirement of procedural due process. Applying
the balancing model of Mathews v. Eldridge,150 the courts faced with this
146. 467 U.S. 717 (1984). After Gray, however, Congress mooted the point by removing the
retroactivity feature. Deficit Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 558(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 899 (1984).
147. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
148. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 762
F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'g en banc, 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984); Board of Trustees of the W.
Conf. of Teamsters Pension Fund v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Washington Star v. International Typographical Union Negotiated
Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye &
Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Peick v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp., 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint
Council No. 83 Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
149. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984). See Thompson
Bldg. Materials, 749 F.2d at 1401-03; Washington Star, 729 F.2d at 1507-11; Standard Dye, 725 F.2d
at 849-54; Pleick, 724 F.2d at 1262-74; Republic Industries, 718 F.2d at 635-39.
150. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The court in Republic Industries relied, at least nominally, on
Mathews to conclude that MPPAA's dispute resolution scheme does not violate the withdrawing
employer's procedural due process rights by requiring payment before providing any opportunity for
a full evidentiary hearing. 718 F.2d at 639-40. In Mathews, an individual who had been receiving
Social Security disability payments for several years challenged the later termination of those benefits.
424 U.S. at 324-25. After a periodic review of medical reports and a questionnaire that had been
completed by the recipient, the state monitoring agency determined that he was no longer disabled.
Id. at 323-24. The Social Security Administration accepted the state agency's findings and terminated
the benefits. Id. at 324. The recipient challenged the action, claiming a procedural due process right
to a pretermination evidentiary hearing. Id. at 324-25. The Supreme Court balanced (1) the recipient's
private property interest in uninterrupted benefits pending final administrative resolution; (2) the risk
of erroneous deprivation of that interest in a process that relied on medical evaluations by the
recipient's' own physician, a comprehensive questionnaire filled out by the recipient (with assistance
available upon request from the local social security office), and complete access by the recipient to
30
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contention concluded that the existing procedures were sufficient and that a full
evidentiary hearing prior to the commencement of payments was not required by
procedural due process. 15 1 It was also urged that placing decision-making
authority in the hands of the plan's trustees, subject only to limited review by an
arbitration panel and even more limited review by a court, amounted to a denial
of the right to jury trial. This claim was easily rejected because of two well-
established seventh amendment principles. First, the right to jury trial exists only
for a claim that either was known and jury-triable under the common law of
England around 1791 when the amendment was ratified, or is a statutory creation
closely analogous in nature and remedy to such a common-law claim. Second,
there is no right to a jury trial when determination of a claim has been placed in
the hands of an administrative tribunal, apparently irrespective of the nature of the
claim.
152
A claim that the dispute resolution system amounts to a delegation of judicial
power to a nonjudicial tribunal in violation of Article III of the Constitution was
rejected on the grounds that (1) withdrawal liability was borne solely of a
congressional regulatory effort, so that Congress could have determined it
unilaterally, and (2) judicial review was sufficient to view the plan and arbitrator
as analogous to the fact-finding adjuncts that had been approved by the Supreme
Court in other contexts. 153 Necessary to this conclusion, of course, was the
preliminary determination that the judicial review provided for in MPPAA was
meaningful; only if such review was meaningful could the fact-finding functions
of the plan and arbitrator be characterized as judicial "adjuncts."154
all information relied on by the state agency; (3) the public interest manifested in the administrative
burden and other social costs that would accompany a constitutional right to a full pretermination
evidentiary hearing; and (4) the likelihood that additional procedural safeguards would diminish
substantially the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest. Id. at 335-49. This analysis led
the Court to conclude that the existing process was sufficient to meet procedural due process
requirements. Id. at 349.
151. Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1140; Thompson Bldg. Materials, 749 F.2d at 1404; Standard
Dye, 725 F.2d at 854; Republic Industries, 718 F.2d at 639-40.
152. Thompson Bldg. Materials, 749 F.2d at 1404; Washington Star, 729 F.2d at 1511; Standard
Dye, 725 F.2d at 854-55; Peick, 724 F.2d at 1277. These courts relied primarily on Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), in which the Court concluded
that, in the case of rights created by federal statutes within the power of Congress to enact, the seventh
amendment does "not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact-finding function and initial adjudication
to an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible," id. at 450, even if the seventh
amendment would require a jury trial had Congress assigned the adjudication of those rights "to a
federal court of law instead of an administrative agency." Id. at 455.
153. Thompson Bldg. Materials, 749 F.2d at 1404-06.
154. Id. at 1406; Washington Star, 729 F.2d at 1511; Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 855; Peick, 724
F.2d at 1277; Republic Industries, 718 F.2d at 641. The issue of encroachment on the structural
integrity of the Article III federal judiciary is explored thoroughly in the discussion of FIFRA data
arbitration, supra text accompanying notes 443-531.
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C. Structural Bias and Procedural Due Process
1. A Question of Loyalties
Although forming only part of the constitutional broadside leveled at MPPAA,
the most serious challenge to the statute focused on the fundamental fairness of
the procedures and presumptions contained in the statute's dispute resolution
system. The essential basis for these challenges was the weight given to an initial
determination by a body (the plan's trustees) that is not likely to be impartial.
This theory was considered by five of the six circuits that upheld the validity of
the statute.15
5
As observed earlier, employers and employees are equally represented on a
plan's board of trustees. One can argue cogently that, from the perspective of a
withdrawing employer, a decision-making entity so constituted is not an impartial
tribunal as required by procedural due process. 156 All of the trustees owe a
statutorily prescribed fiduciary duty to act exclusively in the interests of the plan's
participants (employees) and their beneficiaries. 157 Adding to the probable
predisposition created by fiduciary obligation, those trustees representing
employees are likely to have powerful incentives to make any assumptions and
exercise any discretionary judgment in such a way as to maximize the withdrawing
employer's liability. Moreover, even the employer representatives as a group
would seem to have strong incentives to insure that a presently withdrawing
employer pay as much as possible toward unfunded vested benefits, so as to
reduce the future liability exposure of other employers.
158
The statute does provide a check on this tendency of employer-affiliated
trustees when they select a formula for calculating liability, in that the plan must
use the same formula to determine the liability of other withdrawing employers
in the future. 159 Employer representatives on the board of trustees thus know
that their choice today may affect their own company tomorrow. One cannot
know for sure whether an employer representative's apprehension of similar
155. The decision-maker bias question was not considered in Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983).
156. The essential guarantee of the due process clause is that of fairness. The procedure must
be fundamentally fair to the individual in the resolution of the factual and legal basis for government
actions which deprive him of life, liberty or property.
While different situations may entail different types of procedures, there is always the general
requirement that the government process be fair and impartial. Therefore, there must be some
type of neutral and detached decision-maker, be it a judge, hearing officer or agency. The Court
has continually held that "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."
This requirement applies to agencies and government hearing officers as well as judges.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 487 (3d ed. 1986) (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1965)).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982).
158. See Note, Trading Fairness for Efficiency, supra note 132, at 168.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 1394(b) (1982).
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treatment for his company in the event of future withdrawal will offset his
incentive to reduce unfunded vested benefits immediately. In general, it is to be
expected that a present certainty will influence behavior more than a future
uncertainty. Consequently, the uniformity requirement probably checks the
liability-maximization motive only in the case of a trustee who knows that his own
employer is very likely also to withdraw in the reasonably near term while
substantial vested benefits are still unfunded.
Even if the uniformity requirement does provide a meaningful constraint on
the formula-selection decision by an employer representative on the board, the
statute does not provide the same kind of checks on trustees when they make
highly discretionary actuarial assumptions. The actuarial assumptions for a
specific withdrawing employer merely must be reasonable in the aggregate,
160
and as factual determinations they carrf, very strong presumptions of reasonable-
ness to the arbitral and judicial fora. 1 1 Therefore, regardless of whether there
is personal bias on the part of any given trustee, the decision model for withdrawal
liability determinations incorporates structural bias of sufficient magnitude to raise
serious procedural due process concerns. 16 2 The heavy presumptions in favor
of the correctness of the plan's, and later the arbitrator's, factual determinations
may compound the problem, because a decision maker's behavior is no doubt
affected by foreknowledge of the kind of review to which its decisions are to be
subjected. At the very least, these presumptions do nothing to assuage uneasiness
about the system's unfairness.
2. Judicial Analysis of MPPAA's Structural Bias
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first considered a
procedural due process challenge based on alleged structural bias in Republic
Industries, Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83.163 The court rejected the
challenge for several reasons and upheld MPPAA's dispute resolution system.
First, the Fourth Circuit stated that the trustees' fiduciary duties do not create a
facially unfair bias. Describing the allegation of trustee bias as "little more than
'generalized assumptions of possible interest' unsupported by any evidence other
than a description of the institutional role of the trustees,"' the court indicated that
particularized substantiation of the allegation would be necessary. 164 The court
emphasized that membership on a plan's board must consist of equal representa-
tion from employers and employees, and that they "are fiduciaries and must act
as such." 16 5 And to prohibit tribunals composed of individuals drawn from
160. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1) (1982).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3) (1982).
162. See infra text accompanying notes 177-219.
163. 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983).
164. Id. at 640 n.13 (quoting Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196 (1982)).
165. Id. at 640.
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organizations interested in the matter being regulated would, the court felt, "deny
the tribunal valuable, and perhaps otherwise unavailable, expertise." 166 Second,
the court emphasized that the trustees' decision-making function is not totally
discretionary, but is subject to some constraints under the statute because (1) they
must select one of four calculation formulas or obtain PBGC approval for any
other, and (2) their actuarial assumptions must be reasonable in the aggre-
gate.167 Third, the court observed that the presumptions of correctness merely
"shifted the burden of proof to the challenger," and concluded that the review of
the plan's liability assessment is not "meaningless."
168
Chronologically, courts in the Second, 169 District of Columbia,
170
Ninth, 171 and First 172 Circuits followed Republic Industries' rejection of the
decision-maker bias claim, tracking the Fourth Circuit's analysis in all important
respects. On the question of whether structural bias exists at all, three courts
added the observation that the trustees' fiduciary duties to the plan did not impose
upon them an absolute duty to choose calculation rules and assumptions producing
the highest possible liability for a withdrawing employer. 17  According to
these three courts, the fiduciary status of trustees instead requires them to act
neutrally and reasonably. 174  Indeed, in Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New
England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, Inc., the First Circuit
continued this reasoning to the point of arguing that trustees possibly could even
be found in violation of their fiduciary duties by imposing liability so unconscio-
nably high as to discourage prospective plan entrants from joining in the
future. 17 ' Ultimately, four of the five circuit courts denied that there was any
structural bias at all in the withdrawal liability determination. In Keith Fulton,
166. Id.
167. Id. at 640-41.
168. Id. at 641.
169. Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., Inc., 725 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
170. Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729
F.2d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
171. Board of Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Thompson
Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
172. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 762
F.2d 1137 (lst Cir. 1985), rev'g en banc, 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984).
173. Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1142; Thompson Bldg. Materials, 749 F.2d at 1404; Washington
Star, 729 F.2d at 1511.
174. Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1142; Thompson Bldg. Materials, 749 F.2d at 1403; Washington
Star, 729 F.2d at 1511.
175. Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1142-43. The First Circuit based this argument on the statement
in MPPAA's legislative history that the choice by trustees of a calculation rule that eliminates or
reduces a withdrawing employer's liability would not be a per se violation of their fiduciary duty to
the plan. See H.R. REt'. No. 869(I), supra note 123, at 67, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2935.
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however, the First Circuit did admit the presence of such bias but concluded that
it is not of sufficient magnitude to violate due process.
176
The reasoning of Republic Industries and its progeny is troubling in some
ways. As Justice Scalia, paraphrasing Churchill, recently said in a different
context, the courts' supporting statements "contain much that is obviously true, and
much that is relevant; unfortunately, what is obviously true is not relevant, and
what is relevant is not obviously true."
17 7
The Fourth Circuit's first point, that the trustees' fiduciary status creates no
meaningful bias, is questionable as a factual proposition. What this group of
courts apparently would require to support a claimed lack of decision-maker
impartiality is either direct proof of subjective personal bias, or at least strong
evidence of a personal stake in particular outcomes so as to compel an inference
of subjective personal bias. There is no question that this kind of evidence usually
would lead to a conclusion that procedural due process standards have been
infringed, but structural bias should also count. Indeed, subjective personal bias
probably produces skewed results over time to a lesser extent than the kind of
structural or institutional bias apparently present in MPPAA trustee decision
making. Moreover, determining whether subjective personal bias exists involves
a fact-finding process that is far less reliable than the process of identifying
structural bias, because the former is less susceptible of substantiation and more
easily disguised than the latter.
The First Circuit's additional rationale for finding no bias in Keith Fulton may
be a true statement, but its relevance is tenuous. The court stated that the trustees'
fiduciary obligations do not require them to impose the highest possible liability,
and that they might actually violate their duties if they imposed such great liability
on a withdrawing employer as to dissuade other employers as prospective plan
entrants. 178 Although perhaps true in the abstract, it is difficult to envision
such an occurrence because proving a causal connection between trustee action
and later nonentry would be practically impossible. Even if true, however, the
argument proves little. It requires a quantum leap to get from (a) a bias-produced
surcharge on withdrawal liability that is large enough to harm a withdrawing
employer to (b) a similarly actuated liability increment that is so unconscionably
high as to harm the plan in the long term by discouraging future entry. Moreover,
future entry might even be stimulated by the prospect of a plan less encumbered
by underfunded vested benefits.
In the Fourth Circuit's second point, which emphasized that the trustees do
not act with completely unbridled discretion, the court could be interpreted as
saying that a tribunal can be viewed as impermissibly biased only when its
discretion is limitless. This, of course, is just not true, and it is doubtful that the
176. Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1143.
177. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1399 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
178. Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1142-43.
19901
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court really meant such a thing.179 The nature and extent of limits placed on
a decision maker's discretion are no doubt relevant to the question of whether
structural bias so tends toward unfair results as to violate due process. But a
slight limitation on the discretion of a decision maker will not suffice to cure
structural bias that otherwise is manifestly unfair. What the court surely must
have meant is that the constraints imposed by MPPAA on the discretion of plan
trustees were substantial enough to overcome any possible structural bias, a bias
which the Fourth Circuit and the other courts in this group thought nonexistent or
trivial in any event. The contrary position is, however, quite tenable. The limits
MPPAA does impose on the discretion of plan trustees leave room for a great deal
of judgmental latitude, so much so that whatever structural bias exists in the
system is insufficiently arrested.
The third reason for rejecting the employer's claim of a predisposed tribunal,
that the statute's presumptions of correctness merely shift the burden of proof to
the employer, is an indisputably true statement. Because of the virtual ex parte
nature of the initial determination by the plan, 180 the subsequent arbitration
proceeding possibly should not be characterized as a review at all. Thus, one can
view the presumptions in favor of the plan's liability calculation as creating a
reverse burden of proof in the first instance rather than a burden of demonstrating
error to a reviewing body.18 1 Even if this is an accurate characterization of the
179. Constitutionally impermissible decision-maker bias has been found despite the existence
of.checks on the decision maker's discretion. One example is Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 188-89, in which a due process violation
was found in the system by which a mayor levied fines as a judge in traffic cases and also exercised
substantial authority over a city budget that depended heavily on revenue from such fines, the mayor's
discretion as a judge was constrained both by the standards inherent in applicable traffic laws and by
appellate review.
Although it would seem that the court in Republic Industries could not really have meant that
only "unbridled" discretion in the hands of a structurally biased decision maker would violate due
process, this same language was used by another court in upholding MPPAA's decision process. See
Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1141. Although the other courts upholding MPPAA would not admit of any
bias at all on the part of trustees, it is interesting to note that the court in Keith Fulton accepted the
argument that some bias was present. This court, then, seems to have been of the view that some
degree of structural bias is permissible even in the presence of very great discretion.
180. The plan's board of trustees calculates withdrawal liability, notifies the employer, and
demands payment on an installment schedule. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1) (1982). Within ninety days
after being notified of the liability amount, the employer may ask the plan to review its assessment.
29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(A) (1982). After a "reasonable review," the plan notifies the employer of its
final determination. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(B) (1982).
181. Rather than treating MPPAA's presumptions as a purely procedural burden-of-proof
reversal, one court reviewed the presumptions under the rational basis standard of substantive due
process. See Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1143-44. Not surprisingly, because of the ease with which
rationality may be demonstrated in almost any modem regulatory measure affecting only property
rights, the presumptions were upheld as a logical means of expediting dispute resolution within a
federal program. Id. The court in Keith Fulton probably characterized the presumptions incorrectly
and applied the wrong standard. See United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local
No. 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an
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presumptions, however, it proves little. There are many possible degrees of
presumption and contrary proof in legal decision processes, and a degree that is
appropriate in the case of an initial decision maker without any hint of bias is not
necessarily appropriate for one with demonstrable incentives to favor one of two
participants in a zero-sum game.
MPPAA's procedures and presumptions finally did encounter a measure of
judicial resistance. A panel of the First Circuit in Keith Fulton followed some
aspects of the foregoing critical analysis to find the structural bias and presump-
tions of MPPAA to be violative of procedural due process. 182 After a rehear-
ing en banc, however, the full court followed the other four circuits and rejected
the employer's due process challenge. 183 In 1986, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United Retail & Wholesale Employees
Teamsters LocalNo. 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., concluded that
the structural bias and presumptions attending the withdrawal liability deter-
mination create a decision system fundamentally flawed by unfairness. 184 The
court also found, however, that this bias does not taint the process beyond repair.
With adequate review, the court concluded, the existing system would be valid.
Further finding the system of presumptions and review to be severable from the
remainder of the statute, the court removed them and produced a scheme in which
plans make determinations as before but are now subject to de novo review in
arbitration. 185 The decision was then affirmed by an equally divided Supreme
Court, which of course creates no high court precedent and leaves the system
partially void only in the Third Circuit. 1
86
3. An Elaboration on the Constitutional Status of
Structural Bias
It is not entirely clear how important the occurrence of a purely structural bias
will be in procedural due process examinations of nonconsensual regulatory
dispute resolution. Until recently, the Supreme Court's decisions seemed to view
such bias with great suspicion. In Tumey v. Ohio, a unanimous 1927 decision
written by Chief Justice Taft, the Court found constitutionally deficient a
procedure by which a town's mayor received, as compensation for services as a
judge in prohibition law cases, the court costs assessed against convicted
equally divided Court sub nom. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 481 U.S.
735 (1987).
182. 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984), rev'd en banc, 762 F.2d 1137 (lst Cir. 1985).
183. 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'g en banc, 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984).
184. 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 481 U.S. 735 (1987).
185. 787 F.2d at 142-44.
186. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Local No. 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn &
McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub noa. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 481 U.S. 735 (1987).
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defendants. 187 Tumey, of course, involved a decision maker with such a
striking personal stake in the outcome of its decisions that the case is not
especially helpful in guiding the resolution of really close due process questions.
Almost fifty years later, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, the Court again found
a due process violation in the operation of Ohio's mayor's court system, this time
on the basis of an exclusively structural bias. 188 The mayor served not only
as the municipality's executive officer with budget execution authority, but also
as judge of the municipal court that heard cases involving certain traffic offenses
and city ordinance violations. Fines collected by this court accounted for about
forty percent of the town's total revenue. Although there was no evidence of
subjective personal bias or individual stake in particular outcomes, the Court found
that the structural bias indigenous to such a system contravened the right to an
impartial tribunal. The stake of the mayor in Ward appears to be neither greater
nor more direct than that of the plan trustees under MPPAA. Because the cases
heard by the mayor's court were criminal in nature, however, Ward admittedly
involved stronger private interests than are found in the decision-making processes
of MPPAA and most other regulatory programs.
189
The next year after Ward the Court extended its concern about structural bias
to the regulatory realm in Gibson v. Berryhill.190 There the Court held that
procedural due process was violated by the decision of a State Board of Optometry
revoking the licenses of "all optometrists in the State who were employed by
business corporations." The action was invalidated because the Board of
Optometry consisted solely of self-employed optometrists in private practice, those
whose licenses were revoked accounted for almost one-half of all practicing
optometrists in the state, and the Board's action could result in personal gain to
Board members because of reduced competition. 19 1 In one sense, the personal
stake of plan trustees in withdrawal liability decisions is not as direct as the stake
of the Optometry Board members. The stake of employer representatives on a
plan's board of trustees is vicarious because the possible benefits of their decisions
redound to their employers, whereas the stake of Optometry Board members was
not merely vicarious because they were self-employed practitioners and would
personally receive the benefits of lessened competition. On the other hand, the
position of employee representatives on a plan's board of trustees more closely
approximates that of Optometry Board members because they and the group they
187. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
188. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
189. In this regard, however, the comments of Judge Aldrich, who dissented in Keith Fulton,
are interesting: "The court does not seek to distinguish Ward as being a criminal case, but if one did,
I would ask what would one prefer to have decided by a biased decision-maker, a traffic fine or a
$468,000 assessment? This is financial life." Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters
& Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1137, 1150 (1st Cir. 1985), (Aldrich, J., dissenting), rev'g
en banc, 762 F.2d 1124 (lst Cir. 1984).
190. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
191. Id. at 578-79.
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represent directly benefit from the actualization of their bias. One may look at the
comparison between plan trustees and Optometry Board members from an entirely
different perspective, however: current payments on account of a withdrawal
liability assessment immediately reduce unfunded vested benefits and the
corresponding risk to both the employers and employees represented by plan
trustees, whereas the benefit to Optometry Board members must work its way
through the market and is subject to the vicissitudes of competition. Viewed in
this way, the stake of plan trustees is at least as direct as that of Optometry Board
members.
Because of the exparte nature of the trustees' liability determination, coupled
with the somewhat questionable view of their role as entailing little or no
discretionary judgment, several courts have characterized the withdrawal liability
decision of pension plan trustees as more closely akin to a prosecutorial exercise
rather than an adjudicatory one. 192 The subsequent decision of the arbitrator
obviously is adjudicatory, but that is not where the alleged bias exists. If we do
in fact identify the plan's decisions as quasi-prosecutorial, the presence of purely
structural bias may be less likely to offend current Supreme Court thinking on the
extent to which such bias can be tolerated. In the past decade, the Court seems
to have evidenced less concern about structural bias, especially in situations where
the questioned decisions are not obviously of a traditional adjudicatory charac-
ter.
193
192. See Republic Industries, 718 F.2d at 640 n.13, where the court noted that plan trustees
perform a function that is not purely adjudicatory, but instead "play a mixed role since much, but
admittedly not all, of their task is ministerial in nature." This observation was based, however, on the
court's uncompelling position that trustees exercise little discretionary judgment. See also Thompson
Bldg. Materials, 749 F.2d at 1404 (following the conclusion and supporting rationale of Republic
Industries on this point).
See also Keith Fulton, 762 F.2d at 1140, where the court stated that it did "not perceive the
trustees to be performing an adjudicatory role when they calculate the withdrawal liability." In so
characterizing the trustees' function, however, the court in Keith Fulton seemed to view the
performance of an "adjudicatory" role as being exclusively the province of judges. This, of course,
is not the case at all. Many nonjudicial decision makers perform obviously adjudicatory functions.
193. It must be noted that not everyone shares in the perception of the trustees' function as
nonadjudicatory. In United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Local No. 115 Pension Plan v.
Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 141 n.18 (3d Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2171 (1987), the
court felt compelled to "reject the suggestion, advanced tangentially by the majority in Keith Fulton,
that the trustees' role is not adjudicative in nature. The trustees perform the judicial task of making
case-by-case determinations significantly affecting the property of employers." The court contrasted
the facts in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980), discussed infra at text accompanying notes
194-202. The court observed that in Jerrico the Supreme Court's identification of the decision maker's
function as prosecutorial rather than judicial was based on the finding that he "rules on no disputed
factual or legal questions." Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 247. In Yahn & McDonnell, on the other hand, the
court said that plan trustees "must frequently make complex legal and factual determinations." 787
F.2d at 141 n.18.
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In Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,19 4 the due process issue focused on the
procedure for collecting fines under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 195 The unit
of the Labor Department responsible for assessing such fines, the Employment
Standards Administration (ESA), retains the fines to cover the costs of determining
violations and fixing penalties. These funds are then distributed to the ESA's
regional offices, the point in the organization where an assistant regional
administrator makes the actual fine assessment. The Court rejected the contention
that this system created an impermissible risk of bias by encouraging assistant
regional administrators "to make unduly numerous and large assessments of civil
penalties."'196 The Court concluded that the assistant regional administrator's
duties "resemble those of a prosecutor more closely than those of a judge," 197
because of the fact that his authority extended only to the assessment of fines and
his determination of the appropriate amount was appealable to an administrative
law judge. 198 Because of the quasi-prosecutorial nature of the assistant regional
administrator's duties, the Court felt that the strict standards of Tumey and Ward
were inapplicable. 199  The Court then emphasized two characteristics of the
challenged decision model that provided further support for its conclusion that no
impermissible decision-maker bias existed. First, the assistant regional adminis-
trator's salary was fixed by law, so that he personally could not benefit economi-
cally from his decisions.20° Second, the amounts received as fines represented
substantially less than one percent of ESA's budget, and were allocated to regional
offices on the basis of expenses incurred rather than fines collected. 20 1 Thus,
the Court found no meaningful probability that the decision maker's judgment
would be distorted by the prospect of institutional gain.
20 2
The structural bias inherent in the MPPAA withdrawal liability assessment
procedure is more direct and of greater magnitude than that present in the system
examined in Jerrico. This distinction, plus the fact that the Court elsewhere has
shown that it is at least possible for structural bias in the design of an assessment
or quasi-prosecutorial decision system to be serious enough to offend due
process, 2 3 still leaves some room for doubt about the validity of an MPPAA-
194. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
195. Fair Labor Standards Act, § 16(e), 29 U.S.C. § 216(e) (1982).
196. 446 U.S. at 241.
197. Id. at 243.
198. 29 C.F.R. §§ 579, 580 (1988).
199. 446 U.S. at 243.
200. See 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (1982).
201. 446 U.S. at 245.
202. Id. at 250.
203. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), three defendants
were enjoined by a federal district court from infringing a trademark. After subsequently discovering
that the defendants continued to infringe the trademark in violation of the injunction, two attorneys for
the trademark owner requested that the district court appoint them as special counsel to prosecute a
criminal contempt action against defendants. The court did so and the defendants ultimately were
40
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type model. Jerrico does make it clear, however, that evidence of a purely
structural bias must rise to a much higher level to support a claimed due process
violation in this kind of decision system than in a system with more traditional
adjudicatory characteristics.
In the past decade, evidence of diminished concern over structural bias can
even be found in two of the Court's decisions scrutinizing regulatory decision
systems that possess more adjudicatory properties than exist in the MPPAA trustee
determination. In Schweiker v. McClure,20 4 the Court analyzed the Medicare
scheme for federal reimbursement of insurance carriers. The Secretary of Health
and Human Services, who is responsible for administering the payment of
Medicare claims, pays insurance carriers to perform the claims review func-
tion.20 5 An oral hearing may be held when a claim over $100 is denied by the
carrier and a written appeal is unsuccessful. 206 The hearing in such a case is
conducted by a hearing officer appointed by and completely answerable to the
carrier. At the time of the decision in Schweiker, there was no right of appeal
from the hearing officer's determination. 20 7 Even though a person who actually
participated in the case prior to the hearing was not permitted to serve as a hearing
officer, as of the time of trial five out of the seven past and present hearing
officers for the carrier involved in this case were its former or current employ-
ees.2 08 The district court agreed with a procedural due process challenge based
on alleged decision-maker bias and found the system unconstitutional. 2 ° 9 The
lower court's primary theme was structural bias. The court viewed hearing
officers as having a pecuniary interest in pleasing the carriers they serve because,
even though they are paid with government funds, their incomes as hearing
officers depend entirely on whether and how often the carrier requests their
services.2 10 In every case brought before a hearing officer, the court empha-
sized, the carrier has already denied the claim twice, thus strengthening an already-
forged link between carrier and hearing officer that creates an intolerable risk of
convicted and sentenced to jail terms. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on the basis of its
view that the district court's appointment of an interested prosecutor violated procedural due process.
The private interest in this case clearly was a fundamental one deserving greater procedural protection
than the property interest of withdrawing employers under MPPAA, but the case does at least stand
for the proposition that prosecutor bias is something that matters, even where there is no evidence of
subjective personal bias. Id.
204. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(u)(a) (1982).
206. Id. at § 1395(u)(b).
207. Subsequently, Congress amended the statute to permit an appeal from the hearing officer
to an administrative law judge in the case of claims exceeding $500, with judicial review available for
claims exceeding $1,000. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, §
9341(a)(1)(C), 100 Stat. 1874, 2038 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(bX2) (Supp. IV 1986)).
208. 456 U.S. at 193.
209. McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 414-15 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Schweiker
v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
210. 503 F. Supp. at 415.
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decision-maker bias.2 11 The Supreme Court, however, found no due process
violation.2 12 Noting that the plaintiffs made no claim of actual personal bias
and did not seek to disqualify their individual hearing officers, the Court detected
insufficient structural bias to warrant blanket disqualification. 2 13  Because it
was the federal government that paid the claims, rather than the carriers, the Court
saw no carrier pecuniary interest in particular outcomes and without a primary
source of bias thought it illogical to argue that hearing officers possess a derivative
bias.2 14 In addition, the Court found no primary source of structural bias in the
Secretary's efforts to help carriers identify possible overbillers and to warn them
to control overutilization of medical services. 2 15 The Court thus rejected a line
of reasoning to the effect that the Secretary himself was biased in favor of
inadequate awards, his warnings to carriers about controlling overutilization
created unfair incentives for carriers to minimize awards, and the carriers'
incentives improperly influenced hearing officers.216  In Friedman v.
Rogers,2 17 the Court upheld against equal protection and free speech challenges
a state statute prohibiting optometrists from practicing under a trade name. The
statute had been the culmination of a long-standing economic and political struggle
between "professional" and "commercial" optometrists, the latter group consisting
of salaried optometrists usuaily employed by firms not only providing optometric
services but also manufacturing lenses and selling and fitting frames. The
plaintiff, a commercial optometrist, also challenged a portion of the statute
requiring that a majority of the members of the Texas Optometry Board be
members of the Texas Optometric Association. The Board has broad authority to
regulate the practice of optometry in the state, including enforcement of the
professional responsibility code. The code included the trade-name prohibition,
which was aimed at commercial optometrists. The Association is an organization
of "professional," or self-employed, optometrists. As part of his challenge to the
statute, the commercial optometrist claimed that, with a majority of its members
representing professional optometrists, the Board would be inherently biased when
conducting disciplinary proceedings against commercial optometrists. Observing
211. Id. at 414-15.
212. 456 U.S. at 195-97.
213. Id. at 195.
214. Id. at 196-97.
215. Id. at 196 n.9.
216. Id. As a secondary theme, the district court had examined the need for additional
procedural protection under the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and
concluded that the private interest of claimants weighed heavily enough in the equation to require a
hearing before an administrative law judge either before or after a hearing officer's determination.
McClure v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 409, 415 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Schweiker v. McClure,
456 U.S. 188 (1982). The Supreme Court also disagreed with the position that additional safeguards
were needed to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation, specifically repudiating the lower court's
finding that hearing officers were unqualified to conduct hearings. Id. at 198-99.
217. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
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that the plaintiff himself was not the subject of a disciplinary proceeding, the
Court refused to consider the claim of decision-maker bias because there was no
opportunity to examine in a particular context the possibility that members of the
Board might have personal interests that precluded a fair hearing. 218 Although
couched in terms of standing, the Court's refusal to hear a facial challenge to the
structure of the Board clearly minimizes the importance of a purely structural bias.
Designers of nonconsensual arbitration or other ADR mechanisms in the
regulatory setting must recognize that, if an MPPAA-type system were found to
offend procedural due process because of structural bias, all available solutions
necessarily would involve trade-offs. Moreover, even if structural bias in any such
system survives constitutional challenge, the system is not likely to enjoy full user
acceptance. Whether constitutionally required or not, sound dispute resolution
system design demands a perception of fairness, especially when the procedure is
neither bargained-for nor selected from a menu of alternatives. If interested
parties, such as plan trustees, must be used as initial decision makers in order to
bring necessary expertise to bear, the potential constitutional infirmity can be
remedied by granting the reviewing entity greater latitude to examine factual
determinations. This modification may or may not make an MPPAA-type
procedure completely fair, but it would make it fairer than the present MPPAA
system, and surely would make it constitutional. To thoroughly purge the
procedure of partiality would require removal of interested parties from the initial
decision level. A true adversary proceeding in the first instance before an arbitra-
tor, to whom actuaries and other experts would be directly answerable, is one
possible alternative. Either of these modifications no doubt would reduce the
efficiency of the decision process, but fairness rarely fails to come at the expense
of expediency. 2
19
VI. COMMODITY FUTURES BROKER-CUSTOMER ARBITRATION
A. Dispute Resolution Alternatives
Under the Commodity Exchange Act
In 1974 Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act,
which substantially altered the Commodity Exchange Act's (CEA) design for
regulation of trading in commodity futures, options, and leverage contracts.
220
The 1974 Act created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as an
independent administrative agency with extensive regulatory jurisdiction over
trading practices, contract markets (i.e., commodity exchanges), and commodity
218. Id. at 17-20.
219. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) ("[Plrocedural due process is not
intended to promote efficiency... "). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (procedural
safeguard must be provided "if that may be done without prohibitive cost") (emphasis added).
220. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(1974) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982)).
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futures professionals. 2 21  Further amendments in 1978222 and 1982223 ac-
complished several changes in the CFTC's jurisdiction and regulatory authority.
One very significant aspect of these changes in commodity regulation has
been the creation of innovative resolution procedures for disputes between
commodity futures professionals and their customers. Commodity futures
professionals include futures commission merchants (the commodity futures
counterpart of the securities broker-dealer), associated persons, floor brokers,
introducing brokers, commodity trading advisors, and commodity pool opera-
tors.224  In this discussion, the popular term "broker" is sometimes used
generically to describe all commodity futures trading professionals. Today a
customer has several fora available for resolution of disputes with professionals.
As alternatives to federal court actions for alleged violations of the anti-fraud
provisions of the CEA,225 or suits in state court for common-law claims or
alleged violations of state statutes,2 26 the customer now has the option of using
an administrative reparations proceeding within the CFTC or binding arbitration.
An administrative reparations proceeding is limited to customer claims based
on alleged violations of the CEA or CFTC regulations, and cannot entertain a
customer's state-law claims.2 27  The CFTC's decision-making authority in a
221. 7 U.S.C. § 4(a) (1982).
222. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405,92 Stat. 865 (1978) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982)).
223. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982)).
224. See Raisler & Geldermann, The CFTC's New Reparation Rules: In Search of a Fair,
Responsive, and Practical Forum for Resolving Commodity-Related Disputes, 40 Bus. LAw 537, 538
n.5 (1985); Horwitz & Gilberg, Introducing Brokers Under the Commodity Exchange Act: A New
Category of Commodity Professionals, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 907 (1983); Rosen, Regulation of
Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937
(1983).
225. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988). In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of action for violations of the CEA.
The private right of action has since been codified at 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1988).
In such a case, a federal district court may also decide state common-law and statutory claims
pursuant to its pendent jurisdiction, if the federal and state claims "derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact" and are such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
226. See, e.g., Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 117 I11. 2d 67, 510 N.E.2d 840 (1987)
(claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty under both common law and state deceptive practices
statute); Ellwood v. Mid States Commodities, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1987) (claim of
unauthorized trading); McCracken v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 755 P.2d 454 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(claim of negligence in trading); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hammock, 489 So.2d 761 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (claim of breach of contract for provision of brokerage services).
227. See 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1988), which reads:
Any person complaining of any violation of any provision of this chapter, or any rule, regulation,
or order issued pursuant to this chapter, by any person who is registered under this chapter may,
at any time within two years after the cause of action accrues, apply to the Commission for an
order awarding actual damages proximately caused by such violation.
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reparations proceeding does, however, encompass common-law counterclaims
asserted by a commodity futures broker, as occurs when the latter seeks to recover
a negative customer account balance. A constitutional challenge to the CFTC's
practice of deciding the broker's common-law counterclaims was made in
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.228 The basis for the
challenge was that administrative resolution of pure common-law counterclaims
violates article III of the Constitution by permitting nonjudicial resolution of issues
that are properly determined only in a judicial forum. 229 The Supreme Court
rejected the article III challenge and upheld the practice. 230 Extensive treat-
ment of the article III issue is reserved for the subsequent discussion of FIFRA
data arbitration, because of the centrality of the issue to that arbitration pro-
gram. 2
3 1
It bears noting at this point, however, that the Supreme Court found the
guarantee of article III to include two components: personal and structural. The
personal component consists of a non-absolute right to "an independent and
impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power
of the United States." 232 The Court found that Schor, the customer, had
waived this personal right by insisting upon use of the reparations proceeding and
fully participating in it, raising the article III objection only after the proceeding
had reached a conclusion with which he was dissatisfied.2 33 The structural
component, having its roots in the separation of powers doctrine, consists of a
flexible and somewhat limited protection of the integrity of the judiciary against
undue encroachment by the legislative or executive branches.234 The Court
also found that the reparations procedure did not fun afoul of this article III
component, because the procedure forms a small but integral part of a comprehen-
sive federal regulatory scheme that is clearly within the power of Congress and
because the claimant retains the choice of federal or state court adjudication as
alternatives to the administrative reparations forum.
2 35
228. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
229. Article III of the Constitution provides that "(t)he judicial power of the United States shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish ..." and provides that these federal courts shall be staffed by judges who hold their offices
during good behavior and whose compensation shall not be diminished during their tenure in office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
230. 478 U.S. at 859.
231. See infra text accompanying notes 443-531.
232. 478 U.S. at 848.
233. Id. at 849.
234. Id. at 850-51.
235. Id. at 855.
1990]
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B. Context and Properties of the Arbitration Program
Section 5a(11) of the 1974 Act, as amended in 1982, also requires all
commodity exchanges to "[p]rovide a fair and equitable procedure through
arbitration or otherwise (such as by delegation to a registered futures association
having rules providing for such procedures) for the settlement of customers'
claims and grievances against any member or employee thereof."236 This'
section further specifies that the use of any such dispute resolution mechanism
must be voluntary on the part of the customer. 237 Congress explicitly made the
customer's use of any ADR procedure voluntary, but said nothing about the
consensual or nonconsensual nature of the commodity professional's participation.
Looking solely to the statutory language, one legitimately could ask whether a
commodity exchange or registered association would comply with the statute by
designing an ADR system the use of which is voluntary by both the professional
and the customer. In its regulations, the CFTC has interpreted section 5a(11) as
requiring creation of an ADR procedure in which the professional must participate
if initiated by the customer.2 38  Congress has concurred in this interpreta-
tion.239 Consequently, disputes between commodity professionals and their
customers are subject to ADR procedures that are nonconsensual from the
professional's perspective.
Although section 5a(11) and the CFTC's implementing regulations speak
broadly of any "fair and equitable" dispute resolution procedure, citing arbitration
only as an example, 24 the regulations clearly envision arbitration as the
preferred method. 24 1 All of the commodity exchanges have, in fact, responded
to the CFTC's mandate by implementing arbitration programs. 242 In addition
to exchange-sponsored arbitration, the exchanges can comply with the statute and
regulations by permitting customer-initiated access to an arbitration program
sponsored by the National Futures Association (NFA), the industry's only
236. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (1988).
237. Id.
238. 46 Fed. Reg. 57,457 (1981).
239. Congress expressly stated that its 1982 amendments to the CEA "[do] not affect the existing
requirement that the use of arbitration by the customer is voluntary or the Commission's understanding
that exchange members must participate in arbitration proceedings which the customer has elected to
pursue." H.R. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1982) (emphasis added). See also Geldermann,
Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n., 836 F.2d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1987) (Congress intended
to require exchange members to submit to customer-initiated arbitration), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 54
(1988).
240. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (1988).
241. See 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (1988) (describing a procedure having the earmarks of arbitration);
Id. at § 180.3 (specifically referring to arbitration in provisions regulating content of professional-
customer agreement so as to insure voluntariness on customer's pan).
242. See Note, Dispute Resolution in Commodities Futures, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 175, 181
n.73 (1984).
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registered futures association. 243  The latter may actually possess several
advantages for the customer over exchange-sponsored arbitration. For instance,
a customer can compel a commodity futures professional to submit to exchange-
sponsored arbitration only when the professional is a member of that particular
exchange and the complaint relates to a transaction within the exchange's
jurisdiction. 244 Therefore, exchange-sponsored arbitration is not a viable choice
for a customer complaining about conduct of the professional that relates to
transactions in two or more different commodities not all of which are traded on
that exchange. 245  Arbitration sponsored by the NFA, on the other hand, can
be compelled with respect to any professional who is a member of that national
association.246 All commodity futures commission merchants are required by
247statute to belong to NFA, and other categories of commodity futures profes-
sionals usually must be NFA members as a practical matter because commission
merchants cannot deal with them otherwise.2 48 Therefore, a customer normally
can compel any professional to participate in NFA-sponsored arbitration.
Review of commodity futures broker-customer arbitration apparently is limited
to the same nonsubstantive grounds available for review of consensual arbitration.
In the case of both exchange-sponsored and NFA arbitration, CFTC regulations
provide that the award "shall be final."249  "The only right of appeal" is then
identified as being that "provided under applicable law." 25 0 The CFTC's
evident intent is to incorporate the review provisions of either the Federal
Arbitration Act or the pertinent state arbitration statute, which, as discussed earlier,
generally permit judicial review only for serious arbitrator misconduct or gross
procedural error.
243. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 170.8 (1988). See also Note, supra note 242,
at 188 & n.148.
244. CFTC regulations relating to nonconsensual arbitration provide:
The term "claim or grievance" as used in this part shall mean any dispute which arises out of any
transaction on or subject to the rules of a contract market, executed by or effected through a
member of that contract market or employee thereof which dispute does not require for
adjudication the presence of essential witnesses or third parties over whom the contract market
does not have jurisdiction and who are not otherwise available....
17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (1988).
245. See Note, Dispute Resolution in Commodities Futures, supra note 242, at 185.
246. National Futures Ass'n, Arbitration: A Way to Resolve Commodity-Related Disputes 3
(1989).
247. 7 U.S.C. § 21m (1988).
248. National Futures Ass'n, Bylaw 1101 (1989).
249. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2(f) (1988) (exchange-sponsored arbitration); 17 C.F.R. § 170.8 (1988)
(incorporating same conditions and limitations for NFA arbitration as for exchange-sponsored
arbitration). In the case of exchange-sponsored arbitration, the regulations also specifically prohibit
any review within the exchange itself. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2(f) (1988).
250. 17 C.F.R. § 180.2(f) (1988). See also 17 C.F.R. § 170.8 (1988).
1990]
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C. Encroachment on Article III Judicial Power
The only significant constitutional challenge to the nonconsensual arbitration
of the CEA and its implementing regulations was made in Geldermann, Inc. v.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.25 1 The basis for the challenge was
the same as that leveled at the CFTC administrative reparations procedure in
Schor, namely, that compelling a party to submit to a nonjudicial tribunal for
resolution of private damage claims violates article III of the Constitution. Again,
detailed analysis of the article III issue is reserved for Part VII's discussion of
FIFRA data arbitration.252  Briefly, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Geldermann tracked very closely the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Schor. Unlike Schor, where a customer challenged the
constitutionality of the reparations procedure, in Geldermann the commodity
futures professional raised the article III challenge to arbitration. The court of
appeals found two reasons for concluding that Geldermann had waived its personal
right to an adjudication by an article III court. First, as a member of the
commodity exchange sponsoring the arbitration (the Chicago Board of Trade),
Geldermann was party to a membership agreement that incorporated various
regulations, including those mandating arbitration. 25 3 The court viewed such
agreement as sufficient for waiver of the article III right despite the fact that the
exchange rules included the arbitration program because of a government mandate
and that membership in such an exchange was a practical economic necessi-
ty.254 Second, the court found an independent basis for waiver in Gelder-
mann's participation in the arbitration program and belated assertion of the article
III challenge only after losing in arbitration. 255 With respect to the structural
component of article III, the court of appeals also found no unconstitutional
infringement of the judicial power. 256 In reaching this conclusion, the court
followed the reasoning of both Schor and Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co.257 Thomas involved an Article III challenge to the FIFRA data
arbitration program, and is analyzed in detail in Part VII. C.
258
251. 836 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988).
252. See infra text accompanying notes 443-531.
253. 836 F.2d at 316-18.
254. Id. at 318.
255. Id. at 321.
256. Id. at 322-23.
257. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
258. See infra text accompanying notes 443-99. In Geldermann, the Seventh Circuit also
dismissed a challenge based on the right to jury trial. The court held that the right of trial by jury is
subsidiary to the right to an adjudication by an Article III court. Thus, if there is no right to an Article
III tribunal, there can be no right to trial by jury. 836 F.2d at 323-24.
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VII. FIFRA DATA COMPENSATION ARBITRATION
A. Context and Properties
1. The Role of Safety and Health Data in Pesticide Regulation
The production, sale, and use of pesticides creates a classic economic-
environmental dilemma. According to conventional wisdom, pesticides are critical
to agricultural productivity. 259 These same chemicals, on the other hand, can
present profound risks to the environment. 260 As a consequence, the regulation
of pesticides has assumed an important place on the agendas of state and federal
policy makers. Significant federal pesticide regulation began in 1947 with
congressional passage of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA). 26 1 Dealing as it does with issues combining huge economic stakes
with emotionally charged concerns about human health and possible harm to an
increasingly vulnerable ecosystem, FIFRA's history predictably has been charac-
terized by debate, dissatisfaction, and no small amount of acrimony.
One of the chief points of contention among participants in the ongoing
interchange has been the treatment of safety and health data. Historically, a major
commitment to research and development (R&D) has been essential to successful
development and marketing of pesticides. 2 62  Estimates indicate that 10,000-
259. See S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ("Pesticides are essential to man's food supply
both as to quality and quantity."), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 3995
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 838]; Brief of the American Chemical Soc'y, et al., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellee, at 5, 9-10, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (stressing
importance of pesticides to productivity). See also Maclntyre, Why Pesticides Received Extensive Use
in America: A Political Economy of Agricultural Pest Management to 1970, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J.
533, 535-36 (1987) (direct, short-term productivity gains from use of pesticides are substantial, thus
leading to rapid expansion in use of pesticides). But see id. at 537, 549-54 (productivity gains may
be illusory because of hidden, long-term costs).
260. See S. REP. No. 970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (reporting increased evidence of and public
concern about the health and environmental hazards of pesticides), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4093-94 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 970]; Brief of AFL-CIO, et al., as Amici Curiae
in Support of Appellant, at 2, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (giving examples
of serious health risks from pesticides).
261. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163
[hereinafter 1947 FIFRA] (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k, later superseded by 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y (1988)).
262. See Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 555 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (discussing large
investment in research and development by pesticide manufacturers), vacated sub nom. Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 849 (1980)
(acknowledging critical role of research and development in drug and pesticide industry, in context of
discussing impact of government disclosure on research and development).
From 1981-1987, aggregate annual expenditures on research and development relating to pesticide
screening and registration, for those companies reporting to the National Agricultural Chemicals Ass'n,
were as follows: 1981 = $451.9 million; 1982 = $509.8 million; 1983 = $524.4 million; 1984 =
49
Allison: Allison: Context, Properties, and Constitutionality of Nonconsensual Arbitration:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
50 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1990, No. 1
20,000 compounds typically must be screened to find a commercially useful
pesticide.26 3 Commercialization of a pesticide is not only R&D-intensive, but
also requires compliance with regulatory procedures that can be exceptionally
expensive. Registration of a pesticide with the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), which normally demands several years of testing and the filing of a large
volume of resulting safety and health data, costs several million dollars per active
ingredient. 264 In addition to the direct costs of R&D and registration, opportu-
nity costs also are quite high because a period of several years is necessary after
discovery of a pesticide compound to meet registration requirements and reach
commercialization.
26 5
$730.6 million; 1985 = $683.4 million; 1986 = $685.4 million; 1987 = $681.9 million. See NATIONAL
AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS ASS'N, 1982 INDUSTRY PROFILE SURVEY 13a (1983) (reporting updated
figure for 1981); NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS ASS'N, 1983 INDUSTRY PROFILE SURVEY 7
(1984) (reporting updated figure for 1982); NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS ASS'N, 1984
INDUSTRY PROFILE SURVEY 7 (1985) (reporting updated figure for 1983); NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
CHEMICALS ASS'N, 1985 INDUSTRY PROFILE SURVEY 7 (1986) (reporting updated figure for 1984);
NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS ASS'N, 1986 INDUSTRY PROFILE SURVEY 7 (1987) (reporting
updated figure for 1985); NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS ASS'N, 1987 INDUSTRY PROFILE
SURVEY 8 (1988) (reporting updated figure for 1986 and preliminary figure for 1987) [the 1982-87
annual surveys are hereinafter referred to collectively as NACA SURVEYS]. Beginning with the 1988
INDUSTRY PROFILE SURVEY, published in 1989, research and development expenditures are no longer
reported because of reporting difficulties and consequent doubts about the precision of the figures.
263. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998 (1984).
264. Id. Efficacy data were formerly required in addition to safety and health data. Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 3(c)(1), 86 Stat. 973, 979 (1972)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cXl) (1988)). EPA urged Congress to permit waiver of
efficacy data. H.R. REP. No. 663, at 59-60, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1988, 2032-33 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 663]. See Schulberg, The Proposed FIFRA Amendments of
1977: Untangling the Knot of Pesticide Registration, 2 HARV. ENVrL L. REV. 342, 355 (1977)
[hereinafter Schulberg, The Proposed FIFRA Amendments]. Congress did so in § 3(c)(5) of 1978
FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1988). Under its data waiver regulation, EPA subsequently has waived
much of the efficacy data that previously were required. 40 C.F.R. § 152.91 (1988).
265. Estimates of the time required to get pesticides to market vary from one source to another.
See Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 555 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (district court finding that it takes
4-8 years of screening to identify a compound with commercial potential, and an additional 6 years
(including 2 years to obtain registration) before bringing the product to market), vacated sub nom.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) ; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 321-22 (1977) (statement
of John E. Donalds, Dow Chemical U.S.A.) (estimated effective period for a pesticide patent is 7-10
years out of the nominal 17 year period, implying that regulatory delay could be as much as 7-10
years); S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977) (because of delay caused by registration
requirements, effective patent term is only 12 years out of the nominal term of 17 years) [hereinafter
S. REP. No. 334]; NACA SURVEYS, supra note 262 (during 1981-87, average time elapsed from
discovery of a compound to first full commercial registration was 108 months, or 9 years, a substantial
part of which was devoted solely to fulfilling registration requirements). But see S. REP. No. 334, id.
at 90 (statement of Patricia Wald, Assistant Attorney General) (disagreeing that compliance with
registration requirements produces an effective patent period of only 12 years because patent pending
period can be substantial).
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When the patent on a pesticide expires, or when a similar pesticide can be
produced without infringing the patent on the original, competition is to be
expected. 2 66 Prior to marketing the pesticide, however, the later producer also
must register its product with the EPA. Whether the regulating agency should be
permitted to use the previously submitted data in support of the subsequent
registration application is one of pesticide regulation's longstanding perplexities.
Without such use, a subsequent, or "follow-on," registrant must duplicate the
expenditure of several years and several million dollars to develop its own safety
and health data. If use of previously submitted data is to be permitted, should the
follow-on registrant be required to compensate the original submitter for a portion
of the data development costs? And if compensation is to be required, how are
disputes over the appropriate amount to be resolved?
Congress has amended FIFRA several times since 1947, the most recent
substantial revision occurring in 1978.267 In its latest rendering, the statute
adopts the policy of permitting EPA to consider previously submitted data in
support of a subsequent registration application for the same or a similar
pesticide. 268  As a prerequisite to EPA's use of the safety and health data in
this way, however, the follow-on registrant must offer to compensate the original
data submitter. 269 The registration process then proceeds, regardless of whether
the parties agree on the amount of compensation.
270
The 1978 FIFRA amendments adopted a nonconsensual arbitration system for
resolving data-cost compensation disputes. If the parties are unable to agree on
266. It is theoretically possible, of course, to enter the pesticide business by obtaining a license
from the patent owner prior to patent expiration. This seems to be an unlikely event, in view of the
fact that during the term of a pesticide patent the owner usually will not even sell the active ingredient
to a follow-on registrant who wishes to formulate an end product, thus causing the latter to turn to
somewhat risky foreign sources. See Rathvon, Cates & Liss, The Linuron Decision: Impact on
Pesticide Registrants, Implications for Data Compensation Disputes Under FIFRA--Generic Pesticide
Producers, 12 CHEMIcAL REG. REP. (BNA) No. 46, pt. II, at 1681 (Feb. 17, 1989) [hereinafter
Rathvon].
The competition from follow-on registrants can be very meaningful. When a pesticide patent
expires, and follow-on registrants are able to manufacture the active ingredient, prices of the end
product often decrease substantially. See Brief of Pesticide Producers Ass'n, et al., as Amici Curiae,
at 12-14, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (detailing examples of dramatic price
decreases in such circumstances).
267. FIFRA was rewritten substantially in 1972. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982))
[hereinafter 1972 FIFRA]. Relevant, but relatively minor, amendments were made in 1975.
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-140, 89 Stat. 751 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)) [hereinafter 1975 Amendments]. FIFRA was again rewritten
substantially in 1978. Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)). Other relevant, but again relatively minor, amendments
were enacted in 1988. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2655. [hereinafter 1988 Amendments].
268. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1XD) (1982).
269. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1XDXii) (1982).
270. Id.
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an amount of compensation, their dispute must be submitted to arbitration without
any meaningful judicial review. The dispute resolution mechanism of FIFRA, as
well as its other data-related provisions, were entangled in litigation focusing
mainly on constitutional issues until recently. Indeed, some constitutional
questions still linger, although they are not of the same seriousness as those
resolved. Before turning to the details of the data-cost arbitration program and its
constitutionality, it is instructive to examine more closely the historical background
and present state of pesticide regulation, with particular emphasis on the treatment
of data submitted for registration purposes.
2. Pesticide Regulation Prior to 1972
Federal regulation of pesticides began with enactment of the Insecticide Act
of 1910, which made it unlawful to manufacture and sell adulterated or misbrand-
ed insecticides.27 1  This legislation was replaced in 1947 by the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which was primarily a
licensing and labeling statute.272 It required that all pesticides be registered
with the Department of Agriculture (DOA) prior to sale in interstate or foreign
commerce. 273 The statute also contained general standards setting forth the
types of information necessary for proper labeling of a registered pesticide,
including directions for use; warnings to prevent harm to people, wildlife, and
plants; and claims made about the efficacy of the product. 2' 4 In 1970, the
DOA's responsibilities under FIFRA were transferred to the newly created
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).2 75
3. Pesticide Regulation and the Treatment of Safety
and Health Data: 1972-78
Because of increasing public concern about the safety of pesticides and their
effect on the environment, and because of a growing perception that existing
regulation was inadequate to safeguard the public interest, Congress substantially
rewrote FIFRA in 1972.276 The 1972 amendments essentially changed FIFRA
271. Federal Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 331.
272. 1947 FIFRA, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k, later
superseded by 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6 y (1982)). See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991
(1984) (characterizing FIFRA as first enacted in 1947 as primarily a licensing and labeling statute).
273. 1947 FIFRA, ch. 125, §§ 3(a), 4(a), 61 Stat. 163, 166-67.
274. 1947 FIFRA, ch. 125, §§ 2(u)(2), 3(aX3), 61 Stat. 163, 165-66.
275. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970).
276. 1972 FIFRA, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (1982)). See S. REP. No. 970, supra note 260, at 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4093-94 (reporting increased evidence of and public concern about the health and environmental
hazards of pesticides).
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from a labeling law to a comprehensive regulatory statute. 2 77  As amended,
FIFRA regulated the use, as well as the sale and labeling, of pesticides.
2 78
Moreover, it regulated pesticides produced and sold in both intrastate and interstate
commerce;2 79 provided for review, cancellation, and suspension of registra-
tion;280 and gave EPA much greater enforcement authority. 28 ' The 1972
revision also added a new criterion for registration: that EPA determine that the
pesticide will not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."
2 82
For purposes of this analysis, the most important provisions of the 1972
amendments dealt with the pesticide registration procedure and the use of data
acquired through that procedure. As we have seen,the safety, health, and efficacy
data that must accompany a registration application are the result of a very costly
and time-consuming regimen of testing. It is not only valuable to its developer
but also to would-be competitors, environmental protection organizations,
employee groups, physicians treating patients with abnormal chemical sensitivities,
product liability attorneys, and others. 283  It may well be, as large pesticide
manufacturers have often argued, that legal recognition of the proprietary nature
of such test data is necessary to stimulate adequate levels of investment in
R&D.28 4  In contrast, one cannot easily dismiss the claim of a strong public
interest in disclosing test data sufficiently so that EPA's regulatory effort can be
277. See H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (so characterizing the 1972 revision).
278. See S. REP. No. 838 pt. II, supra note 259, at 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3993.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3994.
281. Id.
282. 1972 FIFRA, § 3(c)(5)(C), 86 Stat. at 980.
283. See, e.g., Monsanto v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 562 (E.D. Mo. 1983), vacated sub noma.
Ruckeishaus v. Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (examples of parties interested in obtaining
registration data); H.R. REP. No. 566, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1982) (discussing value of the data
to a registrant's competitors); Brief of AFL-CIO, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, at
3-5, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (detailing reasons why unions and
environmental groups want to see data); Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant, at 8 n.9, Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (examples of parties interested in obtaining registration data);
Joint Appendix to Briefs of Appellant and Appellee, at 247-59, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986 (1984) (excerpt from trial testimony of EPA official in charge of responding to disclosure requests
indicating wide variety of requestors) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
284. See Brief of the American Chemical Soc'y, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee,
at 5-12, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (arguing that disclosure of test data will
diminish incentives for R&D); Brief of Abbott Laboratories, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Affirmance, at 8-9, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (same). But see McGarity &
Shapiro, supra note 262, at 851-56 (critically examining argument that disclosure of test data will
diminish incentives for R&D).
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overseen by interested members of the public,2 85 consumers can make their
own choices about individualized risks from pesticide exposure, 2 86 and reg-
istrants' testing methodologies can be subjected to the independent peer review of
the scientific community.28 7 Moreover, factoring the interests of economic
efficiency and conservation of scarce research resources into the regulatory
calculus suggests that previously submitted data perhaps should be used to support
later registrations of the same or similar pesticides.298 Prior to 1972, DOA and
EPA had treated data submitted in support of a registration application as
confidential, and both in policy and practice did not disclose it publicly.
2 89
When a producer sought registration of a pesticide identical or similar to one that
had been previously registered, there apparently was an official policy at both
agencies to the effect that previously submitted data would not be used in support
285. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 41-44 (need for oversight and augmentation of
EPA regulatory effort by .interested members of the public); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 262, at
840-44 (same). See generally Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis
of Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 Wisc. L. REv. 207, 221-229 (general discussion
of reasons for government disclosure to public of privately submitted data, with emphasis on Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)).
286. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 262, at 840-44.
287. See id. at 841-42 (discussing importance of peer review and its furtherance through
disclosure); Brief of the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, et al., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellant, at 4-18, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (same).
288. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 31 (citing congressional objective of avoiding
duplicative testing); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 262, at 845-47 (discussing various negative
aspects of duplicative drug and pesticide testing, including greater exposure of human subjects and
diversion of scarce research facilities and personnel from productive uses).
It can be argued, however, that there is no such thing as "duplicative" scientific testing, because
additional testing is an important means of advancing scientific understanding through verification of
earlier results, especially since no two manufacturers use identical processes or produce identical
chemicals. Brief of SDS Biotech Corp., et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee, at 22-23,
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The more data of a given type that EPA has for
comparison and verification, the more confident it can be that its regulatory decision is sound. See 44
Fed. Reg. 27,945, 27,946 (1979). But see McGarity & Shapiro, id. at 847 (in the case of pharmaceuti-
cals, and analogously in the case of pesticides, duplicative testing does not serve the valid scientific
goal of verification through replication, because it is done only for the purpose of obtaining a license
and not for the purpose of scientific verification). Moreover, additional testing may help prevent
problems that historically have been common to pesticide regulation: failure of manufacturers to
discover or disclose adverse effects, difficulty in interpreting controversial data, and fraudulent test
results. Brief of SDS Biotech, id. at 23. See also Brief of AFL-CIO, et al., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellant, at 6 n.6, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). Along the same
lines, it has been argued that the claim that "duplicative" testing ties up scarce scientific resources is
illusory, because "there is no reason to suppose that testing services would not grow to meet increased
demand." Brief of SDS Biotech, id. at 23 n.40.
289. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 38 (USDA and EPA did not disclose test data);
Joint Appendix, supra note 283, at 60-65, 83-86, 95-97 (policy of USDA and EPA was to keep data
confidential, and there was no evidence that confidentiality was breached).
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of the subsequent registration. 290  Despite this official policy, and despite the
absence of legislative authorization to make such use of the data, DOA and EPA
personnel reviewing registration applications consistently did consider previously
submitted data to support these follow-on registrations. 29 1 The 1972 amend-
ments included sections attempting to resolve questions pertaining to both
disclosure of data and use of previously submitted data for later registrations.
With regard to disclosure, a party submitting data in connection with a
registration application was permitted by the 1972 law to designate any portions
of the submitted material it believed to be "trade secrets or commercial or
financial information." 292 The law provided no standards to guide the trade
secret determination, and EPA was permitted to exercise its own judgment as to
293whether particular data should be so characterized. The agency was prohib-
ited, however, from publicly disclosing any such data that it did classify as trade
secrets.29 4 With regard to any data not deemed by EPA to be trade secrets, the
agency was required to make public disclosure within thirty days after registra-
tion.29 5 Disputes between registrants and EPA over the trade secret classifica-
tion of particular data were to be resolved by declaratory judgment action in
federal district court at the instance of the submitter.2 96 Not surprisingly, most
data submitters marked everything as trade secrets. 297 Moreover, EPA adopted
the policy of refusing to treat any safety and health test data as trade secrets, and
of granting trade secret status only to narrowly defined formulaic and manufactur-
ing information. 298 A federal district court ruled, in Chevron Chemical Co. v.
Costle,299 that EPA had exceeded its statutory authority in taking such an
intransigent position, and another court held, in Mobay Chemical Corp. v.
290. S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 38 (policy of USDA and EPA was also not to use data
in its files to support subsequent registrations); Joint Appendix, supra note 283, at 60-65, 83-86, 95-97
(same).
291. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 38, 90 (USDA and EPA did actually use data in
files to support subsequent registrations); Joint Appendix, supra note 283, at 67-69, 70-74, 77, 219-247
(same).
292. 1972 FIFRA, § 10(a), 86 Stat. at 989.
293. Id. at § 10(b), 86 Stat. at 989.
294. Id.
295. Id. at § 3(c), 86 Stat. at 979.
296. Id. at § 10(c), 86 Stat. at 989.
297. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 7 (statement of Douglas Costle, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, that major pesticide firms had obtained de facto exclusive use by
very broad trade secret claims); H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 264, at 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1988, 2031 (same).
298. See Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 447 F. Supp. 811, 824 (W.D. Mo. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 439 U.S. 320, 321 (1979); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024, 1030-31
(N.D. Cal. 1978).
299. 443 F. Supp. 1024, 1031-32 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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Costle,300 that EPA must adhere to the Restatement of Torts definition of trade
secrets when making its determination. 30 1 The attitudes of both sides caused
most registration applications to result in litigation before these two court
decisions, and the same entanglement usually resulted after those rulings because
data submitters continued to make all-encompassing trade secret claims.
30 2
In response to the question whether EPA could consider previously submitted
data to support a follow-on registration, the 1972 amendments adopted a
mandatory licensing scheme. EPA was permitted to use previously submitted data
for subsequent registrations upon satisfaction of two conditions: (1) data classified
as trade secrets could not be so used; 303 and (2) non-trade secret data could be
used only if the follow-on registrant first "offered to pay reasonable compensation
for producing the test data to be relied upon." 30 4 Thus, the seemingly insoluble
trade secret problem also infected the data-use provisions, and the Chevron and
Mobay decisions put a practical hold on EPA's consideration of previously
submitted data to support follow-ons. 3 ° 5 The law viewed the offer of compen-
sation as a prelude to negotiation between the original submitter and the follow-on
registrant. If the two were unable to agree on compensation, the ultimate
determination of reasonable compensation was EPA's responsibility, with review
by a federal district court. 30 6 Although EPA felt that it had neither the resourc-307 i i edrdcsosi
es nor expertise to adjudicate compensation cases, it did render decisions in
two such cases, the facts of which arose before data-use was effectively shut down
by Chevron and Mobay.
30 8
The 1972 version of FIFRA failed to specify an effective date for the data
disclosure and use-compensation provisions.30 9 Further amendments in 1975
prescribed that any data submitted before 1970 would not be subject to the
disclosure provisions and would not be compensable if used in connection with a
follow-on registration.3 10  The 1975 amendments also changed the curious
judicial review provision of the 1972 use-compensation scheme. EPA's
compensation determination was appealable to a federal district court only by the
300. 447 F. Supp. 811, 824-27 (W.D. Mo. 1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 320, 321 (1979).
301. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 & comment b (1939).
302. See Note, The Proposed FIFRA Amendments, supra note 264, at 347-48.
303. 1972 FIFRA, § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. at 979-80.
304. Id.
305. See Note, The Proposed FIFRA Amendments, supra note 264, at 347.
306. 1972 FIFRA, § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. at 979-80.
307. See H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 264, at 59, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1988, 2032.
308. Union Carbide Agric. Chem. Co. v. Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co., FIFRA COMP. Dkt.
No. 27 (July 13, 1982); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., FIFRA COMP. Dkt. Nos. 33, 34,
& 41 (Aug. 19, 1980).
309. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1981).
310. 1975 Amendments, § 3(c)(1)(D), 89 Stat. at 755.
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original data submitter and the court was permitted only to raise and not to lower
the amount of compensation. 3 11 Although this provision had not been chal-
lenged, and indeed had not even been used,312 serious concerns about fairness
led Congress in 1975 to permit review at the instance of either party and to grant
the reviewing court latitude to raise or lower EPA's compensation award.313
A variety of problems with the regulatory regime as it existed under the 1972
and 1975 amendments, including the previously discussed contentiousness over
trade secret classification and EPA's professed inability to adjudicate compensation
disputes adequately, caused the pesticide registration process to grind virtually to
a halt.3 14 This logjam, coupled with a number of other deficiencies in EPA's
regulation of pesticides, moved Congress to autopsy the system yet again.
3 15
4. Pesticide Regulation and the Treatment of Safety
and Health Data: Post-1978
Congressional re-evaluation of the 1972 law and its 1975 amendments
produced a 1978 version of FIFRA with substantially revised disclosure and use-
compensation rules.3 16  As with earlier versions, the prescribed contours of
both data disclosure and use-compensation formed part of a multifaceted
compromise among large R&D-oriented pesticide producers, small producers
needing access to previously submitted test data, formulators of end-use products
from the concentrated chemicals, environmental organizations, users, the scientific
community, and other interested parties.3 17 Because the nonconsensual arbitra-
tion program was but a part of the larger compromise that produced new
disclosure and use-compensation rules, understanding the latter is a prerequisite
to comprehending the former.
311. 1972 FIFRA, § 3(c)1), 86 Stat. at 979.
312. The only two administrative compensation cases decided by EPA under the 1972 provisions
were not appealed. Union Carbide Agric. Chem. Co. v. Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co., FIFRA
COMP. Dkt. No. 27 (July 13, 1982); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., FIFRA COMP. Dkt.
Nos. 33, 34, & 41 (Aug. 19, 1980).
313. 1975 Amendments, supra note 267, at § 3(c)(1XD), 89 Stat. at 755. See S. REP. No. 452,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 1359, 1368-69 (purpose
of change was to "effectuate fairness and evenhandedness by allowing both parties to the compensation
determination the right of appeal, and by removing the limitation on the district court's authority to
reduce the Administrator's determination").
314. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 3.
315. See Note, The Proposed FIFRA Amendments, supra note 264, at 345-51 (discussing various
shortcomings of both the legislation and its implementation by EPA).
316. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat.
819 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)).
317. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 5-16 (providing examples of the various sources
of input leading to 1978 amendments).
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a. The Trade Secret/Disclosure Compromise
The 1978 revision effectively removes general trade secret protection from
safety and health test data. A registrant is still permitted to mark identified
portions of its submitted data as "trade secrets or commercial or financial
information" that are not to be publicly disclosed,3 18 but trade secret status is
available only for narrowly defined categories of non-test data, 319 and the
registration process is not interrupted by disputes over such status.3 20 After
considerable parsing of the statutory language, one can discern three categories of
data:
(1) The first consists of safety and health test data, which EPA is required to
disclose, upon request, within thirty days after registration. 32 1  The only
exception to the agency's duty of disclosure for test data is found in a provision
prohibitin it from disclosing any data to a foreign or multinational pesticide
producer. 322 Any party requesting test data from EPA is required to sign an
affirmation that it neither is nor represents a foreign or multinational producer and
will not disclose the data to such an entity.3 23 All of the large American
pesticide companies that engage in significant R&D are multinationals, so
theoretically they should not be able to obtain each other's test data from
EPA. 324 Intuition, however, as well as some available evidence, suggests that
these large competitors may be able to acquire at least some of this data indirectly
as a result of public disclosure. 32 5
(2) The second category consists of information revealing (a) manufacturing
and quality control processes,32 6 or (b) formulas and methodologies pertaining
to deliberately added inert ingredients, 3 27 which can be publicly disclosed by
EPA only if the agency determines that disclosure is necessary toprotect against
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.32  In addition,
318. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(a) (1982).
319. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d) (1982).
320. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1)(D)(ii) (1982).
321. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX2XA) (1982).
322. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(g) (1982).
323. Id.
324. See Joint Appendix, supra note 283, at 208-09.
325. See id. at 253-54. (One legitimate way for this to happen is for a small competitor operating
solely within this country to acquire test data and later be taken over by a large multinational.). See
also Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 562 (E.D. Mo. 1983), vacated sub noma. Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (expressing doubt about the efficacy of attempting to prevent
disclosed data from finding its way to multinational or foreign competitors); Motion to Affirm, at 4,
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (arguing that publicly disclosed test data inevitably
will find its way into the hands of registrant's competitors).
326. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(1)(A) (1982).
327. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(1)(BXC) (1982).
328. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(1) (1982).
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when necessary to the implementation of FIFRA, formulas may be disclosed to
any other federal agency consulted by EPA,329 and may be revealed by EPA
in a public hearing or in its fact findings.
330
(3) The third category consists of incidental information concerning
production, distribution, sale, or inventories of a pesticide, which is eligible to be
characterized by EPA as trade secret data.33 1 Even if the agency, or a review-
ing court, concludes that particular information of this nature is deserving of trade
secret status, EPA nevertheless may disclose it as part of a public proceeding on
the question of adverse environmental effects if deemed to be necessary to the
public interest.
332
b. Exclusive Use and Compensation: The Quid Pro Quo
In return for the data submitter's loss of much of its right to claim trade secret
status for test data, the compromise struck in Congress provides an exclusive-use
period during which data cannot be used to support subsequent registrations,
followed by another period during which the follow-on registrant is required to
compensate the original submitter. 333 In an interesting political occurrence, the
bill finally reported out of conference committee and ultimately enacted by
Congress provided significantly more protection for large R&D-oriented pesticide
manufacturers than these manufacturers had urged through their trade association
or had been provided in either the final House or Senate bills that went to
329. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(b) (1982).
330. Id.
331. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(b), (d)(2) (1982).
332. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(2) (1982).
333. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1)(D)(i-ii) (1982). See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1560,95th Cong., 2d Sess.
29-30, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2043, 2045-46.
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conference committee.334  As adopted, the 1978 amendments created a use-
compensation structure that charitably may be characterized as convoluted.
For test data submitted in connection with registrations granted after the
statute's 1978 effective date on either new pesticides or new uses of previously
registered pesticides, the law provides an exclusive-use period of ten years.
335
Rather than looking only forward as does the exclusive use provision, the
compensation scheme reaches back to 1970. With respect to data submitted by
a registrant in 1970 or thereafter, that registrant is entitled to compensation for any
follow-on use of the data during the fifteen-year period after initial submis-
sion.3
3 6
Thus, under the 1978 amendments, a follow-on registrant can get EPA to use
data that were submitted to support a new product or new use registration that was
granted between 1970 and 1978, but must compensate the original submitter for
such use during a period of up to fifteen years from the original submission.
337
The follow-on registrant cannot, however, get EPA to use data in its files that
were submitted by the original registrant in support of a registration that was
granted after the effective date of the new law in 1978, unless the data is at least
ten years old.33 8 Without the ability to rely on previously submitted data, a
prospective follow-on registrant must do its own testing and develop its own data.
The initial data protected by the 1978 exclusive-use provision have just recently
334. The National Agricultural Chemical Association (NACA), the membership of which
consists primarily of large pesticide manufacturers, had urged Congress to provide a ten-year period
of exclusive use, but no additional period during which compensation would be paid to the original
registrant by a follow-on. NACA was of the view that any compensation system would be impractical
and unworkable. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 94-98.
The final Senate bill, much of which reflected EPA's views, provided for no period of exclusive
use and a period of 7 years during which the original registrant would be entitled to compensation from
a follow-on registrant. S. 1678, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(1) (1978). See S. REP. No. 334, supra
note 265, at 17 (section-by-section analysis of S. 1678); H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 264, at 53-54
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1988, 2026-27 (EPA's views).
The House bill, and later, amendments proposed by the House to'S. 1678, called for a 5-year
period of exclusive use plus a 5-year period during which the original registrant would be entitled to
compensation from a follow-on registrant. H.R. 8681, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(1) (1978). See H.R.
REP. No. 663, supra note 264, at 23-24 reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1988,
1996-97 (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 8681); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1560, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
29-30, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2043, 2045-46 (proposed House
amendments to S. 1678 borrowing from H.R. 8681).
The version reported out of conference committee and enacted by Congress provided for a 10-
year period of exclusive use for new data, with a total period of compensability of 15 years, thus
effectively creating 10 years of exclusive use followed by 5 years of compensation. See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1560, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2043, 2046-47 (version reported out of conference committee); 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1)(D)(i-ii) (1982)
(enacted version).
335. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cXl)(D)(i) (1982).
336. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1)(D)(ii) (1982).
337. Id.
338. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1)(D)(i) (1982).
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(1988) begun to be available to support follow-on registrations. With regard to
post-1978 data for which the ten-year exclusive-use period has expired, the follow-
on registrant can obtain its use and must compensate the original submitter for
whatever is left of a fifteen-year period since submission. This period of
compensation for post-1978 data obviously must be for five years or less (fifteen
minus the exclusive-use period). Thus, for data supporting a post-1978 registra-
tion, the original submitter can receive ten years of exclusive use and up to five
years' compensation. 33 9 The following scenarios illustrate how the 1978 use-
compensation system operates. In each, 0 is the original data submitter and
registrant, and F is the prospective follow-on registrant.
Scenario 1: In 1989, F wishes to register a pesticide identical or similar to
one for which the test data were submitted prior to 1970. F may cite this data
in EPA's files without delay or obligation to compensate. It should be noted in
passing that whenever a follow-on registrant is permitted to rely on previously
submitted data, either with or without a compensation obligation, the follow-on
merely cites to an index prepared by EPA and does not see the raw test data.
340
Scenario 2: In 1989, F wishes to register a pesticide identical or similar to
one for which the test data were submitted between 1970 and 1978. F may rely
on the data, but is obligated to compensate 0 for F's use of the data during the
remaining portion of a fifteen-year period from original submission. If, for
example, F obtains a registration in 1989 based upon data originally submitted by
O in 1977, F is obligated to pay 0 for a three-year use of the data (1977 + 15 =
1992 - 1989 = 3).
Scenario 3: In 1989, F wishes to register a pesticide identical or similar to
one for which a new product or new use registration was obtained after 1978. F
can cite the previously submitted data only if the prior registration is at least ten
years old. As mentioned above, this means that such data is only recently
becoming available for F's use. The fifteen-year compensation period applies to
such data, but the exclusive-use period during which the data could not be used
at all to support follow-ons has consumed ten of the fifteen years. A maximum
term of five compensable years remains. In effect, then, for data submitted in
connection with a post-1978 registration, 0 receives ten years of exclusive use
followed by five years of compensation entitlement. It also bears noting that any
patents on post-1978 new pesticides or new uses may still be in effect under the
seventeen-year period of patent protection, although regulatory delays will have
consumed at least some of that period. 34 1 Current law permits F to obtain
registration, however, even before patent expiration on the original. 342 Thus,
F can either develop its own data or cite the previously submitted data, obtain
339. See Petrolite Corp. v. EPA, 519 F. Supp. 966, 968-69 (D.D.C. 1981) (confirming this
interpretation of the interplay between the exclusive use and compensation provisions).
340. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 499 F. Supp. 732, 737 (D. Del. 1980), afid, 641 F.2d
104 (3d Cir. 1981).
341. See supra note 265.
342. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a) (1982) (registration system operates independently of patent system).
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registration, and then either wait for patent expiration or negotiate a patent license
from or through 0 if the latter is willing. As a practical matter, 0 probably will
have to wait for the patent to expire. Experience indicates that 0 not only is
unlikely to grant such a license to a potential competitor during the patent term,
but also is unlikely even to sell the active ingredients (the "technical product") to
the follow-on registrant after patent expiration. Thus, even after a follow-on
obtains registration, unless it is prepared to gear up for manufacture of the
technical product rather than just formulate end-use products from the purchased
technical product, it often must find a foreign source for the technical prod-
uct.
3 4 3
Similar use-compensation issues can arise in a slightly different context. If
EPA determines that additional data are needed to maintain an existing registration
(i.e., there are "data-gaps" to be filled), the agency may issue a "call-in" for such
data to all registrants.3 4 4 Compliance with the call-in is necessary to maintain
registration. 3 45 If there is only one registrant, the additional data is subject to
the same use-compensation scheme already discussed in the event that a follow-on
subsequently obtains a registration. If one or more follow-ons have already
registered the pesticide at the time of the data call-in, however, the original and
all follow-on registrants are responsible for complying with the call-in as a
condition to maintenance of their respective registrations. FIFRA permits these
registrants to enter a joint data development agreement under which they share in
the testing or other burdens attendant to compliance with the call-in.34 6 In the
alternative, they may enter an agreement merely to share the costs of developing
the additional data. 347 According to a recent interpretation of the statute by an
arbitration panel in a data compensation case, compliance with this portion of the
statute requires at least a good-faith effort to negotiate a joint development or cost
sharing agreement.34 8 Consequently, a registrant (usually the original) that
develops its own data in compliance with EPA's call-in is entitled to compensation
from other registrants relying on that data to maintain their registrations only if the
former at least has attempted in good faith to negotiate either type of agreement
with the latter. Conversely, a registrant (usually a follow-on) not generating its
own data in response to a call-in is entitled to keep its registration by using the
additional data developed by another registrant only if the former has at least
attempted in good faith to negotiate either type of agreement with the latter. If an
agreement has been attempted but not consummated, or if an agreement has been
made but has not resolved the amount of compensation to be paid for use by one
343. See Rathvon, supra note 266, at 1681.
344. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX2)(BXi) (1982).
345. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX2)(B)(iv) (1982).
346. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX2)(B)(ii) (1982).
347. See id. See also Rathvon, supra note 266, at 1681.
348. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. and Griffin Corp., American Arb. Ass'n Docket No. 16-
171-0080-86M, at 18-21 (Dec. 22, 1988) (Birch, Juten & Foy, Arbs.).
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registrant of new data developed by another, the amount becomes an issue to be
resolved pursuant to FIFRA's arbitration system.
Data compensation disputes of this second kind, either occurring alone or in
conjunction with the type first described, are likely to proliferate in the future
because amendments to FIFRA in 1988 call for a greatly accelerated schedule for
EPA's "reregistration" program.349 Under this program, Congress has mandat-
ed that EPA review and reregister pesticides that originally had been registered
prior to November 1, 1984, in an effort to insure that older registrations conform
to more recent, stricter registration standards. 350 Reregistration often results in
data call-ins by EPA.3 5 '
5. Comparison of FIFRA Arbitration With Other
Nonconsensual Systems
Like the 1972 version of FIFRA, the 1978 amendments permit a follow-on
registrant to rely on compensable previously submitted data only if an offer of
compensation is made to the original data submitter.352  If the parties are
unable to agree on the amount of compensation, the current system provides for
a dispute resolution method very different from the earlier form. Instead of
assigning the adjudicatory responsibility to EPA, subject to judicial review, the
1978 law provides for mandatory arbitration at the instance of either party with no
meaningful judicial review. 353 Data compensation disputes among two or more
registrants subject to a data call-in are resolved in the same manner.354 The
law commits the task of conducting the arbitration program to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), an executive branch agency that
serves mediation and arbitration roles in labor disputes.3 55  The agency,
recognizing its lack of expertise relevant to the responsibility it had been given,
adopted regulations delegating administrative authority over the program to the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), the nation's preeminent private
349. In 1978 Congress had directed EPA to reregister old pesticides "in the most expeditious
manner practicable." 7 U.S.C. § 136a(g) (1982). The new reregistration scheme calls for a series of
very ambitious deadlines for EPA to accomplish the task. 1988 Amendments, § 4, 102 Stat. 2655.
See Conner, Ebner, Landfair, O'Connor and Weinstein, Effects on Industry, in J. GREENE, REGULATING
PESTICIDES: FIFRA AMENDMENTS OF 1988--A BNA SPECIAL REPORT 35, 36-37 (1989) (accelerated
reregistration likely to produce more arbitration cases) [hereinafter Conner, Effects on Industry].
350. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(g) (1982). See J. GREENE, REGULATING PESTICIDES: FIFRA AMENDMENTS
OF 1988--A BNA SPECIAL REPORT 7 (1989) (rationale for reregistration).
351. See Conner, Effects on Industry, supra note 349.
352. 1972 FIFRA, § 3(cX1)(D), 86 Stat. at 979 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136(cX1)(D)(ii)
(1982).
353. 7 U.S.C. § 136(cX1)(D)(ii) (1982).
354. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX2XBXv) (1982).
355. 7 U.S.C. § 3(cXl)(DXii) (1982). See 45 Fed. Reg. 55,394, 55,394-55,395 (1980)
(discussing nature of FMCS).
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arbitration organization. 35 6  The regulations incorporate a slightly modified
version of AAA's commercial arbitration rules, and specify that arbitrators are to
be selected from AAA's roster of commercial arbitrators. 3 57 Arbitrators in the
FIFRA data compensation program are, however, given special training by
EPA.35
8
The dispute resolution mechanism created by Congress in FIFRA was, and
continues to be, unusual in several ways. The fact that parties are forced to
employ what traditionally has been a consensual procedure is itself unusual,
although we already have seen that nonconsensual arbitration has become
somewhat less novel in recent times. Several of the most important features of
data-compensation arbitration are discussed below. To aid in illuminating these
features, pertinent comparisons will be made with counterpart characteristics of the
other nonconsensual systems discussed in this article: court-annexed, pension-plan,
and commodity-futures arbitration.
a. The Nature of the Underlying Rights
Data-compensation arbitration under FIFRA adjusts rights and obligations
between private parties, as do court-annexed, pension plan, and commodity-futures
arbitration. Although adjudications in the four systems all involve private
disputants, rights adjudicated therein are distinguishable along a continuum from
those of a purely common-law nature to those arising solely from federal
regulatory legislation.
Traditional common law tort and contract rights are at issue in court-annexed
arbitration. 359  Because arbitrators in commodity futures arbitration have the
same broad, unreviewable latitude over the merits of a dispute that characterizes
traditional arbitration, these arbitration proceedings can involve a mixture of
common-law and statutory rights.3 60 Customer complaints asserted against a
commodity futures professional may allege violation of the Commodity Exchange
Act or CFFC regulations, such as an allegation of noncompetitive execution or
bucketing.36 1  Such complaints may, on the other hand, allege common-law
356. 29 C.F.R. § 1440.1 (1988). See 45 Fed. Reg. 55,394, 55,394-55,395 (1980) (discussing
the fact that FIFRA arbitrations are outside the expertise and customary role of FMCS as reason for
delegation to AAA).
357. 29 C.F.R. § 1440.1 app. (1988).
358. See Brief of Appellees, at 6-7, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568 (1985); Reply Memorandum for the Appellant, at 34-39, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
359. See Walker, supra note 68, at 917-21 (discussing types of claims subject to court-annexed
arbitration).
360. See supra note 113.
361. Noncompetitive execution of customer orders is often accomplished by a cross-trade. A
cross-trade is the "offsetting or noncompetitive matching of the buying order of one customer against
the selling order of another, a practice that is permissible only when executed as required by the
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contract or tort claims, or both statutory and common-law claims together. In
many instances, even the statutory claims merely represent modified substitutes for
claims that would have been cognizable as contract or fraud claims at common
law.3
62
The claim of a multiemployer pension plan against a withdrawing employer
for the latter's share of unfunded vested benefits represents the enforcement of a
federal statutory right. Such a right may be viewed, however, as a partial
substitute for contractual rights that otherwise would exist absent pension
regulation. Such contract rights would exist among contributing employers, as
well as between these employers, on the one hand, and the trust and its beneficia-
ries, on the other.
363
Under FIFRA, an original data submitter's claim against a follow-on registrant
for a share of data development costs is essentially a federal statutory claim. The
data was developed and submitted for the purpose of fulfilling a federal statutory
requirement. It probably is true that at least some of the safety and health data
would have been developed even without the registration requirement, because the
pesticide developer has a significant self-interest in producing pesticides that
perform their advertised function adequately and safely. It also is probably true
that the data can have value to the submitter apart from fulfilling the FIFRA
registration requirement, such as providing evidence for defense against future
product liability suits, a record of new testing procedures and techniques
discovered during the testing process, information necessary for meeting foreign
registration requirements, and kernels of serendipitous information useful as
Commodity Exchange Act, CFTC regulations and rules of the contract market." COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM'N, GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS USED IN THE FUTURES TRADING INDUSTRY 8 (1978).
Generally, a cross-trade is permissible only if made at the market price after each order has been
offered in open outcry and neither has been accepted. See Cohl v. Floor Broker Asscs., [1977-80
Decisions Transfer Binder] Commodity Futures L. Rep. (CCH) 20,790 (CFTC Mar. 12, 1979).
Bucketing consists of directly or indirectly putting "the opposite side of a customer's order into
the handling broker's own account or into an account in which he has an interest, without execution
on an exchange." COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS USED IN THE
FUTURES TRADING INDUSTRY 3 (1978). See Siegel Trading Co., [1977-80 Decisions Transfer Binder]
Commodity Futures L. Rep. (CCH) 20,452 (CFTC July 26, 1977).
362. One example is unauthorized trading of the customer's account. It can be a violation of
the CEA and CFTC regulations, Blanding v. First Commodity Corp., 2 Comm. Futures L. Rep. (CCH)
21,648 (CFTC Nov. 29, 1982), or a violation of common-law fiduciary duties, Ellwood v. Mid States
Commodities, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1987).
363. These contract rights and obligations would normally be created by a multiemployer
collective bargaining agreement with a union. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIvE BARGAINING 86-92 (1976). Thus, even without specific pension plan
regulation, the rights and obligations of federal labor law would add to, or in the case of conflict
supersede, those existing at common law. Id. at 540-41, 543-51. Breach of a contractual obligation
among employers would almost certainly breach an obligation to the union, as well, and it would
normally be the union that would undertake to enforce the rights in question. When the union is a
party to an action to enforce obligations created by a collective bargaining agreement, enforcement may
be sought in either state or federal court under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
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building blocks for later research.3 6  Some meaningful portion of this value
may well be lost when EPA discloses the test data to requesting parties, especially
if there are indirect leaks to major competitors, but lost value due to disclosure is
not what is supposed to be compensable through arbitration. The follow-on
registrant does not see the data when it is used to support that party's registra-
tion. 365 What is primarily compensable through arbitration is a share of the
cost, however computed, of developing the data necessary to obtain registra-
tion. 366  A secondary element of the compensation right may consist of a share
364. See Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 561-62 (E.D. Mo. 1983), vacated sub nom.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (discussing various other uses of safety and health
data); Comment, The Taking of Trade Secrets: What Constitutes Just Compensation?, 48 U. PITT. L.
REV. 247, 260-61 (1986) (same); Note, FIFRA and the "Taking" of Trade Secrets, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REv. 593, 623 (1980) (same); Brief of Abbott Laboratories, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellee, at 5-7, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (same). See also S. REP. No.
334, supra note 265, at 72 (statement of Douglas Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency) ("data developed in support of registration has [sic] a continuing commercial value beyond
its [sic] value in achieving the immediate registration for which it [sic] was developed").
365. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 499 F. Supp. 732, 737 (D. Del. 1980), affd, 641 F.2d
104 (3d Cir. 1981).
366. There has been, and continues to be, vigorous debate about how these costs should be
computed. For example, questions have arisen as to whether the registrant's compensable costs should
include only those attributable to compelled data in contrast with data voluntarily submitted in
connection with an EPA special review. It cannot be determined from the opinion in the first FIFRA
arbitration case whether such data were treated as compensable. Stauffer Chemical Co. and PPG
Indus., Inc., FMCS Docket No. 16-199-077-82 (June 28, 1983) (Birch, Smolka, & Vassil, Arbs.),
reprinted in Reply Brief for the Appellant, at 42, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568 (1985). In the second case, such data were held not to be compensable. See E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. and Griffin Corp., American Arbitration Ass'n Docket No. 16-171-0080-86M, at
17 (Dec. 22, 1988) (Birch, Juten & Foy, Arbs.). There have been similar disagreements about the
compensability of the cost of efficacy studies conducted after EPA began waiving such studies, but the
arbitrators in both Stauffer, id. at 47, and du Pont, id. at 17, held such data to be noncompensable. See
also Rathvon, supra note 266, at 1683.
In addition, once costs have been determined, ample room for disagreement still exists about the
method for allocating them between original and follow-on registrants. Costs can be divided per capita.
See Note, Compensating Manufacturers Submitting Health and Safety Data to Support Product
Registrations After Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 61 IND. L.J. 189, 213-15 (1986) (urging per capita
allocation). On the other hand, costs can be allocated presently on the basis of current or projected
market shares, or allocated in future periodic installments based on actual future market shares. One
of the EPA administrative decisions rendered under the pre-1978 law used current market shares. Ciba-
Geigy Corp. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., FIFRA COMP. Dkt. Nos. 33, 34, & 41, slip op. at 43-44 (Aug.
19, 1980). The other used a per capita allocation method. Union Carbide Agric. Chem. Co. v.
Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co., FIFRA COMP. Dkt. No. 27, slip op. at 60-64 (July 13, 1982). The
compensation provisions of the 1972 version of FIFRA provided for payment of "reasonable compensa-
tion," 1972 FIFRA, § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. at 979, whereas the counterpart provisions of the 1978
version simply provided for "compensation," 7 U.S.C. § 3(c)(1)(DXii) (1982). In the first FIFRA
arbitration decision under the 1978 regime, a per capita method was used to compute a lump-sum
payment for actual data production costs, and a projected market share method was used to estimate
future royalty payments to compensate for avoided opportunity costs. Stauffer, id. at 52-53. In the
second FIFRA arbitration decision, actual data production costs were allocated on the basis of both
historic and actual future market shares, with payments to be a combination of lump sum and future
66
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of the opportunity costs incurred by the original registrant and avoided by the
follow-on, because of the regulatory delay incurred by the former but not the latter
before being able to market the pesticide.36 7 The right to such compensation,
though existing between private parties, is a pure federal statutory right. This fact
distinguishes the rights and obligations adjusted in FIFRA arbitration from those
adjudicated in court-annexed, pension-plan, or commodity-futures arbitration.
Such a characteristic is clearly relevant to any attempted defense of FIFRA's
unusual dispute resolution mechanism, from either the perspective of sound
regulatory policy formulation or compliance with constitutional directives.
Whether this characteristic, by itself, should be sufficient to fully justify a non-
consensual, standardless, virtually unreviewable procedure is less clear.
installments. du Pont, id. at 36-39.
367. The debate over whether the compensation payable from the follow-on to the original
registrant should include only a share of the actual costs of testing and producing data necessary for
registration, or whether it should also include a "value received" component reflecting the follow-on
registrant's avoided opportunity costs, has been even longer and more vigorous than the debate over
which direct costs to include. Compare Brief for PPG Indus., Inc. as Amicus Curiae, at 10-22, Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (urging a narrow cost-sharing
approach); Brief for PPG Indus., Inc. as Amicus Curiae, at 6-18, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986 (1984) (same); Brief for Sathon, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, at 19-23, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (same) with Brief for Stauffer Chemical Co. as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Affirmance, at 13-18, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (urging a broader
compensation standard including both original registrant's actual data production costs and follow-on's
avoided opportunity costs).
The two EPA administrative cases decided under the 1972 version of FIFRA included only the
original registrant's actual data production costs. Union Carbide Agric. Chem. Co. v. Thompson-
Hayward Chem. Co., FIFRA COMP. Dkt. No. 27, slip op. at 67-69 (July 13, 1982); Ciba-Geigy Corp.
v. Farmland Indus., Inc., FIFRA COMP. Dkt. Nos. 33, 34, & 41, slip op. at 32-34, 43-44 (Aug. 19,
1980). In the first FIFRA arbitration decision under the 1978 version of FIFRA, the arbitrators adopted
a broad approach for calculating compensation, including both actual data production costs (allocated
per capita, paid in a lump-sum) and the follow-on's avoided opportunity costs (compensated by
royalties on follow-on's future sales). Stauffer, id. at 48-54. In the second arbitration case, the
arbitrators acknowledged that avoided opportunity costs can be a legitimate component of total
compensation in appropriate circumstances, du Pont, id. at 17-18, 22-23, but ultimately limited their
award to actual data costs, id. at 32-39. It has been suggested by attorneys for the original registrant
that the arbitrators did not award an amount attributable to avoided opportunity costs because there was
a substantial delay between the time the follow-ons obtained their registrations and the time they began
marketing their products. See Conner, Ebner, Landfair, O'Connor & Weinstein, The Linuron Decision:
Impact on Pesticide Registrants, Implications for Data Compensation Disputes Under FIFRA--The
Original Registrant, 12 Chemical Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, pt. It, at 1681, 1685, 1686 (Feb. 17, 1989)
[hereinafter Conner, The Linuron Decision]. In du Pont, the arbitrators' acknowledgement of the
general propriety of including avoided opportunity costs applied only to data compensation under 7
U.S.C. § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982), and not to joint development or cost sharing under 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(2)(B)(ii), (iii) (1982). This conclusion was based on the arbitrators' interpretation of the
former provision as embodying a broader concept of compensation than the latter. du Pont, id. at 11-
14, 17-18.
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b. The Availability of Decision Standards or
Choice-Based Substitutes
In the absence of either a freely bargained-for dispute resolution procedure or
some other meaningful choice in the selection of a procedure, the existence of
identifiable standards obligatory on the decision maker is the sine qua non of fair
and reasonably consistent conflict adjustment. In the 1978 version of FIFRA,
Congress neither established standards to guide the arbitrators in determining
compensation nor authorized EPA to do so. At least two courts, as well as one
arbitration panel and the FMCS, have concluded that Congress specifically
intended to impose no constraining standards on the arbitral determination of data
compensation. 3 68 The absence of standards is something that participants in
traditional consensual arbitration are accustomed to, because arbitrators in their
normal role are not bound to follow substantive rules of law or evidence unless
the disputants contractually have so provided. 369 Participants in consensual
arbitration bargain for the procedure, however, and presumably trade those
attributes they view negatively for those they view more positively. And, again,
they can even bargain for the applicability of legal rules. FIFRA data-cost
disputants obviously have not bargained for the uncertainty wrought by standard-
less dispute resolution, and are not permitted to bargain for more certainty.
One occasionally encounters the notion that a party submitting to a pesticide
registration or other regulatory process "consents" to all of its conditions as the
quid pro quo for the "benefits" of regulation. 3 70 The only choice such a party
normally has, of course, is to submit or not do business. This "regulatory bargain"
rationale is far more fiction than fact, and certainly does not constitute the kind
of bargaining that lends fairness to a standardless dispute resolution mechanism.
The decision to regulate in a given manner may be good public policy, but
justifying a dispute resolution procedure within the regulatory scheme by
368. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 637 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D.D.C. 1986); Sathon,
Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2241, 2245 (N.D. Ill. 1984); E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. and Griffin Corp., American Arbitration Ass'n Docket No. 16-171-0080-86M,
at 14 (Dec. 22, 1988) (Birch, Juten & Foy, Arbs.); 44 Fed. Reg. 43,292, 43,293 (1979).
369. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
370. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985)
(suggesting that follow-on registrants consented to FIFRA arbitration by choosing to register
pesticides); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006-07 (1984) (using a form of consent
rationale as partial justification for conclusion that Monsanto had no "reasonable investment-backed
expectation" that data would be kept confidential); Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 318-21 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that commodity futures broker consented to
arbitration merely by membership in exchange, despite economic necessity of membership and
government requirement that exchanges have such arbitration), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988). See
also Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 111, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915,
991-92 & n.414 (1988) (although doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" has eroded substantially,
at some point conditioning government benefits on waiver of constitutional right such as access to
Article Ill forum rises to level of coercion and should be void).
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characterizing submission to the process as a manifestation of consent is jurispru-
dential nonsense.
Somewhat like bargaining for a dispute resolution procedure, the availability
of alternative procedures from which the disputants are free to choose can
introduce discipline to the decision-making process that substitutes, though
probably imperfectly, for required standards. FIFRA disputants, however, have
no choice among alternatives for determining compensation.
Court-annexed arbitration similarly involves adjudication by arbitrators not
legally obligated to abide by any set of legal principles. The fact that court-
annexed arbitration programs normally require the arbitrators to be attorneys may
increase the likelihood that they will adhere to pertinent legal rules, but this fact
in itself really adds little to the predictability of result. 371 Lawyers can have
their own personal versions of any given principle. The absence of decision
standards in court-annexed arbitration is largely offset, however, by the availability
of de novo review, which is discussed in the next section.
372
The legislation and agency regulations that impel commodity futures
arbitration also do not require the arbitrators to follow any identifiable standards
for decision. 373 Assuming that arbitrators are knowledgeable of commodity
futures trading, an assumption likely to be fulfilled in such a specialized field, the
fact that the transactions prefatory to arbitrated disputes arise in a highly
differentiated commercial community with well-established conventions may
increase the likelihood that those conventions will usually serve as surrogates for
obligatory legal principles. Here, again, likelihood does not protect disputants in
any given case against decision makers with highly idiosyncratic interpretations
of the conventions. In contrast with court-annexed or FIFRA arbitration,
commodity futures arbitration gives one party, the customer, a choice of dispute
resolution mechanisms. The customer can select arbitration, administrative
reparations proceedings within the CFFC, or litigation in federal or state
court.374 Although this range of alternatives may provide the customer with
a reasonable substitute for either overarching decisional standards or a bargained-
for dispute resolution method, the commodity futures professional has no such
choice.3
75
371. See Walker, supra note 68, at 915, 925.
372. See infra text accompanying notes 389-90.
373. The closest thing to a decision standard in commodity futures arbitration is the statutory
requirement that the procedure itself be "fair and equitable," which of course is no substantive standard
at all. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (1982).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 224-48.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39. As discussed supra at text accompanying notes
251-54, in Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 316-18 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988), an alternative rationale for concluding that the commodity
futures professional had waived its right to adjudication by an Article III court was that the professional
had consented to the arbitration procedure by becoming a member of the exchange. Once again, such
"consent" is largely a legal fiction that cannot substitute for decision-making standards in the way that
true bargaining can. See supra text accompanying note 370.
19901
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In the case of multiemployer pension plan withdrawal arbitration, there is
neither bilateral bargainipg nor unilateral choice from among alternatives to
substitute for decisional standards.3 76  Decisional standards in this system,
however, are more concrete than in the others, despite the wide latitude given
pension plan trustees to make liability assessments against a withdrawing
employer, a latitude imputed subsequently to the arbitrator by a strong presump-
tion of trustee correctness. 377  Pension trustees are constrained at least to the
extent that they must either select their liability calculation formula from among
four alternatives or receive approval from PBGC for any other method, apply the
same formula to other withdrawing employers in the future, and use actuarial
assumptions that are reasonable in the aggregate.3 78  Previous discussion
demonstrated how much discretion rests with the trustees, and subsequently with
the arbitrator, but even the minimal standards found in pension plan arbitration




The knowledge of the parties, their attorneys, and the initial decision maker
that subsequent oversight may be conducted by an independent reviewing body
can provide another source of discipline to restrain potential arbitrariness, bias, or
other individualized oppression in the decisional process. The discipline created
by the knowledge that review is available is similar in kind, if not degree, to that
provided by concrete initial decisional standards or a bargained-for decisional
process. It is present to some degree even if the reviewing body itself is
unconstrained by knowable and reasonably certain decisional standards, but is far
more obvious when the review is so constrained.
FIFRA specifies that the arbitrator's data-compensation award is unreviewable
by any court "except for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct" by the
arbitrator or one of the parties.3 80 Although FIFRA's legislative history sheds
no light on the intended scope of review for fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct, the statute clearly contemplates no review on the merits. The
language is similar in tenor to the review provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), which governs consensual arbitration. Grounds for setting aside an
arbitration award under the FAA are limited to situations involving demonstrable
fraud or material conflict of interest on the part of the arbitrator, a party's
376. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35, 139.
378. See supra note 134.
379. The critical problem with pension plan liability assessments and arbitration, it will be
recalled, is the confluence of these rather loose standards, a biased initial decision maker, and the
absence of adequate factual review. See supra text accompanying notes 155-162.
380. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cXl)(DXii) (1982).
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procurement of an award by fraud or other undue means, gross procedural failures
such as the arbitrator's refusal to receive evidence pertinent and material to the
dispute, and the rendering of an award clearly in excess of the arbitrator's
contractual authority. 381  The grounds for review under the FAA have been
construed quite narrowly by the courts, as should be the case, because a broad
construction would undermine the basic cost and expediency goals of arbitra-
tion. 3
82
It seems likely that a similarly narrow construction will be accorded the
FIFRA arbitration review provision. Indeed, because FIFRA's review provision
makes no explicit reference to gross procedural error or unauthorized action by the
arbitrator, as does the FAA, one can argue that the former envisions an even
narrower scope of review than the latter. There is also the chance, however, that
courts will interpret the term "misconduct" in FIFRA as encompassing such
concepts.383 Preclusion of review involves a trade-off between speed, econo-
my, and flexibility on the one hand, and protection against arbitrary, biased, or
otherwise oppressive decisions on the other. The trade-off, which is much the
same as that made when no standards for decision are imposed on arbitrators, is
an appropriate one when parties freely bargain for it, but is much less defensible
when there is no opportunity to choose.
The legislation and CFTC regulations requiring that commodity futures
exchanges and the NFA establish nonconsensual arbitration systems specify that
the arbitration will be "final," with the only right of appeal being that "provided
under applicable law."3 84 In other words, commodity futures arbitration adopts
the review provisions designed for consensual arbitration under either the pertinent
state arbitration statute or the Federal Arbitration Act, as the case may be.
385
Most state arbitration laws limit judicial review in a fashion similar to the federal
act, so the review provisions borrowed by commodity futures arbitration permit
381. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
382. See Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35
UCLA L. REV. 623, 637-38 (limited nature of judicial review); Stipanowich, supra note 36, at 439-40
(same); Note, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a
"Better Way?", supra note 14 at 1731-32 (same).
383. One court has recently held, however, that FIFRA arbitrators cannot be found guilty of
'misconduct" by employing no particular standards for determining compensation, because no standards
exist. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 637 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D.D.C. 1986).
384. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
385. In Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988), the commodity futures broker was a member of the Chicago Board
of Trade, which had adopted arbitration rules to comply with the CEA and with CFTC regulations.
The exchange rules provided that arbitrations were to be governed by the Uniform Arbitration Act of
Illinois. 836 F.2d at 323. Because of their similarity in almost all relevant particulars, it usually makes
little difference whether the Federal Arbitration Act or a state's codification of the Uniform Arbitration
Act applies. See generally note 55.
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scrutiny only for fraud, gross procedural error, or action in excess of authori-
ty.38
6
Pension plan arbitration is subject to more extensive review than either FIFRA
or commodity futures arbitration. Nonsubstantive complaints about the conduct
of the proceeding are reviewable on the same narrow grounds as in these two
systems.387  In contrast with the other two systems, however, judicial review
of the trustees' and arbitrator's liability assessment does go to the merits. Review
of factual determinations is, by statutory mandate, conducted under a "clearly
erroneous" type of standard; review of statutory interpretation is de novo.
3 88
With respect to review, what distinguishes court-annexed arbitration from
those systems found in regulatory contexts is the availability of trial de novo in a
court that does have an obligation to apply relevant legal principles and whose
decision is further reviewable by an appellate court. 389 Even though trial de
novo is not usually sought, its mere availability serves as a more than adequate
safeguard against oppressive first-level decision making. At some theoretical
point, the statutory disincentives against trial de novo could be sufficient to destroy
its function as a check on arbitrators, but this point does not seem to have been
approached by existing disincentives in most court-annexed arbitration systems.
These disincentives, which were discussed earlier, range from trivial to signifi-
cant. 390 Even at their most substantial, however, the disincentives do not seem
great enough to make trial de novo an empty promise.
B. The Data Disclosure, Use, and Arbitral
Compensation System as a Fifth Amendment Taking
Litigation over the constitutionality of FIFRA's arbitration scheme clouded its
implementation until the Supreme Court recently upheld the key disclosure and
use-compensation provisions in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.39 1 and Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.3 92 The taking and article III issues
resolved by the Court in Monsanto and Union Carbide, as well a statutory
386. See supra note 55 (grounds for setting aside arbitration award under the Uniform
Arbitration Act essentially the same as under the FAA).
387. See supra text accompanying note 145.
388. See supra text accompanying note 140-143.
389. It is not clear that full trial de novo would always be necessary to satisfy various state and
federal constitutional objections to court-annexed arbitration. For example, although most states with
court-annexed arbitration programs provide for trial de novo, a small number do not. See Walker,
supra note 68, at 922. Even if trial de novo is not a state or federal constitutional prerequisite, it may
be necessary for public acceptance in many locales, and some form of relatively thorough review is
obviously necessary for both constitutionality and general community acceptance when pure common-
law claims are at issue and the disputes being resolved are not an integral part of a regulatory program.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
391. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
392. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
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vagueness/standardless delegation issue left unresolved, are outlined here to
illustrate the constitutional concerns that a somewhat unorthodox nonconsensual
dispute resolution procedure can generate.
1. The Construct of the Taking Issue
One of the earliest and most strenuously voiced complaints concerning
FIFRA's validity asserted that the disclosure and use of test data amounted to a
"taking" of the registrant's property in violation of the fifth amendment.
393
Under the taking clause, which acts as a limitation on the sovereign power of
eminent domain, a governmental appropriation of private property is lawful only
if carried out for a public purpose and only if just compensation is paid to the
property owner. 3 94 The basis for the taking contention was that an original
pesticide registrant has a property interest in the test data protectible under state
trade secret law.395 The primary value of proprietary information inheres in
the competitive advantage gained from its confidentiality and the right to exclude
others from its use.396 Data submitters asserted that the disclosure and follow-
on use provisions of FIFRA substantially deprived them of these attributes of
ownership.
39 7
Although several lower federal courts had upheld the validity of the 1978
FIFRA data provisions in the face of fifth amendment taking claims, 398 in 1983
a district court accepted the taking arguments of Monsanto Co. and invalidated the
entire scheme for handling test data.399 The court based its decision on four
points:
(1) Despite the absence of any federal law creating a property right in test
data submitted to EPA, state trade secret law in Missouri, the pertinent jurisdic-
393. The taking issue was raised not long after enactment of the 1978 version of FIFRA. See
Petrolite Corp. v. EPA, 519 F. Supp. 966 (D.D.C. 1981); Mobay Chemical Co. v. Costle, 517 F. Supp.
254 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affd sub nom. Mobay Chemical Co. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 499 F. Supp. 732 (D. Del. 1980),
aft'd, 641 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
394. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
395. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1000-14; Mobay Chemical Co. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d
at 422; Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d at 114-16; Petrolite Corp. v. EPA, 519 F. Supp. at
970.
396. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1011-12 n.15; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
comment b, at 5 (1939); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 262, at 862-63; Comment, The Taking of
Trade Secrets: What Constitutes Just Compensation?, supra note 364, at 259-61; Note, FIFRA and the
"Taking" of Trade Secrets, supra note 364, at 632-33. See also supra text accompanying notes 365-68.
397. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1000-14; Mobay Chemical Co. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d
at 422; Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d at 114; Petrolite Corp. v. EPA, 519 F. Supp. at 969.
398. Mobay Chemical Co. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d at 423-24; Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle,
641 F.2d at 116-17; Petrolite Corp. v. EPA, 519 F. Supp. at 972-73.
399. Monsanto v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 568-69 (E.D. Mo. 1983), vacated sub nom.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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tion, did create such an interest. 40 0 This state-created interest encompassed the
right to prevent disclosure except when essential to serve the public interest and
to exclude others from use of the data.
40 1
(2) Permitting use of Monsanto's test data by follow-on registrants deprived
it of the right to exclude, and this aspect of the property right was appropriated for
a nonpublic purpose. 402 The only beneficiaries, according to the court, were
the individual follow-on registrants. 40 3 One of Congress's main, and explicitly
stated, purposes for permitting follow-on use was to lower barriers to entry and
thereby increase competition in the pesticide industry, an admittedly public
purpose.404 Second-guessing Congress to an unusual extent, the court held that
the evidence demonstrated competition in the industry to be vigorous and in no
need of enhancement.
40 5
(3) The public interest in assuring that safe and effective pesticides are
marketed was served by EPA's analysis and scrutiny of submitted data, including
its reliance on an independent scientific advisory panel.40 6 The public interest
in receiving information of sufficient quantity and quality to make informed
decisions about pesticides was adequately served by FIFRA's labeling require-
ments.407  Increasing the perceived low level of public confidence in the
effectiveness of government pesticide regulation, one of the reasons asserted by
Congress for its decision mandating public disclosure of safety and health data,
may have been sufficiently public in character for fifth amendment purposes.
40 8
But, the court held, permitting the public to share in regulation of the pesticide
industry through disclosure to requesting parties works a destruction of private
property that must be compensated.40 9
(4) FIFRA's arbitration system provided no compensation for disclosure, and
failed to provide just compensation for follow-on use because the absence of either
standards for determining compensation or judicial review made the system
inherently arbitrary.
4 10
400. Monsanto v. EPA, 564 F. Supp at 565-66.
401. Id. at 565-66.
402. Id. at 566.
403. Id.
404. See S. REP. 334, supra note 265, at 30-31.
405. Monsanto v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. at 566.
406. Id. at 566-67.
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2. Safety and Health Data as Property
Acting on direct appeal in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court
vacated, concluding that the disclosure and use-compensation programs passed
fifth amendment muster.411 The district court's opinion showed a lack of
deference to the legislative branch that was striking for any court after the
1930s.412 Thus, the Supreme Court's reversal was unsurprising even though
the nonconsensual arbitration system put in place by FIFRA's 1978 amendments
did raise some provocative questions.
In one of the most significant portions of its opinion, the Court held, for the
first time, that proprietary data filed with a regulatory agency can constitute
property for purposes of the fifth amendment taking clause.4 13 Borrowing from
some of its procedural due process cases such as Board of Regents v. Roth,4 14
the Court acknowledged "the basic axiom that '[p]roperty interests ... are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law."' 4 15 The one point on which the Court agreed with the
district judge was that the state trade secret law of Missouri could provide such
an independent source of property rights.
4 16
*3. Investment-Backed Expectation
The Court next explored whether the disclosure and use provisions amounted
to a taking of Monsanto's intangible property. Monsanto did not challenge the
power of Congress to regulate the pesticide industry, and any such challenge no
doubt would have been fruitless. The Court observed that regulatory restrictions
on commerce have long been recognized as part of the reciprocal exchange for
"the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community."
417
Validity of such regulation under the commerce and due process clauses simply
depends on some minimally rational relationship to a matter of legitimate
411. 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984).
412. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 352-59 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing judicial willingness to second-guess wisdom of economic regulatory measures until about
1937, and increasing unwillingness since that time) [hereinafter J. NowAK].
413. 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
414. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that because state law provided no form of entitlement
to continuation, an untenured assistant professor had no property right in employment and state
university did not violate procedural due process by failing to grant hearing prior to termination).
415. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1001 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 464, 577
(1972))).
416. 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
417. Id. at 1007 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
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congressional concern.4 18 These principles are not only strong but approach
inviolability when the subject of regulation is a product such as pesticides, the
very nature of which creates public and legislative concern.
4 19
Even legitimate regulation can become a taking for which compensation is
owing.4 20 The Court reiterated the aphorism of takings jurisprudence that it
had found it impossible to develop a "set formula" for deciding when "justice and
fairness" dictate that economic harm caused by government regulation be treated
as a compensable taking.42 1 The in uiry into whether there has been a taking
is one of an "ad hoc, factual" nature. Z 2 While no precise decisional model has
proved feasible, the Court has identified several factors relevant to the question
whether government action has crossed the line between mere regulation and
compensable taking. These factors include "the character of the governmental
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations." 423 In the case of FIFRA's data provisions, however, the Court
found the weight of the third factor to be so overwhelming as to dispose of the
taking question without reference to the first two factors.
The third factor, a "reasonable investment-backed expectation," must be more
than a "unilateral expectation or an abstract need," according to the Court.
424
With regard to FIFRA test data in the hands of EPA, the nature of the submitter's
expectation depends on the known conditions under which the data are submitted.
In its analysis, the Court divided the known conditions of data submission into
three segments, the period prior to the 1972 amendments, during 1972-78, and
after the effective date of the 1978 amendments.
Finding no pre-1972 guarantee of confidentiality or exclusive use in FIFRA
or other federal law, the Court concluded that prior to 1972 Monsanto could not
have had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that EPA would maintain
test data in strict confidence and would use them exclusively for the purpose of
considering the application for which they had been submitted.4 25 Therefore,
there could be no compensable taking of data submitted prior to the effective date
of FIFRA's 1972 revision. Although the Court rested its conclusion in this regard
on the absence of any express guarantee in federal law, it also noted two other
buttressing factors. First, in an industry that long had been the subject of much
public concern and government regulation, the possibility was great that the
418. 467 U.S. at 1007 (observing that Monsanto was not challenging the power of Congress to
regulate the marketing and use of pesticides, nor would such a challenge have been of any avail).
419. Id.
420. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking").
421. 467 U.S. at 1005 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), quoting
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
422. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna at 175).
423. Id. (quoting PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
424. Id. (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
425. Id. at 1008-09.
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federal government, which had taken no position prior to 1972 on disclosure of
pesticide test data, would find disclosure to be in the public interest if it focused
on the issue. 426  Second, there was substantial evidence that prior to 1972
personnel of EPA and USDA did customarily consider previously submitted data
in support of a follow-on application, and that this agency practice was well
known within the pesticide industry.
4 27
The known conditions surrounding data submission were markedly different,
however, during the operative period of the 1972 amendments. During this time,
a data submitter had the opportunity to designate its data as trade secrets upon
submission. When Monsanto filed data with EPA during the 1972-78 time frame,
it did so with the understanding that FIFRA prohibited the agency from disclosing
or making a follow-on use of those data agreed or ultimately determined to be
trade secrets. The 1972-78 understanding based on statutorily prescribed
conditions of submittal was sufficient to create a reasonable investment-backed
expectation of confidentiality and nonuse.428 Thus, actions by EPA pursuant
to the current, challenged version of FIFRA disclosing or using data that had been
submitted during the 1972-78 period with such expectations constitute takings
under the fifth amendment. 429 The nonconsensual arbitration program instituted
in 1978 has no applicability to any claimed losses resulting from disclosure, and
judicial determinations of just compensation will be required for any disclosure-
related taking.430  It is possible, the Court acknowledged, that data-cost
arbitration may actually provide just compensation for a particular use-related
taking, but the Court declined to reach the question in this case because there had
been no arbitration. 4
3 1
With respect to any safety and health test data submitted by Monsanto after
the effective date of the 1978 amendments, the Court reached essentially the same
conclusion on the taking question as it had for pre-1972 data. Monsanto could not
have had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that EPA would keep the
data confidential and refrain from follow-on use beyond the limits prescribed in
the amended statute itself. Monsanto was on notice, the Court held, of the manner
in which EPA was authorized to disclose and use any safety and health data turned
over to it by an applicant for registration.43 2 Subsequent to the 1978 revision,
Monsanto and other submitters of new data know that, for a period of ten years
from submission, EPA will not consider such data in evaluating a follow-on
registrant's application without the submitter's permission. The post-1978
expectations of submitters also are formed by knowledge that, once the ten-year
426. Id.
427. Id. at 1009-10. See also supra note 289-91.
428. Id. at 1010-11.
429. Id. at 1012.
430. Id. at 1013.
431. Id. & n.15.
432. Id. at 1006.
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period of exclusive use expires, their permission is no longer required for follow-
on use but that they are entitled to compensation for the use until the end of the
fifteenth year from submission. Similarly, these submitters are aware that EPA
is required publicly to disclose safety and health data subject to limited exceptions.
When distilled to its quintessence, the Court's fifth-amendment analysis of
post-1978 test data simply stands for the fundamental proposition that Congress
may, so long as it otherwise acts within its constitutional power, prospectively
redefine state-created property rights without effecting a compensable taking.
4. Public Purpose
Finally, the Court found that the taking that occurred with respect to data
submitted during the 1972-78 period was for a public purpose. 43 3 Criticizing
the lower court's lack of deference to Congress, the Court stated that the scope of
the public use requirement of the taking clause is "coterminous with the scope of
a sovereign's police powers," and "the role of the courts in second-guessing the
legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use is extremely narrow." 4 34
So long as the taking has a conceivably public character, the Court continued, "the
means by which it will be attained is ... for Congress to determine."
4 35
The public purposes behind the 1978 disclosure provisions included providing
an effective check on the decision-making processes of EPA,436 enhancing
public confidence in those processes,43 7 and allowing members of the public
to determine the likelihood of individualized risks peculiar to their use of the
product.4 38 In a similar vein, the public purposes underlying the 1978 data-use
provisions included eliminating costly duplication of research and data develop-
ment,439 streamlining the registration process, 44° making new end-use prod-
433. Id. at 1016.
434. Id. at 1014.
435. Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
436. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 41 (EPA acknowledging problems with its
regulation of pesticides, and urging public disclosure of data "to encourage public understanding and
criticism of Agency decision-making."); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE REGULATION OF PESTICIDES 49 (Comm. Print 1976)
(staff report criticizing EPA's record and strongly recommending public disclosure of pesticide
registration data as a check on the agency, subsequently relied on heavily by Congress in fashioning
1978 FIFRA amendments).
437. See H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 264, at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1988,2025 (view of EPA that disclosure should improve public confidence in regulatory
process).
438. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 41, 44 (view of EPA that public disclosure
increases individual knowledge of risks and benefits, thus furthering the exercise of independent
consumer judgment); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 262, at 844 (same).
439. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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ucts available to consumers more quickly,44 1 and stimulating competition by
lowering entry barriers to the pesticide business.
442
C. Arbitration as an Encroachment
on Article III Judicial Power
1. The Construct of the Article III Issue
Article III, § 1 of the Constitution provides that "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested" in courts whose judges enjoy lifetime tenure
"during good Behavior" and compensation that "shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office." 443  Independence of the judicial branch, which
was clearly the objective of this provision, serves not only as a check on
legislative and executive power but also increases the likelihood of impartial
adjudications. 444  Although most of the early litigation over FIFRA's data
provisions had centered on taking and other issues related to trade secrets,
44 5
the nonconsensual arbitration program was also susceptible to a nontrivial claim
that it violated article III of the Constitution by delegating federal judicial power
to a tribunal without the core protections of article III. The lower court in
Monsanto had, in a one-sentence afterthought, used article III as an alternate
ground for striking down FIFRA.446 The Supreme Court in Monsanto did not
reach the issue, however, because the Court found it unripe for adjudication.4 47
As the Monsanto case was in process, Union Carbide and several other pesticide
producers were separately pursuing litigation founded primarily on the article III
claim.
440. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 2-5 (discussing critical need to streamline
registration process while making it more effective); H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 264, at 18,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1988, 1991 (same).
441. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 3 ("overriding concern ... that pesticides should
be available to meet pest control needs"); H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 264, at 18, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1988, 1991 (concern about pesticide availability).
442. See S. REP. No. 334, supra note 265, at 30-31, 90-93 (discussing effect of legislation on
pesticide competition); H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 264, at 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1988, 1991 (expressing purpose of enhancing competition).
443. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
444. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), reprinted in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 229, 230-31 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952) (judiciary serves as a check on legislature, not
because it is superior, but because it is an intermediary for the people); id. at 232 (independence of the
judiciary also permits it to judge fairly without regard to temporary "ill humors" of society's majority).
445. See supra text accompanying notes 393-442.
446. 564 F. Supp. at 567.
447. 467 U.S. at 1020.
1990]
79
Allison: Allison: Context, Properties, and Constitutionality of Nonconsensual Arbitration:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
80 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1990, No. 1
After precious little analysis, the district court in Union Carbide found the
mandatory data-cost arbitration scheme unconstitutional under article 111.448
Relying on Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
449
then the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the contours of article
III, the court held that the functions of a non-article III forum such as FIFRA
arbitration must be limited in such a way that "the essential attributes of judicial
power" are retained in an article III court. 450 Because of the nonconsensual
nature of the arbitration and the practical unavailability of judicial review, the
court stated that "[t]he use-compensation system utterly deprives the federal courts
of any meaningful role in ensuring the provision of fair compensation to data
submitters."
451
2. Public Rights, Formalism, and the Northern
Pipeline Antecedent
Again acting on direct appeal, the Supreme Court, in Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Products Co., reversed.452 Although not overruling its
Northern Pipeline decision of three years earlier, the Court did repudiate the
approach and significant portions of the language of that case.
Northern Pipeline had involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the
system of bankruptcy courts created by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.45 3
Prior to this wholesale revision of the federal bankruptcy law, bankruptcy cases
were heard by referees acting as adjuncts to and under the direct supervision of
federal district courts.454 These referees did not enjoy the article III protections
448. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 571 F. Supp. 117, 124
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd sub nora. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568
(1985).
449. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
450. 571 F. Supp. at 124 (quoting Northern Pipeline at 81).
451. 571 F. Supp. at 124.
452. 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985).
453. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1982) and in scattered sections of 18, 28, 46 & 48 U.S.C.).
454. The law in force prior to the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act was the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982)). The 1898 Act was
amended by the Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1982)).
Before 1978, federal district courts served as bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch.
541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). District courts were empowered to appoint referees, who were
authorized to administer and settle disputes and otherwise exercise judicial powers necessary to
bankruptcy dispositions. Id. at §§ 38, 39. The referees' jurisdiction was limited to property that was
in their actual or constructive possession. Id. at § 38. Causes of action owned by the debtor could be
brought by the bankruptcy trustee in the bankruptcy court only if the court would otherwise have had
jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at § 23. If the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction, the action had to
be brought in a state court or other federal court that did have jurisdiction. Id. All decisions of the
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of federal judges.45 5  The 1978 Bankruptcy Act, in an attempt to upgrade the
status of those charged with adjudicating bankruptcy cases, created a new system
of courts staffed by bankruptcy judges.45 6 The judicial power of these courts
extended not only to core bankruptcy proceedings but also to related actions
governed by state law, such as those by or against the bankrupt debtor involving
contract and tort claims. 457 Bankruptcy judges exercised independent authority
over questions of both law and fact, subject only to normal appellate review.4 58
These judges were to be appointed by the president for only fourteen-year terms,
however, so bankruptcy tribunals were not article III courts. 459  In Northern
Pipeline, a majority of the Supreme Court found a violation of article III in the
Bankruptcy Act's creation and empowering of bankruptcy judges, but there was
no majority rationale. 46° The four-member plurality adopted a "formalistic,"
referee were reviewable by the district court. Id. at § 38.
The Chandler Act's amendments in 1938 decreased the administrative duties of the referees and
increased their judicial duties. See SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY COURTS 2-4, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1978)
(discussing authority of referees under prior law). Later, referees came to be known as "bankruptcy
judges." Bankr. R. 901 (7), 411 U.S. 1092 (1973). Although decisions of bankruptcy judges continued
to be reviewable by district courts, they attained de facto finality due to burgeoning district court
caseloads. See SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTtTUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY COuRTS 3-5, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1978).
455. District judges were empowered to appoint referees for two-year terms, Bankruptcy Act of
1898, § 33, and to remove them at will, id. at § 34.
456. See Eisen & Smrtnik, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978--An Elevated Judiciary, 28 DE
PAUL L. REV. 1007, 1009-14 (1979) (discussing elevated status of bankruptcy judges under 1978 Act
over bankruptcy referees and judges under prior law).
457. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (Supp. IV 1978). As a result of the decision in Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), invalidating the broad jurisdictional grant
to bankruptcy courts, current law now places bankruptcy judges under the direct supervision of federal
district courts, much as under pre-1978 law, when they hear "non-core" proceedings without the parties'
consent. 28 U.S.C. § 157(cX1), (2). In addition, district courts may withdraw any case or proceeding
from a bankruptcy judge, either on their own motion or that of a party, "for cause shown." Id. at §
157(d). The district court must withdraw a case from the bankruptcy judge, upon motion by a party,
if the court determines that resolution requires consideration of both bankruptcy law issues and other
federal laws "regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce." Id. "Core"
bankruptcy proceedings involve matters pertaining to the administration of bankruptcy estates,
allowance or disallowance of claims against estates, decisions about creditor preferences, discharging
debts, the sale of property, and the liquidation of assets. Id. at § 157(bX2). Although current law does
not specifically define "non-core" proceedings, it does indicate that liquidation of "personal injury tort"
and "wrongful death" claims are non-core. Id. at § 157(bX2)(B), (0).
458. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 & n.5
(1982).
459. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(a). Under current law, bankruptcy judges are still appointed for 14-
year terms, but the appointment is now made by the relevant United States Court of Appeals. 28
U.S.C. § 152(a).
460. Justice Brennan authored the plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens. 458 U.S. at 52-90. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in the
judgment, but felt it unnecessary to announce broad principles governing the assignment by Congress
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or literal, approach to article III analysis by reading the Court's precedents as
requiring exercise of the federal adjudicatory power by article III courts except in
three situations: (1) Because of Congress's plenary power over the District of
Columbia and United States territories, in such areas it constitutionally can
exercise its Article I legislative power by creating tribunals not having the protec-
tions of article 111.461 (2) Under similar reasoning, the extraordinary degree of
power over the military granted by the Constitution to the legislative and executive
branches justifies the creation of non-article III military courts.462 (3) Congress
also can institute non-article III decision-making bodies for the adjudication of
"public rights."46 3
The "public rights" category was the only one at issue in Northern Pipeline.
The plurality correctly characterized public rights as those arising as an inextrica-
ble part of constitutionally authorized exercises of power by the legislative and
executive branches. 464 Then, however, in an unfortunate choice of words, the
plurality said that "a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise 'between the
government and others."' 465 In an obvious contradiction of this ill-conceived
statement, the plurality then acknowledged that a discharge in bankruptcy might
very well be a public right similar to such congressionally created benefits as pilot
licenses or common carrier operating licenses.466 Regardless of whether the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is of a public character, however, the
of adjudicatory powers to non-Article IIl tribunals. Id. at 89-92. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White and Powell dissented. Id. at 92-118.
461. Id. at 64-65. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (reaffirming rule that
Congress has independent authority under the Constitution to establish legislative (non-Article III)
courts for the District of Columbia, originally announced in Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524 (1838)); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907) (recognizing similar congressional authority
regarding adjudication of questions of tribal membership relevant to property claims within Indian
territory); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (same with regard to territorial
courts). See also FALLON, supra note 370, at 971-73 (discussing use of non-Article III territorial
courts, in connection with proposal that appellate review by an Article III court be a constitutional
minimum).
462. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 66-67. See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65
(1857) (recognizing authority of Congress to establish non-Article III courts-martial). See also Note,
A Literal Interpretation ofArticle III Ignores 150 Years of Article I Court History: Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Oil Pipeline Co., 19 NEW ENG. L. REv. 207, 213-14 (1983) (discussing
cases involving military-tribunal exception to requirement of adjudication by Article III court).
463. 458 U.S. at 67-70. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (upholding
congressional vesting of responsibility for deciding cases under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act in an administrative agency); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438
(1929) (approving congressional creation of Court of Customs Appeals as a non-Article III court);
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856) (approving
congressional grant of authority to Solicitor of the Treasury and United States Marshall to summarily
determine liability and sell assets of a delinquent customs officer). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITtrIONAL LAW 51-58 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing "public rights" cases).
464. 458 U.S. at 67-68.
465. Id. at 69 (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 451).
466. Id. at 71.
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justices found that the state-law contract and tort claims also placed within
bankruptcy courts' power most assuredly did not involve public rights. 467 A
bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction over these private state-law rights might
be valid if it acted only as an adjunct to an article III court, with the latter
retaining the "essential attributes of judicial power."4 68 But such was not the
case here, where the bankruptcy court's authority was plenary and subject only to
appellate review under the normal "clearly erroneous" standard.
4 69
A two-member concurrence in Northern Pipeline agreed that this exercise of
complete adjudicatory power over state-law claims by a non-article III tribunal
violated the Constitution, but could not join in the plurality's sweeping attempt to
categorize the scope of Article 111.470 A three-member dissent could not accept
the plurality's literalist approach to article III and instead argued for a "function-
al," or flexible, approach that would in each case balance the strength of the
legislative interest against the extent to which basic article III values are
undermined. 47 1  The dissent would have found this balance to favor the
legislative interest.
4 72
3. Functionalism and the Evisceration of Northern Pipeline
In Union Carbide, the Court first rejected the pesticide producers' contention
that data compensation rights are state-law rights of the same nature as those at
issue in Northern Pipeline.4 73 To the contrary, the Court held, these rights are
purely creations of federal law.474 As this article's earlier analysis of FIFRA
compensation rights demonstrates, the Court's conclusion in this regard was
correct.
475
The Court then turned to the producers' contention that, even if sired solely
by federal statute, FIFRA compensation rights are "private rights" requiring either
adjudication by an article III court or review by such a court sufficient to retain
the essential attributes of judicial power. 476 In the course of responding to this
contention, Union Carbide's six-member majority effectively renounced the
Northern Pipeline plurality's approach to article III analysis, an approach many
467. Id. at 71-72.
468. Id. at 76-87.
469. Id. at 84-85.
470. Id. at 89-92 (Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
471. Id. at 92-118 (Burger, C.J., White & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
472. Id. at 116-18.
473. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584-85 (1985).
474. Id.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 363-67.
476. 473 U.S. at 585.
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observers had viewed as rigidly formalistic.4 77 A literal prohibition of non-
article III adjudications subject to three tightly circumscribed exceptions is not the
appropriate way to apply article III, according to the Court.478 In place of such
a methodology, the Court opted for a more elastic, functional technique similar to
the balancing process promoted by the dissenters in Northern Pipeline.479 The
thrust of the inquiry should be whether, considering all relevant circumstances, a
particular 'congressional choice to create a non-article III adjudicatory body
seriously threatens an aggrandizement of the political branches at the expense of
the judicial branch. 480
The Northern Pipeline plurality had stated that a case involves public rights
only if those rights arise "between the government and others." To the extent that
this statement was intended to mean that only those disputes including the United
States as a party are to be treated as involving public rights, if in fact it ever
meant that, the Union Carbide Court expressly rejected it.48 1 The Court did
not abandon the distinction between public and private rights, but viewed the term
"public rights" merely as a malleable description of situations in which the
adjudication of rights by a non-article III tribunal is not likely to undermine basic
article III values.48 2 Stated somewhat differently, the Court viewed the public
rights concept as reflecting a practical understanding of the fact that when
Congress chooses a nonjudicial forum for resolving matters the executive or
legislative branches could have determined conclusively, the danger of encroaching
on judicial independence is diminished.483
477. Id. at 585-89. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 370, at 918-19 (stating that "literalism" of Court
in Northern Pipeline is understandable because of its allure, but ultimately impossible to sustain as
Article III doctrine); Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline
Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 204-14 (characterizing Northern Pipeline's public rights/private rights
dichotomy as not only unduly formalistic but also irrelevant); Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article
III Courts, 56 U. CoLO. L. REv. 581, 611-17 (1985) (viewing Northern Pipeline as one example of
"myth" of judges as "gladiators" for the people, standing up against the "King" when necessary); Note,
A Literal Interpretation, supra note 462, at 233-35 (characterizing Northern Pipeline as a deviation
from longstanding precedent); Note, Formalism and Functionalism: From Northern Pipeline to
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1003, 1013-17 (1986)
(criticizing inadequacy of Northern Pipeline's formalistic approach).
478. 473 U.S..at 585-86.
479. Id. at 586-93. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92-118 (Burger, C.J., White & Powell,
JJ., dissenting).
480. 473 U.S. at 589-91.
481. Id. at 586.
482. Id. at 586-89.
483. Id. at 589.
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4. Aggrandizement of the Political Branches and the
Structural Integrity of the Judiciary
In the case of FIFRA data-compensation rights, the Union Carbide Court
identified several factors contributing to a conclusion that the mandatory
arbitration system does not impinge on the structural integrity of the judicial
branch sufficiently to contravene article III.
(1) To begin with, the compensation right possesses many of the characteris-
tics of a public right. Using a registrant's data to support a follow-on registration
serves a public purpose as an integral element of a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme designed to protect the public health. Because the right to
compensation is both a creation of federal statute and a component of a larger
administrative arrangement, Congress had considerable latitude "to allocate costs
and benefits among voluntary participants in the program without providing an
article III adjudication.' 484
(2) Congress could have fashioned other means of adjusting the burdens of
pesticide regulation without even implicating article III. It could have authorized
EPA, for instance, to charge follow-on registrants fees to cover the cost of test
data and from those fees subsidized submitters for a portion of their data
development costs. In the Court's view, Congress instead just collapsed these two
steps into one.
485
(3) The "near disaster" of the 1972 amendments and "the danger to public
health of further delay in pesticide registration" demonstrates an especially strong
legislative interest in developing an expedient method for apportioning data costs
and resolving compensation disputes. 486 The obvious strength of the legisla-
tive interest and necessity of congressional action, in themselves, substantially
diminish the likelihood of a structural magnification of legislative or executive
power at the judiciary's expense. 487
(4) The Court noted that "the FIFRA arbitration scheme incorporates its own
system of internal sanctions and rclies only tangentially, if at all, on the Judicial
Branch for enforcement." 48 8  Under this system of internal sanctions, if a
follow-on registrant fails to comply with the arbitration provisions, EPA is
required to cancel the follow-on registration; in the event of such a failure by the
original registrant the agency considers the data without compensation.
489
These observations were made because, according to the Court, the danger of
legislative or executive encroachment on judicial power is minimal when no
484. Id.
485. Id. at 590.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 591.
489. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1)(DXii) (1982).
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unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement power as a result of the
non-article III adjudication. 49 °
(5) Although the Court had made its point, it closed with two observations
regarding review, the first of dubious validity and the second of little practical
importance. In the first observation about review, the Court stated that FIFRA
"limits but does not preclude" review of the arbitral decision by an article III
court, and that, in the particular circumstances in which expedient dispute
resolution was a practical necessity, the review provided was an "an appropriate
exercise of the judicial function." 49 1 As noted earlier in this article, FIFRA
permits judicial review of an arbitration award to an extent almost identical to, and
certainly no greater than, that of consensual arbitration.49 2 Such review does
not touch the merits of the dispute, but relates only to palpable debasement of the
decision-making process. Indeed, any review could not involve the merits because
there are no standards for decision. The Court stated that "[t]his provision protects
against arbitrators who abuse or exceed their powers or willfully misconstrue their
mandate under governing law."493 The first part of this statement may carry
some meaning because abusing or exceeding authority arguably could be brought
within the term "misconduct" in FIFRA's judicial review provision. 494 The
latter portion of the statement is completely without substance because, as already
fully explored, there are no decision standards and thus no "mandate under
governing law" for an arbitrator to "misconstrue."
4 95
(6) In its second observation concerning review, the Court noted somewhat
cryptically that "review of constitutional error is preserved."4 96 Congress said
nothing in FIFRA about judicial review of constitutional challenges. The Court
meant either that Congress did not prohibit such review and that it is presumed to
exist in the absence of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, or that.article
III and due process preclude Congress from doing so. So far, the Court has not
found it necessary to decide whether Congress has the power to foreclose federal
courts from entertaining constitutional claims, but such an attempted exercise of
490. 473 U.S. at 591. This argument may strike some as being precisely backwards. Judicial
enforcement could, in fact, provide an opportunity for some form of oversight by the Article III
judiciary.
491. Id. at 592.
492. See supra text accompanying notes 380-82.
493. 473 U.S. at 592.
494. See supra text accompanying notes 369-70.
495. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1)(DXii) (1982). Although the FIFRA arbitration provision contains
no explicit standards of decision, the general congressional objectives underlying the 1978 FIFRA
amendments can be discerned from legislative history. Standards borrowed from the legislative history
probably are sufficient to withstand the minimal, perhaps ethereal, constitutional scrutiny called for
under the statutory vagueness or standardless delegation doctrines, infra text accompanying notes 532-
58, but not to support meaningful judicial review or, for that matter, fair dispute resolution in the first
instance, supra text accompanying notes 368-70.
496. 473 U.S. at 592.
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power by Congress surely would raise very serious constitutional questions.
49 7
Whenever a particular federal statute has forbidden judicial review, the Court has
interpreted the preclusive provision narrowly so as not to raise the constitutional
issue. 498  In Union Carbide, the Court's observation concerning the existence
of an independent basis for review of constitutional claims probably is not all that
important because, once the constitutionality of FIFRA itself is established,
constitutional claims should seldom arise from the continuing operation of the
arbitration program. Any procedural malfeasance by the arbitrators that might
generate due process claims presumably would already lie within the express scope
of permissible judicial review and the review therefore would not take on a
constitutional dimension.499  Fifth amendment taking claims could still arise
from individual arbitrations, such claims being based on assertions by an original
registrant that a particular arbitration award provided no compensation at all for
diminution in value by public disclosure (which, of course, the award is not
supposed to provide), and that the award fell substantially short of providing
constitutionally required "just compensation" for use of the data to support a
follow-on registration. Assuming that FIFRA's data disclosure and use provisions
remain essentially unchanged in future years, the potential for taking claims will
497. In Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 243 n.6 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring),
a case involving the statutory limitation of judicial review in Selective Service cases, it was observed
that an interpretation of the limitation as precluding judicial consideration of constitutional claims
would raise serious constitutional problems.
498. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 311 n.3 (1985) (in case
challenging constitutionality of federal statute placing $10 limit on attorney fees in disability benefits
cases before Veteran's Administration, interpreting statutory prohibition of judicial review as not
encompassing review of constitutional claims); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974)
(interpreting statutory prohibition of judicial review of Veteran's Administration educational benefits
decisions as not encompassing review of constitutional challenges).
Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether the Constitution requires access to judicial
review for constitutional claims, it has determined that the Constitution does not mandate the
availability of general appellate review of legal or factual issues, in either criminal or civil cases. See,
e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (criminal); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972)
(civil). See also Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REv. 579, 628-29 (1984)
(criticizing Court's refusal to recognize constitutional right of appeal).
499. Moreover, there are indications that procedural due process claims focusing on EPA's
operation of the data use/compensation system or FMCS's supervision of the arbitration program may
be difficult to maintain. One district court has held that an original registrant cannot challenge, on
procedural due process grounds, EPA's failure to notify it of the agency's use of post-1978 data to
support a follow-on registration, because under Monsanto there is no property right in such data. The
court held, again relying on Monsanto, that a procedural due process claim can only be asserted with
regard to data submitted during 1972-78. Eli Lilly & Co. v. EPA, 615 F. Supp. 811, 819-20 (S.D. Ind.
1985). The court may have misread Monsanto, because the Supreme Court held that there is indeed
a property right in data submitted to EPA to obtain registration, but that there is a compensable
"taking" of only such data as were submitted during 1972-78 with a reasonable, investment-backed
expectation of continued confidentiality. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04,
1006-13. Prior to Monsanto, at least one district court had held that no procedural due process claims
could be asserted by submitters of data after 1978 because there was no property right in such data.
See Petrolite Corp. v. EPA, 519 F. Supp. 966, 974 (D.D.C. 1981).
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dwindle with time because of the Supreme Court's decision in Monsanto that only
data submitted during the 1972-78 period has been "taken" for fifth amendment
purposes.
5. Developments in Article III Doctrine Since
Union Carbide
a. Schor and the Bifurcation of Article III
One cannot properly leave a discussion of Union Carbide without further
comment about its effect on article III jurisprudence. The Northern Pipeline
plurality's decision model, consisting of an almost unyielding buffer around the
federal judicial function, penetrable only by three exceptions, had been roundly
criticized as not only representing unwarranted and unrealistic formalism, 50 0 but
also as a radical departure from 150 years of more ductile theory.
50 1
Given the difficulty the Court has experienced historically in attempting to
articulate coherent article III doctrine,50 2 and the fact that the formalistic
approach of Northern Pipeline commanded only a plurality, the substantial
theoretical shift in Union Carbide was not altogether surprising. Although there
may have been some doubt immediately after Union Carbide as to whether the
case signalled a permanent reversion to a less formalistic approach toward article
III, any such doubt had little time to manifest itself before the Court again visited
the question in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.50 3 As
discussed earlier, Schor did not involve nonconsensual arbitration but instead
examined an article III challenge to the somewhat analogous administrative
reparations scheme of the Commodity Exchange Act.50 4 Schor's importance
to the present discussion lies in its bifurcation of article III interests and its strong
confirmation of the shift in Union Carbide to a less formalistic view of article III,
500. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 370, at 918-19 (arguing that "literalism" of Northern Pipeline
plurality ultimately impossible to sustain as Article III doctrine); Redish, supra note 477, at 204-14
(characterizing plurality's public rights/private rights dichotomy as not only unduly formalistic but also
irrelevant); Resnik, supra note 477, at 611-17 (viewing Northern Pipeline as one example of "mythic"
perception of federal courts as bulwarks against executive tyranny); Note, Formalism and Funct-
ionalism, supra note 477, at 1013-17 (1986) (criticizing Northern Pipeline's formalistic approach as
inadequate and unworkable).
501. See Redish, supra note 477, at 204-10 (arguing that Court's elevation of public/private
rights distinction is aberration in historical development of Article III doctrine); Note, A Literal
Interpretation, supra note 462, at 233-235 (characterizing Northern Pipeline as a deviation from
longstanding precedent).
502. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)
(Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing historic development of
Article III doctrine as marked by "frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents").
503. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
504. See supra text accompanying notes 227-35.
88
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1990, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss1/4
NONCONSENSUAL ARBITRATION
a shift of potentially great significance to the constitutionality of yet-unborn
nonconsensual arbitration systems.
In Schor, a customer asserted violations of CEA's anti-fraud provisions in a
CFTC reparations proceeding against a commodity futures broker. Before
receiving notice of the reparations proceeding, the broker had filed a diversity
action in federal district court to recover the debit balance in the customer's
trading account with the broker.50 5  The customer counterclaimed for the
alleged CEA violations in the district court, and also moved on two separate
occasions to dismiss or stay the district court action on the grounds that
continuation of the federal suit would be a waste of judicial resources and a
burden on the litigants because the CFTC reparations proceeding would fully
506
adjudicate the rights of the parties. Although the customer's motions to
dismiss or stay the broker's federal court action were not granted, the broker
ultimately was induced to dismiss that action voluntarily and assert its claim for
the debit balance as a counterclaim in the reparations proceeding. In that
proceeding, the administrative law judge ruled in the broker's favor on both the
customer's claim and the broker's counterclaim. 50 7 Then, for the first time, the
customer challenged the CFTC's statutory authority to determine a state common-
law counterclaim. The administrative law judge rejected the challenge, the CFTC
declined to review the decision, and the customer sought review before the federal
court of appeals.
50 8
On its own initiative, the court of appeals raised the question of whether the
CFTC could constitutionally adjudicate the broker's counterclaims without
impermissibly encroaching on the federal judicial power under article III.
Although the court of appeals ultimately did not reach the article III question, the
Supreme Court did find it necessary to confront the issue.
50 9
505. Conti Commodity Servs., Inc. v. Mortgage Servs. of Am., Inc., No. 80-C-1089 (N.D. Ill.,
filed Mar. 4, 1980).
506. 478 U.S. at 838.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. The court of appeals, sua sponte, had raised the issue of whether the CFTC could
constitutionally adjudicate common-law counterclaims in light of the Supreme Court's then-current
decision in Northern Pipeline. Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 740 F.2d 1262 (D.D.C.
1984), vacated sub nom. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). After
considering the question, the court of appeals opted for an interpretation of the CEA that denied the
CFTC authority to adjudicate common-law counterclaims, thus avoiding the Article III constitutional
issue. 740 F.2d at 1266-69. The Supreme Court then decided Union Carbide and, after granting the
CFTC's petition for writ of certiorari in Schor, vacated the court of appeals decision and remanded it
for reconsideration in light of Union Carbide. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 883 (1986). After reconsideration, the court of appeals reinstated its earlier decision that the
CFTC had no statutory authority to entertain the broker's common-law counterclaims. Schor v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 770 F.2d 211 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd sub nor. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). The Supreme Court again granted certiorari.
474 U.S. 1018 (1985). The Court first concluded that the court of appeals had erred in finding no
statutory authority for the CFTC's determination of common-law counterclaims. 478 U.S. at 841-47.
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The Court identified two interests served by article III, one personal and the
other structural. The personal interest protected by article III consists of the right
of litigants "to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government." 510  The structural interest, on
the other hand, is found in the need "to protect 'the role of the independent
judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.' 5 1'
b. Waiver of Article III's "Personal" Component
Perhaps the most important distinction between the two interests, according
to the Court, is that the personal interest is waivable whereas the structural one is
not. 512  In Schor, the Court concluded that the customer had waived his
personal right to an adjudication by an article III tribunal in two ways. First, the
customer had expressly waived the right by demanding that the broker pursue its
counterclaim in the reparations proceeding rather than in the federal court action.
The customer was content to have the entire dispute, including the broker's
common-law contract claim, resolved by the CFTC until the administrative law
judge ruled against him. 5 13 Second, even if the customer had not expressly
insisted on having the broker's counterclaim resolved administratively, he had
implicitly waived his personal article III right by foregoing state or federal
litigation and electing administrative reparations when CFTC regulations made it
It is true that a cardinal rule of federal statutory construction requires courts, when faced with two or
more reasonable alternatives, to choose an interpretation that avoids serious doubt about the statute's
constitutionality. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1979). In
Schor, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the only reasonable interpretation of the CEA was
that Congress had indeed authorized the CFTC to dispose of common-law counterclaims. 478 U.S.
at 841-47. The Article III challenge thus had to be resolved. Id.
510. 478 U.S. at 848.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 848-49. It is difficult to foresee the future consequences of the Court's bifurcation
of Article III into personal and structural interests. Several questions, which are beyond the scope of
this article, remain to be answered. For instance, if in a particular case the structural interest is found
not to be offended, and if the personal interest is found not to have been waived, are there
circumstances in which the personal interest by itself will provide a basis for invalidating congressional
action? Also, if the personal interest is found not to have been waived, what factors will guide the
analysis of that interest? To what extent, if any, will those factors be similar to the factors identified
by the Supreme Court as relevant to the structural component of Article III?
As applied to Article III doctrine generally, the two interests identified by the Court in Schor may
turn out to be inseparable in practice, if not in theory. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 866-67 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the two interests are
inseparable). If so, the distinction ultimately will be of little practical importance. The one situation
where the dichotomy may have a practical effect is in a special case like Schor where the challenger
was afforded several choices and now complains about the Article III implications of the choice he
made. It may be that only the commodity. futures professional, and not the customer, can claim that
Article III values have been subverted.
513. 478 U.S. at 849.
90
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1990, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss1/4
NONCONSENSUAL ARBITRATION
clear that the agency would exercise jurisdiction over counterclaims arising from
the same transaction.
5 14
Given the particular facts of Schor, the Court's waiver rulings seem quite
reasonable, if we accept the proposition that article III separation of powers claims
should be waivable at all. The customer's conduct clearly was sufficient to
support a finding of express waiver. The implicit waiver found in the customer's
knowing election of an alternative procedure over litigation also makes sense,
whether the procedure in question is reparations or arbitration. It simply is not a
nonconsensual procedure from the customer's perspective. The commodity futures
customer has more freedom to select among dispute resolution procedures than if
there had been no superintending regulatory scheme.
The factually based finding of waiver in Schor is far more defensible than the
fictional waiver that subsequently served as an alternative ground for decision in
Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.515 In the case,
which involved the CEA's arbitration system rather than its administrative
reparations procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
concluded that a commodity futures broker had waived the right to raise an article
III challenge for two reasons. First, the broker waived the right by belatedly
raising an article III challenge only after the arbitration proceeding had concluded
to his dissatisfaction. 5 16 Although these facts do not point quite so strongly to
waiver as did the facts in Schor, this part of the holding in Geldermann is at least
sensible. The second basis for finding waiver, however, raises the "regulatory
bargain" concept discussed earlier. The court found that the broker also had
waived its right to assert an article III challenge merely by becoming a member
of the particular commodities exchange, the rules of which provided for
compulsory arbitration if demanded by a customer. 5 17  The exchange rules
were adopted, of course, under compulsion by the CFTC. Moreover, the broker's
"choice" was the largely illusory one of operating at a substantial competitive
disadvantage by foregoing exchange membership.
18
514. Id. at 849-50.
515. 836 F.2d 310, 317-20 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 54 (1988).
516. Id. at 321.
517. Id. at 317-20.
518. In Geldermann, the court of appeals supported its fictional waiver holding by taking, totally
out of context, an isolated statement from Union Carbide. 836 F.2d at 317-18. In Union Carbide, the
Supreme Court pointed to the fact that FIFRA's data provisions were uncoupled with any judicial
sanctions, but instead were enforceable only by a set of internal administrative sanctions, as one of
several factors supporting a conclusion that the danger of encroachment on federal judicial power was
minimal. 473 U.S. at 591-92. The Court observed, in dictum, that if there were any judicial sanctions
the only object of them would be a follow-on registrant who had consented to the arbitration procedure.
473 U.S. at 592. Although this statement in Union Carbide hints at acceptance of the notion of
fictional consent to a nonconsensual dispute resolution procedure, its use as authority for a finding of
waiver in Geldermann was obviously improper.
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c. Article III's "Structural" Component and the
Confirmation of Functionalism
After finding that the customer had waived its personal right to raise an article
III challenge, the Supreme Court in Schor analyzed the nonwaivable structural
interest safeguarded by article III. Here, the Court reiterated its rejection of a
formalistic approach to article III analysis in favor of a functional approach that
focuses on whether adjudication in a non-article III tribunal unduly threatens the
institutional integrity of the judicial branch. 519 Following much of Union
Carbide's reasoning and language, the Court identified several factors which when
taken together lead to the conclusion that CFTC determination of common-law
counterclaims creates little real danger of legislative or executive aggrandizement
at the expense of the judiciary.
The first factor to be examined is the extent to which the "essential attributes
of judicial power" are reserved to article III courts rather than being transferred
to a non-article III tribunal.520 The only departure from the "traditional agency
model," according to the Court, is the CFTC's authority to decide common-law
counterclaims in an administrative reparations proceeding.521  Although a
"wholesale importation of concepts of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction into the
agency context may create greater constitutional difficulties," the judicial power
519. 478 U.S. at 851. Although current scholarship widely recognizes Union Carbide and Schor
as representing a return to Article III functionalism, it generally sees cases such as Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986), decided on the same day as Schor, and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), as
representing the continuing use of formalism when separation of powers questions involve legislative-
executive conflicts rather than legislative-judicial ones. See Brown, Article III as a Fundamental
Value--The Demise of Northern Pipeline and Its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 55, 77-80 (1988); Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches to Separation of Powers Questions--
A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 515-16 (1987); Note, Formalism and
Functionalism, supra note 476, at 1033-34. See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833,865 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("impossible to reconcile the radically different
approaches" of Bowsher and Schor).
Despite the Court's dramatic departure from the much-criticized Northern Pipeline plurality's
approach, Schor also has not fared extremely well in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Brown, supra;
Saphire & Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor
Era, 68 B.U.L. REV. 85 (1988) (proposing that, because neither the risk to administrative agencies
created by formalism of Northern Pipeline nor the risk to judicial independence created by
functionalism of Union Carbide and Schor is acceptable, Article III doctrine should focus on
availability and scope of judicial review); Strauss, supra; Note, Eroding the Separation of Powers:
Congressional Encroachment on Federal Judicial Power, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 669, 686-97 (1987)
(sharply criticizing Schor as providing little guidance and as sacrificing constitutional value of judicial
independence to nonconstitutional value of efficiency); Note, Commodity Futures Trading Commission
v. Schor: Article III Finds a Home on the Slippery Slope, 21 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 707, 748-49 (1988)
(although viewing Northern Pipeline as too formalistic, thus risking destruction of critical institutions
(administrative agencies), seeing Schor as too functional, thus risking gradual erosion of judiciary's
independence); Note, Formalism and Functionalism, supra.
520. 478 U.S. at 851-53.
521. Id. at 852.
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allocated to the CFTC is quite narrow.5 22 The agency's overall adjudicatory
power is limited to a highly circumscribed area of law and its even narrower
jurisdiction over non-federal counterclaims arising from the same facts is "limited
to that which makes the reparations procedure workable." 5 23 Moreover, CFTC
reparations decisions are fully reviewable by an article III court, under a "weight
of the evidence" standard for factual determinations and de novo for legal
ones.524  The second factor viewed by the Court as important to article III
structural analysis is the "origins and importance of the right to be adjudicat-
ed."525 While admitting that the risk of undue encroachment on the federal
judiciary is at its greatest when an obviously "private," common-law right is
implicated, the Court found such risk to be de minimis in the present case because
of the range of available dispute resolution alternatives. 526  Although the
commodity futures professional has far less choice than the customer, even the
broker in the present case had an option to pursue its debit-balance claim in
federal or state court. 527  The customer has even more choices.528  The
existence of these alternatives is relevant to the structural component of article III
because they make it clear that Congress was trying to promote expedient dispute
resolution in pursuit of broader regulatory objectives rather than attempting to
intrude upon judicial prerogatives. 529
The Court identified the third factor as "the concerns that drove Congress to
depart from the requirements of article Ill.,,53 0 At this point, however, this
factor had become redundant. The relevant concerns of Congress, which related
to enhancing the efficiency of commodity futures regulation by providing
expedient dispute resolution procedures, had already been identified by the Court
and found substantial in its examination of the second factor.
The decisions in Union Carbide and Schor could not be clearer in their
implications for article III scrutiny of nonconsensual dispute resolution mecha-
nisms in federal regulatory programs. When arbitration or some other resolution
procedure is adopted pursuant to a demonstrably legitimate federal interest, is both
related and subsidiary to that interest, and calls for only a relatively circumscribed
exercise of judicial power by a non-article III tribunal, anyone raising an article
III challenge faces long odds. Moreover, the Court apparently will not be
reluctant, under the right facts, to find that such a claim has been waived, although
it remains to be seen whether the dichotomy between a waivable personal interest
522. Id.
523. Id. at 856.
524. Id. at 853.
525. Id. at 851.
526. Id. at 853-55.
527. See supra text accompanying notes 505-06.
528. 478 U.S. at 855. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26.
529. 478 U.S. at 854-55.
530. Id. at 851, 855-56.
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and a nonwaivable structural interest will have any practical significance, aside
from special cases like Schor where the challenger had selected from an array of
dispute resolution options.
53 1
D. Statutory Vagueness/Standardless Delegation
Not surprisingly, those challenging the constitutionality of FIFRA's data
provisions also have pointed to the fact that the statute grants arbitrators the
authority to make legally binding determinations without any accompanying
standards. The issue may be posed in more than one way. In Monsanto the
district court held, without any real discussion and apparently as an alternative
ground for striking down the statute, that the compensation provisions were
"arbitrary and vague."532 Although the district court announced this conclusion
in the midst of stating its rationale for finding that the FIFRA compensation
system did not provide just compensation for the taking of Monsanto's property,
it seems to have been applying a substantive due process standard. The
Supreme Court did not reach the issue, however, because the Court viewed it, like
the article III issue, as unripe for determination. 534  When the statute in
question is regulatory, nonpenal, and affects only property rights rather than a
fundamental right such as freedom of expression, a challenge based on alleged
statutory vagueness is very unlikely to succeed. 5 35 The courts' virtual rejection
of due process as a basis for challenging the substance of a statute, rather than its
procedural implementation, is too well known to warrant comment. 536 Al-
though neither standards for determining compensation nor the general policy
goals of Congress were given expression in the statute itself, the legislative history
531. Again, the facts in Schor supported a finding of waiver by a customer who had many
choices. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will not extend its willingness to find waiver to cases
where there is no factual basis for doing so, as was improperly done by the court of appeals in
Geldermann. See supra note 518. The isolated statements about consent to registration in Monsanto,
467 U.S. at 1007-08, and about consent to arbitration in Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 592, were not
made by the Court in connection with a waiver issue, and should not be seized upon to support a
finding of waiver. Fictional consent should not even be used in place of sound policy analysis to
justify a regulatory decision, much less to fabricate a waiver of important rights. See supra text
accompanying note 370.
532. Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 567 (E.D. Mo. 1983), vacated sub nom.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
533. In the next paragraph, the court stated that "the arbitration scheme does not afford
Monsanto just compensation and constitutes a denial of due process in violation of the Fifth
Amendment." 564 F. Supp. at 567. See J. NOWAK, supra note 412, at 321-29 (discussing the nature
of the distinction between procedural and substantive review under the due process clause).
534. 467 U.S. at 1020.
535. See J. NOWAK, supra note 412, at 323 & n.2, 846-47 (discussion of statutory vague-
ness/overbreadth as a viable constitutional doctrine in cases involving penal statutes or affecting
fundamental rights).
536. See L. TRIBE, supra note 463, at 565-86 (tracing rise and fall of substantive review under
the due process clause).
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of FIFRA's 1978 data provisions is far from silent. This history, which has been
elaborated upon already,5 37 provides ample evidence of what Congress was
attempting to accomplish generally through the data provisions, and courts
considering a statutory vagueness charge will almost certainly find that the
legislative record constitutes sufficient guidance to withstand a due process
challenge. 5
38
In Union Carbide, the issue was propounded in terms of whether FIFRA's
data provisions had accomplished a standardless delegation of Congress' legislative
power in violation of article I of the Constitution. The district court stated that
"plaintiffs appear correct in their contention that this is a standardless delegation
of [legislative] powers," 539  but rendered no holding on the standardless
delegation issue, instead resting its decision solely on article 111.540 The
Supreme Court also did not reach the article I delegation issue in Union Carbide,
because of the Court's view that the issue had been neither fully litigated in the
lower court nor adequately briefed or argued before the high court.
Because FIFRA arbitration adjusts rights and obligations between identified
parties on the basis of an established set of historical facts, the -rocedure is
fundamentally an adjudicatory rather than a rule-making one.542 On the
surface, viewing the arbitrator's role in this way makes for a somewhat uneasy
theoretical fit when one claims that Congress has delegated legislative rule-making
power without adequate standards. In the administrative realm, however, the lines
between adjudicatory and rulemaking actions are often blurred, with policy making
not uncommonly taking place in an adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory proce-
dure. 5
43
537. See supra notes 259-358 and accompanying text.
538. See infra text accompanying note 547.
539. 571 F. Supp. at 124.
540. Id.
541. 473 U.S. at 593.
542. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (discussing and
applying adjudicative/legislative distinction in context of determining whether procedural due process
guarantee applies); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (same); J. NOWAKC, supra note 412, at
484-85 (discussing nature of adjudicatory actions in due process context); R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO &
P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PROCESS 248-55 (1985) (same) [hereinafter R. PIERCE].
543. Agencies are not required to select among the various adjudicatory and rulemaking
procedures according to traditional definitions of adjudicative and legislative action, and some agencies
have preferred to use adjudicatory proceedings to accomplish rulemaking. See R. PIERCE, supra note
542, at 282-85. Congress can, if it wishes, require agencies to employ hybrid adjudicatory/rulemaking
procedures in which adjudication and policy making are entwined. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202, 88 Stat.
2183, 2193-98 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982)). Courts, however, cannot require
agencies to employ adjudicatory-type procedures in its rulemaking that are more demanding than those
required by statute or the Constitution. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). A court can require an agency to conduct an adjudicatory-
type hearing in rulemaking, for example, only when the action that is denominated "rulemaking" bears
all the obvious earmarks of adjudication--the action affects a relatively small number of persons, those
19901
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In the case of FIFRA, the lack of express legislative guidance provided for
arbitrators necessarily casts them in a limited policy-making role, especially in the
early stages of the arbitration program's implementation. 44 Thus, despite the
adjudicatory nature of their task, an article I standardless delegation issue may
indeed arise if FIFRA arbitrators are viewed as policy-making surrogates for
Congress. Even if such an issue exists, however, a standardless delegation
challenge faces odds as long as those facing a statutory vagueness claim. For
decades the courts have strained mightily to uphold delegations of rule-making
power to administrative agencies, and have approved delegations accompanied by
the broadest possible standards.545 Because FIFRA arbitrators are subdelegates
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 546 any rule-type policy
making by the arbitrators will presumably be judged according to the same relaxed
constitutional standards as those applied to such actions when practiced directly
by an administrative agency. In a vein similar to that likely to be followed in
persons are exceptionally concerned, and their concern is based in each case on individualized grounds-
-so that procedural due process applies and mandates a hearing. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
410 U.S. 224, 244-45 (1973).
544. Neither FIFRA nor the regulations of EPA or FMCS make provisions for any precedential
value to be accorded to arbitration decisions. To do so would certainly not comport with traditional
conceptions of the arbitral process. However, because of the narrowness of the issues dealt with in
FIFRA arbitration and the relatively small and highly differentiated community of interested parties
and arbitrators, it would not be surprising to observe the development of at least an informal
manifestation of stare decisis as more data compensation cases are decided. Subsequent arbitration
panels would then play less of a policy-making role.
In the second full-fledged FIFRA arbitration to be decided, the arbitrators made an explicit effort
to prepare the opinion in a way that would increase its future value as precedent and even pled with
future participants in the process to reduce the substantial transaction costs of FIFRA arbitrations by
giving precedential effect to their determinations. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. and Griffin
Corp., American Arb. Ass'n Docket No. 16-171-0080-86M, at 5-6 & app. A at 37-40 (Dec. 22, 1988)
(Birch, Juten & Foy, Arbs.). But see Conner, The Linuron Decision, supra note 367, at 1685-88
(attorneys for original registrant in du Pont arbitration arguing that no FIFRA arbitration decision,
including that one, should be treated as having precedential value).
In contrast with commercial arbitration, precedent does play a role in labor arbitration, where
arbitrators prepare written opinions and sometimes do rely on prior arbitrations. See, e.g., Star Mfg.
Co., 68 Lab. Arb. 148 (1977) (Hall, Arb.) (arbitrator treating prior arbitration award as having
precedential value); Pepsi Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. and Brewery & Soft Drink Workers, Local 20, 55
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 663 (1970) (Volz, Arb.) (same).
545. See R. PIERCE, supra note 542, at 56-59 (tracing decline of nondelegation doctrine since
New Deal). There has been recent interest in attempting to revitalize the nondelegation doctrine,
including expressions of such interest by Chief Justice (then Justice) Rehnquist. See American Textile
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 546-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't
v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See also R. PIERCE,
supra note 542, at 60 & n.58 (discussing recent scholarly opinion urging revitalization). Although such
revitalization has not yet occurred, Professors Shapiro & Glicksman recently argued that Congress has
shown signs of filling the void during the 1980s by exercising greater control over administrative
discretion, something that few thought Congress would do without pressure from the courts. See
Shapiro & Glicksman, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law,
1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 823-24.
546. See supra text accompanying notes 355-57.
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response to a due process challenge, courts are almost certain to view the major
objectives of the data use and compensation scheme that can be gleaned from the
legislative history--eliminating costly duplication of research and data develop-
ment, streamlining the registration process, making new end-use products available
to consumers more quickly, and stimulating competition by lowering entry barriers
to the pesticide business--as constituting sufficient congressional guidance to
satisfy article I concerns.
547
Today, delegating policy-making authority without standards will not raise
significant article I concerns unless the policies left to the delegate are truly central
to the congressional function. 548 Although Congress probably could have set
regulatory policy more effectively by explicitly identifying the specific objectives
of data compensation for arbitrators to pursue, what has been left to the
arbitrators--calculating compensation in furtherance of purposes generally
discernible from legislative history--is policy making at a sufficiently subordinate
level to survive the minimal constitutional scrutiny these kinds of regulatory
delegations normally receive. It is true, however, that unless Congress broadens
the scope of judicial review or the courts do so by an expansive (and strained)
interpretation of the statutory term "misconduct, " 549 a court probably will be
disenabled from determining in any given case whether the arbitrators have acted
in furtherance of congressional goals. Given the extreme difficulty of successfully
maintaining a standardless delegation or due process challenge against federal
regulatory legislation, such disenabling may represent bad law but does not offend
modern constitutional norms.
In the aftermath of Monsanto and Union Carbide, one district court, in PPG
Industries, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co.,550 has confronted the standardless
delegation issue directly. In PPG the court followed the reasoning of Fahey v.
Mallonee to conclude that the absence of compensation standards does not
transgress article 1.551 The PPG court read Fahey as distinguishing statutes
that are penal in nature, create novel rules of law where there is no settled law or
custom, and delegate authority to private groups, from statutes that are regulatory
in nature, create remedies known to existing law, and delegate authority to public
bodies.5 52 The PPG court found that the first two criteria of Fahey clearly
supported the constitutionality of the FIFRA delegation. The arbitration provision
is regulatory, not penal, and serves only "to replace the decision-making body
547. See supra text accompanying notes 439-42.
548. See L. TRIBE, supra note 463, at 363 ("agency exercising delegated authority is not free
... to exercise its authority to pursue any and all ends within the affirmative reach of federal
authority").
549. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX1XD)(ii) (1988).
550. 637 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D.D.C. 1986).
551. Fahey v. Malonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
552. PPG, 637 F. Supp. at 89 (citing Fahey, 332 U.S. at 249).
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administering a remedy that already existed." 553 Here the court was referring
to the fact that the data use and compensation provisions had existed under the
1972 version, with EPA serving as compensation adjudicator.554 With respect
to the third criteria, the court admitted that the arbitrators under FIFRA are not a
public body. The court reasoned, however, that the concern with delegation to
private parties had to do with the private party's interest in the industry being
regulated, 55  as in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.5 56  The private
parties involved in the FIFRA delegation are not members of the pesticide
industry, the court emphasized, but instead are disinterested arbitrators appointed
by FMCS from the roster of the American Arbitration Association. 57  In
analyzing this third factor, the PPG court would have been on firmer theoretical
ground had it focused on the arbitrators' position as subdelegates of FMCS rather
than their position as nonmembers of the industry, but the conclusion that the
standardless delegation to FIFRA arbitrators does not violate article I of the
Constitution is probably the correct one.
5 58
553. PPG, 637 F. Supp. at 89.
554. See supra text accompanying notes 306-08.
555. PPG, 637 F. Supp. at 89.
556. 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935).
557. See supra text accompanying notes 355-57. See also Bruff, Public Programs, Private
Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEx. L. REV. 441, 455-462
(1989) (discussing difficulty of distinguishing between "public" and "private" decision makers to whom
regulatory decisions have been delegated, and importance of ensuring alignment between public
interests and interests of the private deciders).
558. There is a possibility that a follow-on registrant may be able to assert a due process or
Article I challenge to the data use and compensation provisions of FIFRA only in a case in which that
party had declined to cite previously filed data because of the nonconsensual arbitration program, and
instead had obtained registration by developing its own data. Under the "statutory estoppel" doctrine,
a party cannot claim entitlement to a benefit under a statute, receive such benefit, and then take a
position inconsistent with its earlier claim of entitlement. Federal Power Comm'n v. Colorado
Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 502 (1955). Statutory estoppel arguably could occur if a follow-on
registrant asserts an entitlement to the benefit of receiving registration upon citing previously filed data,
accepts registration, and then challenges the constitutionality of the provision for determining its
liability to the original submitter. One district court has so held. Sathon v. American Arbitration
Ass'n, 20 Envt'l Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2241, 2244 (N.D. I11. 1984). In that case the follow-on registrant
relied on data in EPA's files to obtain registration, then refused to arbitrate and filed a declaratory
judgment action claiming that the arbitration scheme was unconstitutional. Another court, in PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 637 F. Supp. 85 (D.D.C. 1986), did entertain the Article I
challenge of a follow-on registrant that had obtained registration by citing previously filed data, but
that party had not exercised a free choice in relying on data in EPA's files. Although PPG was
decided later than Sathon, the facts of PPG had arisen earlier, at a time when EPA effectively
prevented follow-on registrants from developing their own data as an alternative to citing that which
had already been filed. In 1979 EPA had adopted its "cite-all" regulations, under which the agency
interpreted FIFRA to require that a follow-on registrant cite all pertinent previously filed data and pay
for them. 40 C.F.R. §§ 162.9-4, .9-5 (1979). PPG Industries had acquired its follow-on registration
while these regulations were in effect. In 1983, in National Agricultural Chemicals Ass'n v. EPA, 554
F. Supp. 1209 (D.D.C. 1983), the court held that EPA had exceeded its statutory authority by adopting
98




The modern movement toward greater use of alternative dispute resolution
procedures has many complex roots and takes a variety of forms. The pressure
generated by the delay, expense, and acrimony that many participants associate
with formal litigation models, whether judicial or administrative, has been vented
partly through development of novel mechanisms and partly through greater usage
of older devices such as arbitration and mediation. The ADR movement has taken
hold not only in the realm of private disputes, but also in the resolution of
conflicts arising within the context of regulatory programs. Indeed, in the regula-
tory context the ADR movement is actually the second part of a biphasal
phenomenon, because adjudication by administrative agencies was originally
viewed as a less formal alternative to judicial resolution.
Although most manifestations of ADR have been and continue to be the
product of consent among the disputants, recent times have witnessed increasing
experimentation with nonconsensual mechanisms. Many of these experiments with
nonconsensual ADR have involved arbitration, either in traditional or modified
form. Nonconsensual arbitration occurs when a statute, administrative agency
regulation, or court rule compels either or both of the parties to participate in the
process.
The four nonconsensual arbitration systems chosen for study--court-annexed,
multiemployer pension plan, commodity futures, and FIFRA data compensation
arbitration--possess both similar and dissimilar origins and characteristics. Court-
annexed arbitration developed solely from dissatisfaction with the many private
and social costs associated with litigation. The other three systems sprang from
a desire to promote expedited dispute resolution ancillary to the achievement of
broader regulatory policy goals. Although one finds substantial variation among
the general policy goals of the legislation regulating withdrawal from multi-
employer pension plans, relations between commodity futures professionals and
their customers, and treatment of data associated with pesticide registration, the
dispute resolution provisions of each statute clearly express a common uneasiness
regarding judicial and administrative use of traditional litigation models.
Although all four systems process disputes between private parties, court-
annexed arbitration primarily resolves pure common-law claims, while the other
three adjust rights that are either created by or ancillary to federal regulatory
measures. Both pension plan and FIFRA arbitration deal with federally created
statutory rights; in the former these rights are actually a modified substitute for
common-law contract rights, while in the latter the rights are pure creations of
federal statute. The rights adjudicated in commodity futures arbitration include
pure federal statutory creations, federal statutory rights serving as modified
the cite-all regulations. In 1984 EPA responded to this decision by amending its regulations so as to
give a follow-on registrant the option of citing and paying for previously submitted data or developing
its own as a basis for registration. 40 C.F.R. § 152.86, .90, .92 (1988).
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substitutes for common-law claims, state statutory claims, and pure common-law
claims.
Components of fairness also differ among the four systems. For example,
formal standards of decision exist only in the case of pension plan arbitration,
although informal and largely unpredictable standards may work their way into the
other systems. In all systems except one, neither party has a realistic choice about
using the arbitration procedure; in commodity futures arbitration, the customer has
access to a range of dispute resolution alternatives while the professional has none.
Review of the arbitral decision also varies. Review of commodity futures and
FIFRA arbitration is similar in that no inquiry into the merits of the decision may
be made, whereas restricted merit review of pension plan arbitration is available.
A party to court-annexed arbitration may obtain trial de novo subject to an
assortment of disincentives. Trial denovo is available in court-annexed arbitration
for obvious reasons. Although it may or may not be a constitutional necessity,
some form of very thorough review is unquestionably necessary for constitutional-
ity when pure common-law claims are simply removed to a nonjudicial forum
without the consent of the parties. Moreover, when such claims are involved, any
hope that nonconsensual arbitration will receive a workable level of acceptance
among users is probably dependent on access to thorough review.
In addition to analyzing the contexts and properties of the four nonconsensual
arbitration systems, this study explored their constitutional dimensions. When
government requires disputants to employ nontraditional fora and procedures,
constitutional questions are to be expected and constitutional parameters must be
defined and respected. Constitutional concerns are most serious in the case of
court-annexed arbitration, the major challenge thereto asserting denial of the right
to trial by jury. When court-annexed systems are kept simple, so that the
preliminary layer added by the system causes insubstantial delay or expense for
a dissatisfied party seeking further recourse, courts have found a sufficient
palliative in the availability of trial de novo. Some specialized versions of court-
annexed arbitration, such as those limited to the processing of medical malpractice
claims, have run into trouble when their complexity generated enough additional
delay or expense to unduly encumber the right to jury trial. In addition,
specialized versions have occasionally run afoul of procedural due process when
the required composition of the tribunal has created doubts about its impartiality.
Constitutional barriers to the use of nonconsensual arbitration as one
component of a regulatory program are predictably lower. When legitimate
regulatory purposes are demonstrable, the interests implicated relate only to
property, and the consequences for recalcitrants are nonpenal, designers of
nonconsensual conflict resolution procedures have much latitude. Today's
Supreme Court shows little jealousy for the traditional role of the judiciary and
consequently is receptive to innovative dispute resolution techniques. The Court
is likely, for example, to find an impermissible encroachment on the power of
article III courts only in extreme cases where legislative or executive aggrandize-
ment is clear and pervasive. Likewise, while delegations of ill-defined authority
to nontraditional decision makers may not represent good law or policy, they will
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seldom violate either article I or due process parameters. The circumstances in
which nonconsensual arbitration generates really serious constitutional difficulties
will be highly idiosyncratic, as in the case of multiemployer pension plan
arbitration. There, the use of and deference to an initial decision maker of highly
questionable impartiality has generated nontrivial procedural due process concerns.
Even so, all but one of the federal circuit courts considering the issue have upheld
the system, and the Supreme Court's view of it is uncertain. The one relevant
issue to which the Court may have actually developed a heightened constitutional
sensitivity is the definitional scope of property rights under the fifth amendment's
taking clause.
FIFRA arbitration, to which the most extensive attention was paid in this
study because of its unusual characteristics, provides an especially vivid
illustration of the lengths to which designers of nonconsensual arbitration systems
may go without infringing constitutional principles. Although greater legislative
latitude should be permitted when, as in FIFRA, the affected interests are pure
creations of federal statute, the Court's approval of virtually standardless
adjudications of disputes between private parties without any meaningful review
starkly demonstrates the wide expanse of that latitude.
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